

The Case of Ditto Block: A Study of Special Weapons and Tactics, Antisocial Personality, Mental Illness and Barricade Offenders

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Abstract: Comprehensive analysis of a repeat barricade offender as part of a Sanity at the Time of Offense evaluation is presented. Sources of information included law enforcement, legal, medical, mental health, and correctional documents from before, during, and after both barricades. Analysis included triangulation of validity interviews from multiple sources against multiple barricade offender databases and research. Incident and offender characteristics at time of barricade one is compared against barricade two.

After the first barricade, the offender completed Fitness to Stand Trial restoration, found fit to stand for a jury trial, found not guilty and released. One year later, he was involuntarily admitted to a mental health hospital. Within one week after court-ordered release, the second barricade occurred. During barricade two, the Special Weapons and Tactics team had no intelligence regarding the first barricade. The offender foresaw negotiation strategies and cut off communication. He predicted Special Weapons and Tactic team tactics; he ambushed the team, stalled the entry, retreated, and created a standoff that concluded in a failed suicide by cop incident. Different Third-Party Intermediaries participated in both barricades. During barricade one, the Third-Party Intermediary (his sister) provided intelligence. During barricade two, the Third-Party Intermediary (ex-girlfriend) did not provide intelligence until after the dynamic entry failed, and a team member gathered intelligence from her. Mental health providers never provided intelligence to law enforcement.

Analysis reveals Special Weapons and Tactical Teams cannot operate without behavioral specialists. Community leaders' continuous comprehensive oversight of Special Weapons and Tactical Teams is required for appropriate communication among professionals and policy decisions derived from pattern analysis of Post Incident Reports. Offender risk assessment require law enforcement, corrections, and mental health contributions. Repeat barricade offender scenarios are required components of professional development for Special Weapons and Tactics teams, mental health providers, attorneys, judges, and community leaders.

Keywords: Barricade Offenders, Special Weapons and Tactics SWAT, Sanity at time of Offense, Bipolar Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder.

SOURCES AND METHODS

Source of Information

Interviews with Offender. Validity interviews with defense and prosecuting attorneys, forensic mental health, medical and correctional staff. Study of police reports: criminal complaint prior to barricade one, between the time of barricade one and two, and all reports related to barricade two. Review of literature regarding Special Weapons and Tactic teams, operators, mentally ill barricade offenders their families, medical and mental health services. Study of mental health and medical documents from hospitalizations, including prior to and following barricade one; mental health records from second and third hospitalizations including prior to and following barricade two; fitness to stand trial evaluation and forensic inpatient fitness restoration program mental health and medical records. Information from following databases and research projects:

1. Feldmann's 1996 Louisville Barricade database n = number of subjects or observations, (n=120), published 2001.
2. Georgia Bureau of Investigation data collected June 1995 through mid-June 1999, published 2001 (n= 32, n=24),
3. Hostage Barricade and Suicide Database,
 - a. Download 1999, (n=1,828) number of subjects change related to number of responses available for specific questions. Different number of responses to different questions reported in the body of this study.
 - b. Hostage Barricade and Suicide Database, download 2013, (n=not reported).
4. International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National Tactical Officers Association National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Study (2014) from SWAT operations during years: 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013.
 - a. Unweighted data (n= 254) specific questions answered range from n=245 to n= 864:

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(n=245), (n=776), (n=782), (n=785), (n=864). Unweighted data derived from returned questionnaires from three regions of the United States of America range from n= 55 to n=107. The unweighted data was as follows; Central United States n=92 cases (36.2%), East United States n=107 cases (42.1%), West United States n=55 cases (21.7%) (Table 1b page 4).

- b. Weighted data (n=865) derived from returned questionnaires from three regions of the United States of America range from n= 171 to n=865. Weighted data was as follows Central United States n=329 cases (38.1%), East United States n=364 cases (42.1%), West United States n=171 cases (19.8%) (Table 1a, p. 4)
5. Multi-Method Study of Police Special Weapons and Tactics Teams in the United States, (ICPSR 20351) David A. Klinger, Jeff Rojek, National Institute of Justice, Department of Justice
 - a. Study date received August 2008, Award number #2000 IJ-0003. Special Weapons and Tactics Teams surveys 1986 through 1998 (n = 365), number of Special Weapons and Tactics Teams interviewed (n= 7), number of Special Weapons and Tactics Teams observed training (n=6).

Method of Analysis

Research structure and analysis followed a case study format (Yin 1994 2018; Schwandt 2007:27-28). Often case research subjects are given names that mask their identity and provide recognizable connections between incidents, subject characteristics, and circumstances such as Freud's "Wolfman" (Freud 2003:203). Other case study research employs subject aliases with research titles clarifying topics (Cleckley 1941, 1976; Hare 1993 2007; Samenow 2007). This paper presents Ditto Block, a repeat barricade offender with a first name identifying that the offense occurred twice and the last name identifying the type of behavior - blockades. The full title of the paper clarifies topics (Yin 1994:143-144; Yin 2018:238-240).

Method of analysis was consistent with Yin's (1994) and Schwandt's (2007) case research guidelines. Information was cross-referenced "triangulated" (Schwandt 2007:298; Yin 1994:92; Yin 2018:127-128, 128b, 129). Triangulation methods (see letters a

through r) generated case analysis integrity checks and maintained chain of evidence (Yin 1994:34, 79, 98-99, 113, 147; Yin 2018:134-135). A transcript of the Ditto Block's interview was included for the reader's review (Yin 1994:78-84; Yin 2018:114f, 113, 118-121, 135).

Consistent with Yin (1994; 2018) and Schwandt (2007), numerous rounds of peer reviews from individuals, some of whom were knowledgeable about the specifics of the case; all of whom were knowledgeable in specific disciplines were completed prior to submitting the Ditto Block analysis for journal review (Yin 1994:144; Yin 2018:242). These disciplines included communication between community mental health, medical services, forensic and correctional professionals. Other reviewers included individuals with expertise in hostage negotiations, Special Forces, law enforcement, special weapons and tactics teams and operations. Reviewers included criminal trial attorneys with experience in defense and prosecution of barricade cases.

Both within and between groups were analyzed (Yin 1994:38-53; Yin 2018:47-78). Within group investigation analyzed Ditto Block against himself at different points in time prior to, during, and following two different barricades. Between groups investigation analyzed Ditto Block's characteristics and incidents against database information and case histories about repeat barricade offenders with and without hostages.

Data analysis within context of specific phenomenon, i.e., Special Weapons and Tactics team barricade and non-barricade operations was included. Variations between variables and factors correlated with outcomes, i.e., level of violence was analyzed.

Meticulous descriptions and development of novel hypotheses of a specific and rare case event - repeat barricade offenders were generated. Analysis revealed supported for or rejection of twelve hypotheses concerning barricade offenders and Special Weapons and Tactics team operations described in the review of literature.

Triangulation of Offender's statements and behavior with all possible variables and factors:

- (a) Data from International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers Association Special Weapons and Tactics and National Institute of Justice 2014 research compared against Offender's statement and behavior for barricade one and two,

- (b) Offender's statements and behavior triangulated with medical, correctional, and law enforcement documents for barricade one and two and for the period prior to barricade one and between barricade one and two,
- (c) Offender's statement and behavior triangulated with textbooks, and research about barricade offenders and incidents for barricade one and two,
- (d) Offender statements and behavior for both barricade one and two triangulated with specific SWAT tactics used in this case and SWAT best practices,
- (e) Offender's statements and behavior observed by SWAT triangulated with intelligence assessment generated by the SWAT team for barricade one and two and SWAT national intelligence standard,
- (f) Offender's statements and behavior triangulated with barricade offenders and incidents with and without hostages for barricade one and two,
- (g) SWAT ambush during barricade two compared with ambush of police officers and SWAT teams' intelligence and counter intelligence research of ambush of SWAT teams,
- (h) Offender's domestic violence behavior during barricade two compared with domestic violence data about barricade offender and incidents,
- (i) Offender's statements and behavior during barricade one and two compared with mental health inpatient threat assessment generated at time of barricade one and two and general threat assessment against barricade offender characteristics and incidents,
- (j) Third Party Intermediaries from barricade one and two compared with each other,
- (k) Third Party Intermediaries in barricade one and two compared with research and text books information about Third Party Intermediaries,
- (l) Triangulation of leadership and management of combined Special Forces and law enforcement special operation teams,
- (m) Triangulation of federal and local government oversight and leadership of SWAT at time of barricade one and two and federal and local government oversight and leadership of SWAT best practices,
- (n) Triangulation of barricade offender databases application in barricade one and two and criminal trial for barricade one and two,
- (o) Triangulation of forensic evaluations of barricade offenders and incidents for barricade one and two with forensic evaluations reported in research and textbooks,
- (p) Triangulation of outcome of criminal trial one and two against each other,
- (q) Each specific detail about barricade one and two incidents triangulated with each other and with data from barricade incident databases, and
- (r) Each specific detail about Offender's characteristics at time of barricade one and two triangulated with each other and with data from barricade offender characteristics databases.

INTRODUCTION

A rare event in forensic psychology occurred when a court ordered a Sanity at the Time of Offense evaluation for a repeat barricade offender. Every detail from every factor and variable of the offenses and Offender's characteristics were gathered, organized, and placed in context of their stable or fluctuating relationships. Interrelationships that created the constellation of factors and variables generating the synergy of the first offense are analyzed. The entire case analysis is completed a second time for the second offense. Final case analysis includes each offense cross-compared with every factor and variable against Offender's own characteristics and offense incidents and information from both single and repeat offenders' literature, generating a case study unique in forensic psychology.

This case illustrates the cacophony that occurred when medical, mental health, court, and law enforcement professions and a mentally ill offender with antisocial personality traits interacted with each other prior to, during, and following repeat barricade incidents. The how and why for amplification of the inherent dangers of interacting multiple risk factors at the cross road of each interacting factor: mental illness, antisocial personality disorder, and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) when there was no leader

orchestrating interaction among professionals is presented. Comprehensive analysis, as part of a Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation, revealed a constant state of professions disconnected from each other whether offenses were occurring or not. Disconnect included: mental health disconnected from law enforcement, law enforcement disconnected from court system, corrections disconnected from police department, and forensic mental health disconnected from community mental health, and a SWAT team disconnected from the Hostage Negotiation Team. Review of SWAT, barricade offender characteristics and incidences literature revealed three research paths disconnected from each other.

Disconnect combined with offender characteristics serving as a catalysis generated two critical reactions. First, a SWAT team was ambushed and subsequently drawn into a failed suicide by cop incident during barricade two. Second, consequences of disconnect during barricades, and SWAT team's inability to generate Post Incident Reports resulted in no intelligible collection, organization, and analysis of what occurred before, during, and after barricade one or two. Police department and SWAT team could not provide any data to forensic examiner completing sanity at the time of barricade two to present in their report or court testimony about Offender's thoughts, feelings actions, or situational factors, and consequently, the basis for SWAT team's tactical operations. The police department where barricades occurred did not have or perceive, as opposed to the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) standards, any need for a jurisdictional SWAT team database and collected no SWAT team call up or callout information in any format (NTOA 2008:8). The forensic examiner completing the sanity at the time of barricade two was denied information from a restricted federal law enforcement barricade database and access to offender prison records.

Literature regarding SWAT teams and operators, mentally ill barricade offenders, their families, and medical and mental health professionals are analyzed along a forty-two-year timeline from 1975 through 2017. Review of literature integrating historical development and structure of barricade offender databases, including key obstacles in data collection and analysis, is presented. Methodical and analytic solutions including integrating data collection and statistical analysis and mandatory inclusion of behavior specialists as an occupational specialty into SWAT teams are provided. Review of literature incorporating

detailed technical information from key research studies while simultaneously describing the sequential profound shift in public policy, law enforcement, and criminal justice resulting in the rise and growth of law enforcement militarization is provided. The unforeseen complex complications militarization, and wrong house no knock warrant operations had and continue to have on splintering research into different paths, fractured along political affiliations, is described in detail. The continued impact the splintered body of research has on forensic evaluations, court treatment interventions, and criminal trials of barricade offenders is provided. Literature regarding similarities and difference between offender mental health diagnostic classification, barricade classification, and barricade incident classification, and specifics of Offender and his offenses is presented. Data derived from observations of SWAT teams in practice and during callouts compared against the SWAT team in this case is presented.

Case analysis encompasses five interconnected components: (a) detailed examination and cross-comparison of literature and research including identification of the origin and proliferation of SWAT teams in the United States of American and the profound impact law enforcement's expanding definition of high-risk situations had on militarization, barricade offenders, no knock warrants, and divergent levels of professionalisms among SWAT teams, (b) integrating literature and research concepts with facts of offender characteristics and offenses incidents, (c) analysis of barricade offender characteristics, incidents, and interactions between barricade offender their families and police, (d) impact of professions' not communicating with each other, including obstacles encumbering court order evaluations, and (e) outcome of two separated criminal trials for two different barricades by the same offender. Case analysis comparison of mental health diagnostic classifications, barricade characteristics, and incidents classifications against the facts of both barricades in this case supported use of Call's 2003 barricade classification systems by forensic examiners. Case analysis generated recommendations specific to SWAT team operators, community leaders, mental health providers, forensic evaluators, attorneys, and judges.

LITERATURE REVIEW

1975 Sociology View of SWAT

The Union of Radical Criminologists and the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) traced

the genesis of SWAT in United States of American from a sociology communist perspective back to the 1960's (Cooper *et al.* 1975). Their publication, *The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove - An analysis of the U.S. police*, a popular reference within the sociology field, devoted five pages to the topic of SWAT. The authors, contributors, and supporters of *The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove* self-identify their link with the Center for Research on Criminal Justice, but did not self-identify their specific role by names until the second edition (Bernstein *et al.* 1977).

Sociology literature seldom identifies *The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove* (Bernstein *et al.*, 1977) publication as a political pamphlet, a self-reference used by the publishers, or detail the publishers' specific political positions. (Cooper *et al.* 1975:5). Political positions held by Cooper *et al.* influenced their work, the following twenty years of sociology and field-studies encompassing SWAT (Kraska and Kappeler 1997:2). Bernstein *et al.* (1977) viewed law enforcement through a socialists/communist perspective, and thus, analysis of law enforcement was perceived within a social class struggle context. The first edition of *The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove* was dedicated to:

The people of Viet Nam, who after years of heroic struggle, now celebrate their glorious victory and begin national reconstruction; who resisted every technological weapon the U.S. could devise including the electronic battlefield, "smart bombs, night vision devices, tiger cages, electronic sensing devices, chemical defoliants and napalm; who defeated every genocidal strategy directed against them including carpet bombing systematic assassination (Operation Phoenix), and total population control through computerized intelligence operations". Those in the United States and Puerto Rico, who have been or are now the victims of repression; who fight for their lives in the prisons and jails; who have been murdered by the police; who have been spied upon, infiltrated framed and tortured" (P.2).

Center for Research on Criminal Justice staff dedicated the first edition to "the people of the United States and throughout the world fighting against exploitation and oppression and struggling for socialism" (Cooper *et al.* 1975:2). Their position, social

conflicts including protests against government policies and agencies as well as crimes which were not political, were conceptualized by ruling elite in United States of America as problems requiring an increase in police militancy leading to the SWAT solution to oppress citizens (pp. 15-29). They credited Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) SWAT unit as established in 1967 (p. 48). To support their political position, Bernstein *et al.* (1977) opined:

It is not a town's population size but rather its wealth that determines the "need" for SWAT. They offered an example supporting the premise that SWAT was a tool of the elite designed to suppress worker citizens that "the town of Belvedere (California) has a heavily armed SWAT team, Belvedere, with four officers on the police department, organized a SWAT team made up of citizen volunteers. The SWAT team has at its disposal a two and half ton Army surplus tank, with a fifty-caliber machine gun mount. Belvedere has less than 3000 people in two square miles, but it is the wealthiest city in Marin County in terms of median family income and its property was assessed at nearly \$24 million (p. 49).

These case study authors noted that Belvedere California is located across the San Pablo Bay about 43 minutes from Berkley, California. At the time of their publication and in the decades since, The Center for Research on Criminal Justice never provided alternative hypothesis for Belvedere SWAT development. They never considered citizens of Belvedere might volunteer to join SWAT out of perceived need to protect their family, home, and community from riots and destruction. These case study authors noted that the Center staff reported the Army Surplus tank had a fifty-caliber machine gun mount but did not report there was a fifty-caliber machine gun. They never provided any information as to whether the tank had any functional capacity beyond Providing safety for law enforcement during riots. Cooper *et al.* (1975) reported.

Since its inception in 1967, SWAT has been activated close to 200 times. Teams have acted as security for the president and vice president, visiting diplomats and heads of state, and have protected officers engaged in crowd control during campus

disorder, rock festivals, and other civil disturbances. They have helped officers investigate “armed strongholds” and rescued wounded officers and hostages. Since 1971 when they were assigned to handle situations involving barricade suspects they have been involved in 96 such incidents, and according to their own report have only fired on four occasions, have wounded one suspect and killed seven. Six of those seven were suspected members of the Symbioses Liberation Army (SLA) (p. 95).

The Center for Research on Criminal Justice staff concluded that language of the LAPD was deceptive and did not indicate which individual or groups were subject to SWAT operations. They present as support the December 8, 1969 shootout with the Black Panther Party and the 1975 shootout SWAT and the FBI had with SLA (Cooper *et al.* 1975:95). The staff opined that military strategy of efficiency and tactics expanded, and in 1976, San Quentin Prison authorized the establishment of a Correctional Emergency Response Team (CERT) modeled after SWAT (pp. 49-52). These case study authors noted that Bernstein *et al.* (1977) did not research SWAT's role during barricade or hostage incidents, family dynamics, and mental health needs of offenders or in what manner barricade or hostage incidents were addressed through mental health services or court process.

1988 View of SWAT

The Criminal Justice Research and Training Center completed a national study of SWAT. Research method consisted of mailing questionnaires containing almost 300 fields of data to 456 police department in cities throughout the United States (Stevens & MacKenna 1988). They reported 186 out of 456 police departments completed surveys, yielding a 41% response rate. Of the respondents, 9% did not have a tactical unit (p.117). SWAT literature reported SWAT initial suggested acronym for the Los Angeles Police Department was Special Weapons and Attack Team however, the word attack was considered too aggressive and the team was renamed Special Weapons and Tactic Team (Haberman 2014). Police departments named their units Tactical Unit (22%), SWAT (20%), Emergency Response Unit (15%), Special Operations Unit (7%), and other (28%). Original Los Angeles SWAT force teams consisted of 10 six-man teams, with a leader, two assaulters, a

scout and a rearguard officer. Special equipment of the time consisted of a 0.245 -caliber bolt-action sniper rifle, two 0.223 caliber semiautomatic rifles, and a pair of shotguns. Officers were also equipped with service revolvers and gas masks. In their helmets, gloves and body armor, they could not be distinguished from combat troops (Fisher, 2010:3). The authors of this study were unable to locate a reference to 0.245 bullets but did locate various rifles with 245 as part of the manufacture identification.

National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) SWAT team configuration recommendations did not include the number of team members however; recommendations were that team configurations would include the following operational capability: tactical command, containment, emergency action, deliberate action, and precision long rifle (National Tactical Officers Association, 2008:4). Twenty-six years after Stevens and MacKenna's 1988 publication, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) in their study of SWAT operations from 2009 to 2013 reported teams (n= 785) still used a variety of names including Special Weapons and Tactics (51%), Special Response Team (14.3%), Special Emergency Response Team (5.2%), Emergency Response Team (11.1%), Special Operations Team (1.7%), and Other (16.6%) (IACP & NTOA, 2014, p. 8).

Stevens and MacKenna (1988) reported among police departments with tactical units, 46% were from cities with population range of 50,000 to 99,999, 34% from populations from 100,00 to 249,999, and 17% were from populations over 250,000. They reported factors important in selecting tactical officers were common sense, emotional stability, interest in assignment, compatibility with unit personnel, and self-confidence (p. 118). IACP and NTOA research described SWAT selection factors included; oral interview, minimum years of service, firearms proficiency, test results and physical proficiency tests (2014, p. vi). Balko (2014) opined law enforcement recruitment strategies generally self-select for individuals unfit to enter law enforcement much less SWAT due to individual's internal pathological drive to seek and escalate confrontation rejecting their role in de-escalation (p.306). Balko observed small police departments exemplified by the 46% of police department with SWAT teams identified by Stevens and MacKenna (1988) do not have the required number of SWAT applicants among its department ranks forcing such department to select unqualified

individual for SWAT (p. 307). Review of the literature revealed that issues and solutions correlated with small police department hostage negotiations teams had been addressed (Greenstone, 1995).

Twenty-eight years after Stevens and MacKenna's 1988 findings, assessment tools for selection of Department of Defense Special Forces operators and Law Enforcement SWAT candidates had advanced including methods assessing reasoning ability and impulse control when stimulated with visual and auditory distractors in addition to escalating stress (Hirsch, 2017). Review of literature revealed numerous publications addressing attributes correlated with successful hostage negotiators (Charlés, 2007; Donohue & Taylor, 2007; Gelbart, 1997; Miller & Clark, 2006; Royce, 2005; Strentz, 2006; Tatar, 1983; Van Hasselt *et al.*, 2006; Van Hasselt, Romano, and Vecchi, 2008).

Stevens and MacKenna (1988) reported few SWAT members had skills in forensic laboratory analysis, handwriting analysis, bomb disposal, foreign language skills, intelligence analysis, and bomb detection. However, a high percentage of skills were available to units through police departments. Percentage of skills within SWAT teams were special operations, weapons/tactics, (91%), knowledge of crowd behavior (65%), riot control (59%), hostage negotiation (57%), bomb detection (35%), intelligence/threat analysis (33%), foreign language communication skills (23%), foreign language translation skills (23%), bomb disposal (23%), handwriting analysis (1%), forensic laboratory analysis (1%), and other (9%). (p. 1119) Out of 186 responses, 33% reported intelligence/threat analysis was present in the tactical unit and 55% reported intelligence/threat analysis was present in their department (p. 119).

Stevens and MacKenna (1988:119-120) surveyed police departments tactical units perceived level of support provided by their police departments. The metric used to measure support was a five-point rating scale with one representing poor, and five representing excellent. The highest ratings were department support of plans when needed in major operations with a rating of 4.1. Other areas receiving high ratings for department support were training, planning, labor, and personnel. Department support received much lower ratings in areas of intelligence gathering, information processing and counter-terrorism target assessment. Tactical unit information processing, and analysis received a 2.6 rating. Mid-range ratings included

coordination and cooperation with tactical unit activities.

Although Stevens and MacKenna (1988) did not publish data on barricade or hostage incidence, their work addressed the divergent reality between the 1970's television series SWAT that aired in United States of America from February 1975 to April 1976 and the reality of what occurred during SWAT callouts. Within their study, they cited the work of Stratton (1985), who reported Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department SWAT deployed 591 time between 1973 through 1982. Of 591 callouts, weapons were fired in eleven instances, five people were killed, three people were wounded, and three shootings resulted in no injuries for a total safe arrest of 987 felons.

1994 Emergence of No Knock Search Warrants

Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU), tactical operations were observed for several years, prior to 1993 with results published in 1994 (Chambliss 1994:177). RDU assessment was based on observations from students and their college professor who combined spent more than 100 hours riding along with RDU. Chambliss (1994:179) reported RDU activities entailed three behaviors: undercover drug buys, vehicular stops, and no knock search warrants. He reported drug buys accounted for approximately one third of RDU's arrests and another 50% of arrests came from vehicular stops and the remainder from serving warrants, observation made of street transactions, responding to telephone calls and tips received through police headquarters.

Chambliss (1994:183-187) provided statistical data from prison population research to support his conclusion – a perception a community-needed RDU was a sham orchestrated by the crime industry. He concluded, "Intensive surveillance of black neighborhoods and pattern of surveillance of white neighborhoods had the general consequence of institutionalizing racism by defining problems of crime generally, and drug use in particular, as a problem of young black men" (p. 191). He provided statistical data from prison populations from Washington, D.C. and Baltimore areas in particular to support his conclusion. Chambliss concluded that community leaders who support either the perceived need or ongoing budget for RDU were duped by the crime industry. Moreover, RDU demonstrated an inherent repressive culture (pp. 187-189).

His observations supported his conclusion – RDU standard operating procedures created a RDU culture that encouraged violation of citizens' constitution rights during vehicular stops. A RDU member was reported as having stated, "This is a jungle...we rewrite the constitution everyday down here. If we pull everyone over, they will eventually learn that we aren't playing games any more. We are real serious about getting the crap off the streets" (Chambliss 1994:179) These case study authors noted Chambliss' (1994) research presumed similarity between RDU and SWAT because both engaged in no knock search warrants. However, while on duty, RDU were dressed either in patrol uniforms or in street clothing and did not engage in tactical operations consistent with SWAT callouts such as security for visiting diplomats, protecting officers engaged in crowd control, investigate of armed strongholds, rescue of wounded officers and hostages barricade incidents.

1997 Connection: Department of Defense Special Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement

Kraska and Kappeler (1997) developed a 40-item survey (98 variables) which they mailed in 1996 to every police department excluding federal agencies serving jurisdictions of 50,000 or more citizens and employing at least 100 sworn officers. These case study authors opine that the number of mailed out surveys was not clearly reported, mailed out questionnaires ranged from n=686 to n=690 After additional mailings, they reported receiving back 548 responses (n=548) for a 79% response rate. Of 548 departments that responded, 89.4 % had a Police Paramilitary Unit (PPU) and over 20% of those departments without a unit said they were "planning on establishing one in the next few years" (P. 5).

Consistent with the findings from Stevens and MacKenna (1988), Kraska and Kappeler (1997:5-6) reported most PPU formed in the 1970's. In 1982, about 59% of police department had a PPU; in 1990, about 78% had a PPU; and in 1995, about 89% had a PPU with the bulk of newer units from smaller municipalities and state police agencies. In 2010, best estimates calculate at least 3,500 paramilitary police units operating throughout United States of America (Fisher 2010:3). The authors of this case study observe that the shifting number of operating SWAT teams reported in research resulted from a number of factors including: both PPUs and SWAT's disregard for self-assessment including refusal to respond to questions about their existence and activities; absence of

community leadership; and exponential growth of PPU teams, with an unknown number of teams operating similar to a PPU and not traditional SWAT, among police department with less than 100 sworn officers. In concert with exponential growth of PPUs, the literature identified a "SWAT" industry again confusing PPU and SWAT operations selling all manner of Special Forces tactical equipment and services to law enforcement (Balko 2014; Chambliss 1944; Fisher 2001, Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Kuzmarov 2012).

Kraska and Kappeler (1997) concluded that there was an inevitable historical, political, and sociological bond, between police and military citing scholarship of Bittner (1970) and Enloe (1980), and the inevitable bond connecting the military and formation of civilian police forces in emerging states (Turk 1982). Kraska and Kappeler (1997:6) calculated total number of established PPUs between 1980 through 1983 and plotted both growth in number of PPUs and number of PPUs callouts. The mean number of PPU callouts was constant and minimal with about 13 callouts on average a year or approximately one PPU deployment per month for each PPU. PPUs' activity more than doubled by 1986, almost tripled by 1989 and quadrupled by 1995 (p.6). Kraska and Kappeler (1997:7) reported among PPUs that were in existence since 1980 (n=193), there was as an increase in PPUs' activity of 538% moving from one callout per month to four or five. It was unknown if the 538% increase in callouts per month was caused by number of traditional PPU activities or normalization of PPU unites into mainstreaming policing. Of total number of callouts (n=25,201), civil disturbance accounted for 1.3% (n=338), terrorist incidents, 0.09 % (n=23), hostage situations 3.6% (n=913), and barricade persons 13.4% (n=3,880). Respondents reported majority of callouts were to conduct what police call "high risk warrant work," mostly "drug raids." Warrant work accounted for 75.9% (n=19,125) of all paramilitary activity in 1995.

With bond between military and police as context, Kraska and Kappeler (1997) concluded the following. Within United States of America, distinguishing characteristics of Police Paramilitary Units (PPU) and other units in police departments modeled themselves after military Special Forces included PPU's assimilating and incorporating Special Forces jargon into law enforcement culture and deployment with an array of United States Special Forces military equipment, including lethal weapons such as submachine guns, and explosives. Moreover, PPU's assimilated and incorporated other technologies

including less than lethal weapons employed during Special Forces type dynamic entries - serving search warrants (p. 3). These case study authors noted the tactical similarity between no knock search warrants modeled after Special Forces capture or kill mission standard operating procedures and literature describing PPU teams. These case study authors noted that Kraska and Kappeler's scholarship describing PPU operations was assumed identical to traditional SWAT operated thus, PPU and SWAT acronyms were believed to be identifying the same teams and the confounding factor that PPU units were inferred by Kraska and Kappeler to engage in barricade operations.

Kraska and Kappeler (1997:4-5) reported additional similarities between military Special Forces and PPUs included PPUs' organizations structure modeled after military and foreign police special operation teams, and teams traditionally work significantly different from routine policing. They concluded, although PPUs were intended to respond to riots, terrorism, barricade suspects and hostage situations; by 1997, PPU teams were assigned to whatever departments defined as "high risk". They randomly selected 81 out of 548 police departments for unstructured follow-up interviews. Forty agencies that used PPUs for proactive patrol work were selected at random and the remainder of respondents completed telephone interviews during which police officials elaborate on their responses.

Telephone interviews completed by Kraska and Kappeler (1997) revealed about 10% of PPUs continued to focus on civil disturbances, terrorist incidents, hostage situations and barricade offenders and 90% of PPUs began focusing on operations during which PPUs moved into civilian populations and proactively produced cases against drug users and low-level dealers (Barnett 1987). These case study authors opine that Kraska and Kappeler's scholarship defined a key factor significantly confusing SWAT literature. Although they use acronyms SWAT and PPU interchangeably they acknowledge approximately 10% of original SWAT teams remained faithful to SWAT original intent leaving 90% to mutate into PPU teams. The consequence of refocusing operations was that PPUs led between 200-700 dynamic entry warrant/drug raids also known as no knock warrants a year (p. 7). Kraska and Kappeler (1997:11) reported that because 23 respondents wrote in the margin of questionnaires they trained with either "Navy Seals" or "Army Rangers", they completed telephone interviews to find out the extent and nature of training. One PPU member

stated, "We've had teams of Navy Seals and Army Rangers come here and teach us everything. We just have to use our judgment and exclude the information like, "at this point we bring in the mortars and blow the place up" (p. 12).

These case study authors noted Kraska and Kappeler (1997) observed a significant change in policing contrary to SWAT barricade operations when they reported, "contemporary PPUs do not just react to pre-existing emergencies that might require highly trained teams of police officers. Instead, most PPUs proactively seek out and even manufacture highly dangerous situations" (p. 12). Kraska and Kappeler's mixing both SWAT and PPU operations together and alleging all teams seek out or manufacture highly dangerous situations appears to be the genesis of the accusation SWAT seeks out and creates highly dangerous situations including barricade incidents. It was not until SWAT Operational Studies by Klinger and Rojek (2004) that Kraska and Kappeler's perception about SWAT seeking out and creating dangerous barricade situations was investigated. These case study authors opine imbedded within the first forty years of SWAT literature the militarization movement also referred to as part of the crime industry was feeding the majority of law enforcement who desired, demonstrated by PPU operations to emulate Special Forces warriors. In essence, a law enforcement militarization movement created by United States of America Department of Defense equipment activated and supported a civilian law enforcement PPU culture engaging in Special Forces capture kill style raid operations against citizens without effective United States of America Senate or Congressional supervision. The absence of any continuous comprehensive federal mandated oversight of the shift from SWAT to PPU directly resulted in community conditions within section of United States of America cities studied by insurgency research (Balko 2014; Comber 2008; Kuzmarov 2012; Galula 1964; U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007).

These case study authors opine, although PPU obtained military equipment and training, two critical components of Special Forces doctrine, were absent. First, the case study authors found no published research addressing training of United States of American police departments by Special Forces units advocating PPU units receive cultural training and embed themselves in the population, and remain in place for an extended strategic mission of supporting the population working from the bottom up to fight

crime. Second, they found no published research indicating United States city or county law enforcement received training commensurate with military Special Forces intelligence collection and analysis provided to law enforcement outside of United States of America (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014). Comber (2008) and Kuzmarov (2012) completed analysis of police departments' militarization including genesis, structure and function of paramilitary police units in emerging states. Comber completed analysis of Special Forces counterinsurgency intelligence sources and methods by law enforcement.

Review of the literature between 1975 through the early 1980's offered two competing and somewhat overlapping hypotheses for law enforcements accommodation and assimilation of militarization ethos into law enforcement. The first hypothesis advocated by Cooper *et al.* (1975) was the socialists/communist hypothesis – in essence, police are tools of the elite repressing the workers. The second hypothesis advanced by Kraska and Kappeler (1977) theorized law enforcement officers acting out fantasies during military Special Forces type training exercises and in public compounded by a continuous self-reinforcement feedback served as the genesis and escalation of militarizing police departments. These case study authors' note that during the first barricade jury trial both Cooper *et al.* (1975) and Kraska and Kappeler's positions were advocated by defense. Kraska and Kappeler's 1997 hypothesis rests on four findings. First, 46% of PPU's advised they drew expertise from police officers with military special operations experience. Second, 43% trained with active duty military experts in special operations. Third, 30% of department officers received training from police officers with military special operations experience. Fourth almost 46% trained with active-duty military experts in special operations. They opine that the four findings reinforced concerns regarding training: reinforcement of "dangerousness" of the group's work, importance of feeling and thinking as a team, belief that the elite team was doing "real police work", and the "pleasure" that comes from playing out "warrior fantasies" (p. 11). There were no counter arguments to Cooper *et al.*, (1975) and Kraska and Keppeler (1997) because between 1975 through early 1990's literature did not include research regarding barricades offender characteristics and incidents and no specific data regarding what was occurred during SWAT barricade incident operations.

Kraska and Kappeler (1977) reported the fantasies were further reinforced with the onset of 1980's drug

war, when President George H. W. Bush administration established several Department of Defense "Joint Task Forces" responsible for coordinating drug interdiction operation outside United States of America, at the border and domestically. Joint Task Forces required substantial overlap and cooperation between military and civilian police forces, to the point of military elite special operation teams' cross-train with U.S. civilian police forces (p. 12). Balko (2014) reported, in addition to President George H. W. Bush, United States of American Presidents' contributions to militarizing police included President Nixon (p. 53), Reagan (pp. 125, 139), Clinton (p. 193) and Bush George W. (p. 250). Discussion of how both political parties Republicans and Democrats supported or decried militarization when it was in their political interest has been identified (pp. 205-206). These case study authors opine Kraska and Kappeler (1997) used behavior of PPU's, and RDU's described by Chambliss (1994) and confused the literature, implying law enforcement special operation units including SWAT, PPU's, and RDU's all operated the same. The authors opine probable constitutional violations Chambliss observed by RDU and PPU's raised apprehensions regarding SWAT operational callouts. Specifically, did a SWAT team participate in no knock warrants, and if there was participation, what was the frequency and outcome of participation.

These case study authors opine a specific team's participation in no knock warrants had the potential of initiated a cascade of simulations multiple diverging consequences. Consequences included; erosion of community support (Chambliss 1994; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997), law suits due to nonfatal wrong-house entrees, law suits due to unjustifiable homicide, negligent homicide, officer down, and citizens shooting police breaking into their home (Fisher 2010:143-216) and how SWAT teams were perceived by juries. These case study authors opine divergent consequences resonated throughout the community effecting a variety of relationships including but not limited to community leaders who represent concerned citizens and their complaints regarding the police department, and citizens who served on barricade offenders' jury trials. These case study authors opine the unintended consequence of nonfatal and fatal wrong house no knock warrants influenced both the community, from which members of the jury are selected, data SWAT teams and police departments collect during operations, and thus, data available to forensic examiners completing court order Sanity at the time of

Offense Evaluations. These case study authors also opine forensic examiners must be mindful of community reactions to SWAT team operations and understand the offender and offense related to barricade incidents, the issue before the court, as opposed to wrong house no knock warrants incidents.

These case study authors opine SWAT team literature and research from mid-1970's until the late 1990s was marked by strong political opinions regarding police departments acquiring military equipment though National Defense Authorization Act 1033 (U.S. Congress 1996). Moreover, literature and research focused on training, consisting of both use of equipment and dynamic entry tactics, provided by military Special Forces (capture kill missions), and police department units deployed with military equipment. Research and newspaper articles published during this time period produced literature saturated with observations of criminal justice military connection (Cooper *et al.* 1975; Chambliss 1994; Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Research of the time ignored or disregarded that SWAT did not proactively seek out or manufacture highly dangerous barricade situations. Moreover, research of the time ignored or disregarded that SWAT was obligated to manage and resolve barricade and hostage situations dating back to *Downs v U.S.* (1975).

Militarization of American police raised questions critical to forensic examiners completing sanity at the time of offense evaluations such as who is making decisions and what the chain of command is and who is responsible during SWAT callouts including barricade incidents. IACP and NTOA (2014:16) research reported authority to deploy SWAT teams as follows: 2.1% first officer on the scene, 12.3% field supervisor, 16.2% Watch Commander, 33.3% SWAT Commander/Supervisor, 29.5% Chief Executive, 0.7% Mayor, 0.9% County Executive, 5.1% Other. (p. 15). IACP and NTOA (2014) reported n=864, that excluding exigent circumstances 7.8% SWAT Officers, 62.1% incident commander, 17.3% Chief Executive and 12.8% other had decision-making authority in hostage/barricade situations. Excluding exigent circumstances, 6.9% SWAT Officers, 67.4% Incident Commander, 12.0% Chief Executive, 13.7% other had decision-making authority in use of chemical agents (p.16). Excluding exigent circumstances 4.8% SWAT Officers, 55.3% Incident Commander, 16.8% Chief Executive, 23.1% and Other had decision-making authority in explosive breach situations.

IACP and NTOA (2014:15) research revealed once deployed, 87.8% of SWAT units had access to emergency medical support; 87.7% to a hostage or crisis negotiator; 86.8% to precision long rifle team; and 80.2% to canine support. Seventy-three-point five percent reported access to animal control, 63.1% to social services, 59.8% to bomb technology, 77.8% to an armored vehicle, 67.4% to a robot, 50.8% to explosives, and 60.7% to video or audio taping equipment. Over one-third of respondents reported their SWAT team would have access to aviation (38.1%), marine support (34.5%), and body-worn cameras (27.1%). In this case study, there was no information to support the hypothesis the police department deployed SWAT as a proxy to engage in urban privateering (Paramilitary police cops, 2014). In this case study, during both barricades, police documents revealed intelligence collection consisted only of information gathered by a SWAT member interviewing TPI s during barricade one and two and information provided by police dispatch such as the number of police calls to the residence and concern regarding potential for violence. Intelligence gathering procedures during barricade one and two were within the constitutional boundaries of SWAT intelligence gathering procedures best practices (Mijares and McCarthy 2015:243-244). Study of documents revealed following the ambush SWAT did not engage in any "reachback intelligence collection" that would include open source information from the different professions having knowledge about the offender, his criminal justice involvement or family dynamics (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014).

Facts of this case were fundamentally inconsistent with IACP and NTOA (2014) research which reported 60.7% of SWAT teams' video-recorded callouts. In this case, SWAT and police department did not video-record any police activity from callup through barricade incident callout or post barricade activities. Case facts were fundamentally consistent with Stevens and MacKenna's (1988) research because the SWAT team in this case study was among the 67% who had no intelligence threat analysis in the unit and 45% who had no intelligence threat analysis present in the police department. These case study authors opine it is a failure of both community and law enforcement leadership that through the National Defense Authorization Act 1033 or otherwise such as Department of Homeland Security Grants, SWAT failed to acquire any equipment that allowed command to listen, watch, and record what transpired or to gather,

organize, and analysis incidents. The authors further opine absence of documentation of tactical operations effectually obstructed post-tactical operations analysis and a court ordered evaluation of offender at the time of offense.

Stevens and MacKenna's (1988) study included assessing SWAT teams' support for intelligence activities. The assessment of SWAT team support for intelligence collections and analysis consisted of team members ranking items of importance from a list of seventeen activities. Items were rank ordered on a five-number scale with 1 representing poor and 5 excellent. Every intelligence activity rank within the bottom third of seventeen items. Department support in intelligence gathering number 13 on the list score of 2.9. Inter-agency support in intelligence gathering number 14 on the list score of 2.8, tactical unit intelligence activities number 15 on the list 2.5, counter-terrorism target assessment number 16 on the list 2.5, tactical unit information processing and data analysis number 17 on the list 2.4 revealing tactical intelligence was perceived as the least important to SWAT and police department. The only analytic activity to reach above the bottom one third ranking was data processing and crime analysis 11 on the list for a score of 3.1. The forensic examiner completing the Sanity at time of Offense evaluation was advised by the district attorney as part of the response for documentation collected at the time of the offense; because Offender would not communicate hostage negotiators do not collect data or provided intelligence to SWAT and SWAT does not collect data or intelligence itself. Absence of communication, if not conflict, between two law enforcement teams assigned to the same barricade incidents illustrated the problems between professionals who do not operate as components of a joint task force. Conflicts and solutions to resolve conflicts between hostage negotiators and SWAT operators appears in the literature (Vecchi 2002).

These case study authors opine the first thirty years of SWAT operations field studies provided passing references to type and frequency of barricade incidents. Publications during this time span focused on the emerging role of psychologist principally as members of hostage negotiations and not members of special operations teams (DeBernardo 2004; Ebert 1986; Fuselier 1988; Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner, and Gelles 1998; Reiser and Klyver, 1987; Super 1999). These authors found no research published during those years identifying the need for leadership orchestrating interaction among different professions

such as mental health, court professionals, and law enforcement. Moreover, no leadership demanding collection, organization, and analysis of callouts and rapid dissemination of post incident information to different professions analogous with Department of Defense Joint Special Forces command (McChrystal, Collins, Silverman, and Fussell 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).

These case study authors opine research from mid-1970's until 1990's revealed community leader's continuous comprehensive oversight of teams operating in their jurisdiction is required for appropriate communication among professionals, and policy decision derived from pattern analysis of Post Incident Reports. Community leaders' oversight by way of observing SWAT precision shooting drills is insufficient; oversight must include study of frequency of types of callups and callouts (pattern analysis of Post Incident Report), cost of maintaining SWAT readiness, meeting national training recommendations, human cost including injuries to team members and lost work hours, legal actions by citizens, etc. During early 2000's information and data specific to SWAT callups and callouts including barricade offenders and incidents gathered during the late 1980s was published.

In 2000 SWAT Operational Studies Emerge

Klinger and Rojek (2004) published findings from SWAT gathered between 1986 through 1998. They researched number of SWAT teams operating and type of callups and callouts within United States of America during incidents during which one or more individuals barricade themselves, alone or with one or more hostages. These case study authors noted Klinger and Rojek might have published their research twice, once in 2004 and again in 2008 as an executive summary (Klinger and Rojek 2008). Neither 2004 nor 2008 reports clearly state when research initiated or completed. However, both cite years 1986 through 1998 as the year's data was available for analysis. Both publications advised The National Institute of Justice funded research gathered data through members of National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA). With assistance of NTOA, Klinger and Rojek (2004:9) placed telephone calls to chief of police or sheriff of 2,027 police agencies, with more than 50 sworn police officers asking for information regarding SWAT operations. They reported out of the initial 1,183 agencies, 590 indicated they would assist in data

collection. However, only 341 out of 1,183 or 29% operating SWAT teams completed surveys (pp. 13-14).

Following survey return rate of 29%, Klinger and Rojek (2008:14) again search their data and reported 24 more operating SWAT teams who provided survey results but had not been counted in the initial total number for a final total number of 614 (590 plus 24 for a total $n=614$). They reported a final response to the survey of 30% (365/1,207). They found when asked to submit SWAT Post Incident Reports, just 105 agencies submitted any reports to NTOA. Degree of participation varied substantially among 105 agencies that provided Post Incident Reports. Of 476 Post Incident Reports sent to NTOA, 186 came from a single agency, 88 came from six agencies that submitted between 10 and 20 reports, while the remaining 202 came from 98 agencies that submitted fewer than 10 reports for a modal number of reports submitted as one ($n=56$).

Klinger and Rojek (2008:2-3) concluded that fewer than one-third (less than 394) of 1,183 agencies with SWAT teams participated in special operation surveys and Post Incident Reports were even more dismal with fewer than one in ten of 1,183 (less than 118.3) sent in any reports. They reported average (mean) number of SWAT callouts during 1986-1998 included: barricade suspects 3.5, hostage taking 0.5, warrant service 14.1, and miscellaneous other 2.1 (p. 6). Authors of this case study note Klinger and Rojek (2008:44) reported 290 callouts involved service of high-risk warrants. During service of those high-risk warrants, nine resulted in barricades. Of 116 barricade suspect callouts, 26 were hostage incidents, 10 were interventions with mentally disturbed individuals, and the rest classified miscellaneous sorts of incidents. No data was provided to analyze the number of barricades resulting from SWAT team dynamic entry into the wrong house no knock warrants. Klinger and Rojek (2008:44) reported 90% of barricade callouts were resolved with no shot fired by SWAT team, more suspects committed suicide than were shot by SWAT members (17 vs 11). Offenders shot more often than did SWAT officers (51 versus 48 cases). Offenders fired 259 shots while SWAT fired 17. They concluded officers were restrained when they did shoot and that the vast majority of SWAT operation involved no shooting by anybody and suspects are more likely to resort to deadly force than were SWAT officers.

These case study authors calculated a barricade offender danger of being shot percentile derived from research data cited in this case study regarding

offenders who were shot during a twenty-nine-year time period 1975 through 2004. They opined the staff at the Center for Research on Criminal Justice (Cooper *et al.* 1975) calculated out of 96 barricades four shots fired (4.1%), one wounded (1.0%), seven killed (10.1%), and Stratton (1985) reported Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department SWAT deployed 591 time between 1973 through 1982. Of 591 callouts, weapons were fired in eleven instances (1.86%), five people were killed (0.8%), three people were wounded (0.5%), and three shootings resulted in no injuries for a total safe arrest of 987 felons. Stevens and MacKenna (1988) data gathered between 1973 and 1982 calculated out of 591 barricades, eleven shots (1.8%), three wounded (0.5%), and five killed (0.8%). Klinger and Rojek's 2004 findings reported above were consistent with previous research. Of citizens shot, Bernstein *et al.* (1977) data included the SLA shoot out which included six killed due to fire or gunshot. (Mijares and McCarthy 2015:95). During the Black Panther shoot out, three were wounded. (Fisher 2010:3), four were wounded (Balko 2014:79).

Klinger and Rojek's 2008 research included interviewing seven different SWAT teams and observing six of seven during training exercises. Their 2008 report included detailed observations of SWAT training revealing substantial differences in time per month different SWAT teams devote to training. Officers on part-time teams tended to train far less than their peers, assigned to full-time teams, and teams that included both full and part time members with full time teams tending to train the most (p. 28). They reported 9 in 10 teams included barricade suspects, building searches, hostage incidents and narcotics warrants in training portfolios, less than 10% trained for water-borne assaults and just over 10% trained for aircraft and train assaults. The most common type of "other" training was active shooter, immediate action or rapid deployment (p. 26). Klinger and Rojek reported a specific SWAT team operated somewhere on a vast continuum of two extremes (minimal education, training and professionalism at the bottom, extreme competence at the top). Their finding informs community leaders, mental health professionals, forensic examiners, and the court there are extreme differences among SWAT teams and police departments' professionalism in a multitude of areas such as precision shooting and tactics to intelligence assessment.

These case study authors opine it is critical court professionals and community leaders know where the

SWAT team in their jurisdiction falls on the SWAT team professional continuum. Professionals interacting with SWAT teams need to know if there is a reasonable expectation SWAT had the will, means, or methods to collect, organize, and analyze intelligence and generate a Post Incident Report related to the case before the court. Moreover, professionals need to know if SWAT members had data to assist in threat assessment and management or response to citizen complaints. One possible reason for extreme range of SWAT teams on the continuum is that SWAT teams and police department are not mandated to follow NTOA guidelines and there is no mandatory federal government oversight (Mijares and McCarthy, 2015:245-251; NTOA 2008).

Stevens and MacKenna's 1988 and Klinger and Rojeck's 2008 findings revealed SWAT teams' absence or flawed data collection, organization, and analysis methods continued between 1988 and 1998. Klinger and Rojeck (2008:29) reported some police departments did not keep records that distinguish between two types of barricades (i.e., criminal and emotionally disturbed person). Moreover, a substantial number of respondents did not distinguish between an emotionally disturbed person and criminal barricades and narcotics and other warrants. Another example of poor data collection, organization, and analysis was revealed when a large police department reported they did not distinguish between barricades and hostage incidents and count all incidents of both sorts as barricades. With understanding that there were significant deficits in data collection, organization, and analysis among SWAT teams, Klinger and Rojeck (2008:30-31) reported fewer than one in three departments with SWAT teams in United States provided any data for their research. From data collected, they calculated there were 8,284 callouts involving barricaded subjects between 1986 and 1998. Their observation of SWAT training revealed intelligence collection occurred only by snipers, scout teams, and during hostage negotiations (pp. 57, 59). Intelligence collection by SWAT prior to serving warrants included problems of minimal notification that a warrant was ordered and significant differences between SWAT teams' intelligence standard operating procedures (pp. 68-72).

They observed SWAT teams while on active duty callouts. They observed teams' response when told to deploy for high-risk warrants in some cases with less than 30 minutes' notice and other teams who had means, methods, and time to gather, organize, and

complete data analysis, prior to deployment and/or tactical operations (Klinger and Rojeck, 2008:69-70). The researchers observed what they called both ends of the continuum, observing one team that employed real time intelligence processing during deployment and significantly improved the safety of citizens, SWAT team members, and the successful outcome of the callout (pp. 70-72). These case study authors opine community leaders, court officers (i.e., judges, and prosecution attorneys), and law enforcement must demand and then allot SWAT teams time to exercise standard intelligence operating procedure including allocation of means and methods for precise target identification. There must be a feedback cycle that includes other professions such as community leaders, and mental health, courts, and correction officers providing input so procedures for correct identification of target is reinforced and procedures leading to incorrect identification of targets (i.e., wrong house no knock) can be identified and fixed. (McCrystal *et al.* 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014).

Klinger and Rojeck (2008) reported SWAT teams spent zero training on data collection, organization and analysis of callouts. Zero training spent on analysis of team callouts were inconsistent with type of callout training scenarios suggested by NTOA. Authors of this case study opine that community leaders and SWAT teams' failure to collect organize and analyze SWAT members' callout data in their jurisdiction is a fatal flaw because absence of data renders community leaders and SWAT members blind to shifts in the community population. For example, the SWAT team in this case study operated in a jurisdiction where chronically mentally patients from outside the jurisdiction had been transported and deposited into the jurisdiction. It was common for recently deposited mentally ill patients to have lived for twenty or more years one hundred miles away. The rationale for transportation and deposit was that patients were deposited in a jurisdiction (where the repeat barricades in this case study occurred) believed to have a safer environment and would absorb cost of providing medical, mental health treatment, police services, and housing. Depositing agencies disputed the allegation they were exhausted meeting needs of chronic mentally ill, including excessive use of police services.

2014 SWAT Begins to Study Itself

In 2014, research including SWAT team structure and operations in United States of America and number of SWAT interventions in conditions during

which one or more individuals had barricade themselves, either alone or with one or more hostages was gathered. IACP and NTOA (2014:8) research consisted of NTOA asking members of the International Association of Chiefs of Police to provide information including both SWAT deployments defined as when a SWAT team took tactical action and activations defined as when a SWAT team was placed on notice. This 2014 research did not report number of chiefs of police contacted. Because number of chiefs of police contacted was unknown, authors of this case study were unable to calculate response rate to the request. Nevertheless, IACP and NTOA reported the request gathered information from $n=254$ law enforcement agencies however in some sections of the report a total $N=864$ with a breakdown of East Coast of United States $n=364$, Central $n=329$ and West $n=171$ was used in data analysis. In other sections of the report $n=785$, $n=782$, $n=776$ were reported. The IACP and NTOA 2014 study collected data between the years 2009 and 2013. These case study authors found analysis in Table 1 incomplete because number of return questionnaires either actual numbers or estimates were not reported. For example, Table 1

reports in 2009, 0.177 SWAT officers injured and 0.006 killed. These case study authors could not determine number of SWAT officers injured or killed by year because the mean was not a whole number and it was not clear how many questionnaires were used in the calculation.

Consider that a caveat regarding the numbers provided in Table 1 were not consistently taken from official department records. Representatives reporting on behalf of the department provided numbers from either documents or their best estimate. NTOA treated actual and estimated numbers equally. Therefore, numbers in Table 1 represent the best estimate (p. 18).

Change in mean number between years 2009 and 2013 are provided in the far-right column of Table 1. The general trend of increase in no knock warrants reported by Kraska and Kappeler (1997) appeared to continue into mid-2000s because the NTOA 2014 research revealed most common activation by activity and by year was high-risk warrant. Conversely, mean number of no knock warrants reported by NTOA members was 17 in 2009 and 14 in 2013, indicating 17.1% fewer activities. Analysis of the decrease in

Table 1: SWAT Activity 2009-2013 that Occurred During Deployment

Activity	Mean of Numbers Reported by Respondents Who Responded (Includes Actual or Estimated)					Percentage Change
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2009-13
Warrant Service (Unknown Risk)	4.07	4.03	3.46	3.82	4.15	2.0
Warrant Service (High Risk)	17.04	16.35	15.44	14.86	14.13	-17.1
Suicidal Individuals	1.54	1.69	1.43	1.48	1.56	1.3
Barricaded Suspects	3.42	3.33	3.4	3.68	3.47	1.5
Civil Unrest/Crowd Control	0.26	0.31	0.41	0.31	0.34	30.8
Hostage Situations	0.61	0.51	0.48	0.41	0.51	-16.4
Hostage Rescue	0.22	0.2	0.19	0.1	0.16	-27.3
Automobile/Van/Truck Assault	0.67	0.59	0.62	0.75	0.77	14.9
Water-borne Assault	0	0	0	0	0.02	
Bus Assault	0.018	0.011	0.035	0.034	0.028	55.6
Train Assault	0	0	0	0	0	
Building Searches	5.11	4.92	4.73	5.14	5.03	-1.6
Area Searches	1.24	1.42	1.24	1.51	1.42	14.5
Woodland Searches	0.67	0.68	0.72	0.81	0.79	17.9
Active Shooter	0.13	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.11	-15.4
Downed Officer	0.043	0.03	0.024	0.029	0.017	-60.5
Aircraft Assault	0	0	0	0	0	

Note. Combined actual and estimates. From "National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Study: A National Assessment of Critical Trends and Issues from 2009-2013," by International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA), 2014, p. 19. Retrieved from <https://ntoa.org/pdf/swatstudy.pdf>

high-risk warrants was based on whole numbers. Mean number of activities for warrant incident with unknown risk was consistent across years ranging from 3.5 to 4.2. Activities involving building searches accounted for a mean of about five activations per year ranging from a high of 5.1 in 2009 to a low of 4.7 in 2011. Callouts involving barricade offenders yielded a mean of about three or four activations per year ranging from a high of 3.7 in 2012 and a low of 3.3 in 2010 (p. 20).

The IACP and NTOA (2014) study reported a statistical break down by year classifying incidents that occurred during SWAT activations (See Table 2). Because the National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Study did not cross-reference specific callouts (i.e., barricade with hostage, no hostage, warrant service etc.) against specific incident involving an increase in violence (i.e., suspects fired shots etc.), it was not possible for these case study authors to delineate which incident occurred during barricades with or without hostages. Because data did not include number of repeat barricade offenders, these case study authors were unable to calculate if there was any difference between Offender's violent behavior during their first and second barricade.

Table 2 revealed that most common incidents that occurred during callout by year (combined actual and estimates) involving SWAT encountering an armed

suspect or finding guns. On average, armed suspects or guns at the scene of SWAT callouts occurred between seven and eight times a year. SWAT was eight times more likely to use less-lethal solutions than lethal force (IACP and NTOA 2014, p. 20). These case study authors opine SWAT Operations Studies from early 2000 generated some data, a lot of information and a significant move towards transparency. Nevertheless, tragic events such as August 2014 Ferguson, Missouri, U.S. unrest and police militarized response televised nationally provided a national audience for the third hypothesis regarding militarization of police department and SWAT operations which again raised questions of probable constitution violations.

The third hypothesis for law enforcements accommodation and assimilation of militarization ethos into law enforcement emulated from SWAT wrong house no knock warrant fatal catastrophes research (Balko 2014; Fisher 2010; Kuzmarov 2012). Balko hypothesis a specific social change, and a significant impact on law enforcement best practices, occurred within the United States of America during the 1970's. He opined during the 1970's, the belief it was acceptable for police to execute law enforcement tactical operations without intelligence collection prior to deployment became the norm and reflected societies

Table 2: SWAT Incidents that Occurred During Deployment by Year

Incident Occurred During Deployment	Mean of Numbers Reported by Respondents Who Responded (Includes Actual or Estimated)					Percentage Change
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
Improvised Explosive Device Encounters	0.28	0.38	0.32	0.4	0.33	17.9
Chemical Agent(s) Encountered	0.055	0.11	0.1	0.097	0.083	50.9
Suspects Armed or Guns Found	7.6	7.9	7.8	7.9	7.4	-2.6
Suspects Fired Shots and SWAT Did Not	0.23	0.299	0.27	0.22	0.213	-7.4
SWAT Officers Injured	0.177	0.201	0.16	0.18	0.19	7.3
SWAT Officers Killed	0.006	0.006	0	0	0.005	-16.7
Suspects Injured	0.48	0.41	0.44	0.37	0.45	-6.2
Suspects Killed	0.07	0.12	0.1	0.09	0.08	14.3
Animals Engaged with Less Lethal	0.76	0.65	0.66	0.67	0.68	-10.5
Animals Engaged with Deadly Force	0.19	0.2	0.16	0.14	0.19	0.0
Hostages Injured	0	0.01	0.005	0.04	0.005	
Hostages Killed	0.006	0.006	0	0	0	-100.0
Lethal Force Used	0.17	0.1	0.11	0.1	0.15	-11.8
Less Lethal Solutions Used	1.3	1.09	1.07	1.17	1.19	-8.5

Note. Combined actual and estimates. From "National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Study: A National Assessment of Critical Trends and Issues from 2009-2013," by International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA), 2014, p. 19. Retrieved from <https://ntoa.org/pdf/swatstudy.pdf>

shift in moral standards. Balko opined the perception of a failing criminal justice system (Frum, 2000), converged with the glorification of rouge police officers, portrayed in a manner that rouge officer's criminal acts were justified due to the perceived failing or failed criminal justice system was repeated ad nauseam in popular culture of the time (Balko 2014:304 -307).

Balko (2014:305) reported the observations from a former narcotics officer and co-creator of a law enforcement television series who hypothesized law enforcement officers' mimetic rouge officer pop culture icons; thereby assimilating the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of the iconic pathological rouge officer. Two of the three police militarization hypotheses, Kraska and Kappeler (1997) and Balko (2014), reasoned the increasing pressures from inside and outside SWAT community to accept assignments that are beyond their original intent served as an additional catalyst for militarization. Balko (2014), Fisher (2010), and Kuzmarov (2012) reviewed the overwhelming influence access to military equipment had on police departments' need to be perceived as tough on crime and thus police department requesting military combat equipment. These case study authors opine police departments engage in an arms race with neighboring police departments reinforcing the department need to be seen as tough on crime.

Balko (2014), Kuzmarov (2012), Fisher (2010), Chambliss (1994), and Cooper *et al.* (1975) provided competing hypothesis portraying law enforcement as tools of the elite, dysfunctional offices with warrior fantasies or rouge officers. Concurrent with Balko (2014) publication and the SWAT operational study (IACP and NTOA, 2014), the August 2014 Ferguson riot occurred. The aftermath of law enforcement's militarized response to events such as the Ferguson protests and riot reached the top level of United States of America's Executive Branch on January 16, 2015, when President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13688 (EO 13688) the "Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition. EO 13688 stated intent was to identify actions that can improve federal support for the appropriate use, acquisition, and transfer of controlled equipment (military equipment) by State, local, and Tribal law enforcement" (U.S. Department of Justice 2015). These case study authors opine lost in the national discussion of SWAT operations were the special circumstances of barricade offenders with and without hostages. Sharp criticism of EO 13688, including the issue of denying law

enforcement safety equipment appeared in law enforcement literature (National Sheriffs' Association 2015).

Barricade Repeat Offender Statistics

Search of peer review research did not locate research specific to repeat barricade offenders. However, detailed examination of barricade offender databases identified estimates of repeat barricade offenders within different databases. Murphy (2001:43) downloaded information from HOBAS in 1999 and reported 3.9 percent of barricade offenders had a history of previous hostage and/or barricade activities. Within Murphy's 2001 Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) barricade study, 1 out of 24 offenders 4% had a previous barricade and/or hostage incident. Three sources reported barricades repeat offender cases. Murphy (2001) reported one, Strentz (2013) two, and Memphis Commercial Appeal (2013) posted a repeat offender news story online.

a. Passenger Aircraft Hijacking

Strentz (2013:46-48) reported the case of an offender with antisocial personality disorder who hijacked a passenger aircraft twice. Law enforcement did not recognize the repeat offender at the time of the second hijacking because years had passed and a different SWAT and negotiation team in a different city at a different airport responded. The offender was killed by SWAT in what Strentz suspected was a suicide by cop.

b. Domestic Relationship Multiple Murders

Strentz (2013:86-90) reported the case of an offender with antisocial personality disorder and bipolar disorder who took his ex-girlfriend hostage after she ended the relationship. The repeat offender located the ex-girlfriend, murdered the people she was talking to, and murdered another individual who responded to the shots and yelling. After he took the ex-girlfriend hostage, he traveled from Maryland to Virginia. While stealing a car, he shot and killed the driver. The ex-girlfriend successfully fled the offender. After the offender returned from Virginia to Maryland, he located the ex-girlfriend's family, took them hostage, and after a prolonged barricade, was shot and killed by police.

c. Murder Suspect

Murphy (2001:7) referenced the case of an offender reported to be a heavily armed man suspect of killing four people who held at least three hostages: his ex-

girlfriend's mother, her brother and the mother's boyfriend in an apartment as relatives and friends pleaded for offender to come out. Law officers negotiated with offender by telephone. The police department reported a policy of surround and talk. The offender said that if he faced returning to jail, he would kill himself or make police shoot him. The offender had been in a similar position before when he kept police at bay for 16 hours following a domestic complaint by a girlfriend. He was finally forced out with tear gas.

d. Domestic Barricade with Family Hostages

Memphis Commercial Appeal (2013) filed a news story regarding a suspect in a barricade incident who was arrested in a similar armed standoff involving his family about five months previously. Criminal charges included aggravated assault, aggravated kidnapping, and violating bond conditions in the latest incident, in which offender was accused of holding his girlfriend at gunpoint for more than an hour. No injuries were reported. The incident occurred at offender's apartment when he and his girlfriend had an argument. Circumstances of the argument were unclear. The offender's mother escaped with his 1-year-old son before TACT officers arrived and the offender surrendered. The offender's infant son and girlfriend were both held at gunpoint in a previous barricade situation at her apartment. TACT officers responded to that incident, in which two shots were fired but no one was harmed. That standoff began after offender allegedly choked his girlfriend. The offender was out on bond after being accused of attacking her two weeks earlier, and was ordered to stay away from her. He apparently violated the same bond condition again in the current standoff.

Taking of hostages occurred in each repeat offender barricade reported by Memphis Commercial Appeal (2013), Murphy (2001), and Strentz (2013). Offender in this study did not take hostages during barricade one or two. Literature review did not locate an offender who had barricaded themselves with no hostage with a repeat offense of a barricade with hostage or an offender who barricade themselves with hostages with a repeat offense of a barricade with no hostage. These case study authors opine that research delineating repeat barricade offenders who do not take or keep hostages during barricades and repeat offenders who take and do not release hostages may be a salient factor in threat assessments due to the apparent violence of repeat barricade offenders who take and keep hostages.

Search of literature did not locate studies regarding escalation of police involvement with barricade offenders prior to first or second barricade. However, textbook references located a case of a repeat protester who demonstrated escalating threatening behavior who subsequently took television station employees hostage (Strentz 2013:4). Assessment and management of citizens who demonstrate escalation in aggressive behavior who target federal judges and public figures had been researched (Calhoun and Weston, 2003). None of the repeat offenders reported in literature or Offender in these authors' case study demonstrated escalation of irritation and aggression directed towards judges or public figures. However, Offender in this case study demonstrated escalation in aggressive behavior with patrol officers and immediately prior to barricade two, a girlfriend.

Counter Tactics

Because Offender in this case study demonstrated effective use of counter tactics including an ambush during barricade two, these case study authors reviewed law enforcement tactical research. Blair and Martaindale (2014) researched active shooter tactics. They published results from a two by three active shooter research design in which two different types of entry styles (Dump and Slice) and three specific entry tactics. Entry tactics included: (1) subject in the middle of the room immediately shoots; (2) a subject in the blind corner of the room shoots one second after officers made entry; and (3) subject is innocent person. In addition, their research design compared tactical outcome under two other conditions – a door that open to the left and a door that open to the right. Findings indicated a specific entry style for active shooter incidents.

Blair and Martaindale (2014) did not research an active shooter until police engaged. The research design did not include variables specific to this case analysis: an ambush of SWAT Officers, SWAT officers moving from a first floor to a basement, and suicide-by-cop incident during a SWAT operation. Blair and Martaindale (2014:8) reported when a SWAT officer was shot at, post incident briefings focused on downed officer drills and not the decision to conduct the raid or tactics used to make entry. The IACP and NTOA research (2014:12) reported SWAT teams reviewed policy and training; 16.2% of the time following a SWAT team deployment, 21.2% monthly, 4.4% quarterly, 4.4% Semi-Annually, 40.5 Annually, 1.3% never, 12.1 % other. It did not provided results regarding type of

policy review or training following a critical incident similar to the one in this case where during barricade two, SWAT was ambushed with a barrage of knives, and then after a twelve-hour standoff, lead into a suicide-by-cop incident. A year after Blair and Martaindale (2014) published their research, Mijares and McCarthy (2015) published analysis of nineteen cases between 1966 and 2013 reviewing SWAT tactics including single and multiple active shooter, state and non-state sponsored terrorist groups, domestic political-criminal groups and barricade offenders. They provided detailed case analysis of LAPD SWAT raid on the Black Panthers Headquarters in 1969 (pp. 26-33), and the SLA shootout in 1974 (pp 75-100), both of which Cooper *et al.* (1975) cited as acts of repression against citizens.

Blair and Martaindale (2014:223-230) published a case analysis which had some similarities to the repeat offender case presented by these case study authors. Case facts included a police department response to a domestic disturbance after a mother called 911 requested police assistance to escort her son out of the house. The mother told police to enter her house. As police entered the house, the son wearing a bulletproof vest and possessing a rifle, a shotgun, and three handguns shot police officers without warning. He fired from inside the house and through the doorway. The son then walked out of the house and again shot police where they laid. Blair and Martaindale's case analysis included description of a SWAT team who had advanced up the SWAT professional continuum through a supportive city government and organizational administration and demonstrated proficiency using state -of-the-art technology including communication devices (p. 226). These case study authors noted that during the criminal investigation of the case presented by Blair and Martindale, information from SWAT and other officers at the scene including specific offender behaviors in sequence, were available for analysis. In addition, specific offender statements made during the ambush, but before resolution of the incident were collected. The authors noted that in this case analysis the responding SWAT team and police department provide zero information.

Law Enforcement Ambush Research

The International Association of Chiefs of Police published the Ambush Fact Sheet research (IACP 2017). The report presents findings from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) in the Line of Duty data

collection program. Two datasets were used: an incident-level supplemental dataset of serious injurious and fatal assaults against police; and an agency-level dataset that captures all assaults—non-injurious, injurious, and fatal—per agency.

The research concluded four factors define law enforcement ambushes: element of surprise, concealment of the assailant, their intentions, or weapon, suddenness of the attack, and a lack of provocation. The research defined two ambush classifications. First, entrapment ambushes are premeditated. The entrapment ambush is an ambush, where offender lures an unsuspecting officer into a location to execute an attack. The second classification was spontaneous ambushes. Spontaneous ambushes are unprovoked attacks without long-term planning. Spontaneous ambush is "crime of opportunity." During spontaneous ambushes, offenders make the decision at the time of officer's approach and surprises officer with an unprovoked assault. Between 1990 and 2000, police murders attributable to ambush assaults was about 12 percent; from 2001 to 2012, that figure was 21 percent. The figure (see Figure 1) of United States of America below shows Pacific, South Atlantic, and Middle Atlantic regions of United States had the greatest number of law enforcement ambushes, with over 750 each. New England has had fewest—less than 250—between 1990 and 2011. Barricades in this case occurred in East North Central area with a total ambush range of 500 to 749.

Figure 2 provides number of ambushes within context of number of police agencies in different regions. When calculating number of ambushes within context of total number of agencies, data indicate little change in number of ambushes. The Pacific Region continued to have the greatest average annual number of ambushes per 1,000 agencies, with over 15. New England remained the least prevalent location for ambushes, with fewer than six per 1,000 agencies per year. North Central area had 6 to 8.9 per 1,000 agencies per year. These case study authors opine ambush data indicate jurisdictional difference are important considerations when calculating frequency of ambushes.

Ambush offender characteristics were as follows: 98% male, 75% criminal record, 40% violent crimes, 27% under judicial supervision, 23% prior relationship with police officer including personal interactions and previous arrests, 9% two assailants, 8% three or more offenders. Average age of ambush offender (30),




Figure 1: Law Enforcement Ambush by Region.

From “IACP Police Ambush Fact Sheet,” by International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and CNA Analysis and Solutions. 2017. (Cooperative Agreement No. 2011-CK-WXK036). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services. Retrieved July 26, 2017(<https://isdacenter.org/police-ambush-fact-sheet/>).




Figure 2: Law Enforcement Ambushes and Number of Agencies by Region.

From “IACP Police Ambush Fact Sheet,” by International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and CNA Analysis and Solutions. 2017. (Cooperative Agreement No. 2011-CK-WXK036). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services. Retrieved July 26, 2017(<https://isdacenter.org/police-ambush-fact-sheet/>).

average height and weight (5'9", 177 pounds). Firearms were common in ambushes. However, a significant proportion of offenders' use hands as weapons. Knives and other sharp objects were least frequently used weapon. A substantial proportion meet the classification “other” deadly weapons, which include anything from a blunt object to a motor vehicle. Over time, proportion of ambushes in which hands were offenders' weapon increased, whereas proportion of firearms as weapons declined. Weapons used in

ambushes included: 36% firearms, most common firearm was a handgun, followed by rifle, then shotgun, 35% hands, 26% other, 3% knife. In 2012, hands and firearms were almost equal during ambushes.

Entrapment ambush data revealed 41 percent of officers survived compared to 49 percent in spontaneous attacks. Overall survival rate for ambush assaults was about 46 percent. These case study authors opine data suggests a possible ambush survivability algorithm. Specifically, three variables: (1)

officers who wore protective body armor survived 53 percent of the time; compared to 30 percent without body armor; (2) officers who took cover; and (3) officers who returned fire were more likely to survive than those who did not. Data was not available for these case study authors to develop a regression analysis using the three variables. During barricade two ambush, SWAT had protective body armor, took cover, and use less than lethal force when deploying a taser during hand-to-hand combat. Unlike military doctrine, although (a) multiple SWAT operators required immediate medical services, a issue disputed during barricade two jury trial (b) a clear delay in SWAT team receiving assistance and (c) absence of a Quick Reaction Force (e.g., backup SWAT team) the police department did not conduct a review of command decisions or team performance following the ambush (Radvanyi, 2002). These authors opine documents revealed team resiliency during barricade two stemmed in part from SWAT operators continuing to function as one unit and developing a secondary plan consistent with IACP and NTOA (2014) research, which revealed 80.2% of SWAT teams had access to canine support.

The number of injured and killed SWAT Officers was difficult to distinguish in IACP and NTOA (2014) research because numbers represented actual numbers or estimates and the actual numbers on which the mean was based was not reported (see Table 2). However, data from other researchers published in 1992 indicated about thirty-eight percent of SWAT teams experienced a significant injury during tactical operations within the past 24 months. Common injuries included gunshot wounds, chemical exposure, and fractures (McArdle, Rasumoff, and Kolman 1992; Jones, Reese, Kenepp, and Krohmer 1996). Search for SWAT ambush literature revealed the "Swatting" phenomena (Miller and Morris 2011; Wingfield, 2015). Swatting was classified as a cyber-related violent crime (Miller and Morris 2011:75). Literature suggests specific people may be prone to being victims of Swatting (Fagone 2015; Gamers use police hoax 2014). Swatting behaviors have been sub-classified within cyber-related violence crimes by Miller and Morris (2011) as cyberbullying (pp.77-82), cyberstalking (pp. 83-85) cyberpredators (pp. 85-88), and cyberterrorism (pp. 88-90).

Swatting entails a specific SWAT team target by an individual or group of individuals to manipulate the SWAT team to respond to an extreme high-risk incident which is nonexistent and thus, creating a threat to a citizen. The specific motivations for Swatting varies

depending on the perpetrators of the Swatting and which citizen or family is targeted by the perpetrators. These case study authors noted that on July 6, 2017, a SWAT team was target in a swatting manipulation and responded to a home identified as a location where an accidental shooting had occurred. The event occurred at 1 a.m. and included a 17-year-old who used twitter to communicate "suicidal ideation". While on route to the home, SWAT was informed of the accidentally shooting and a person was shot. This case study author's note, that consistent with findings from this case study, the SWAT team reported that it was not until after the callout that SWAT members realized that they were sent to that home previously. Due to the in-depth data mining required to identify the perpetrators, the police department reported they were unable to pursue the perpetrators (Longaecker 2017). Swatting behavior beginning with targeting a specific SWAT team raises the problem of the absence of SWAT counter intelligence awareness (Barnea 2017).

These case study authors' search of literature regarding repeat offenders' ambush tactics specific to SWAT yielded research about repeat terrorist operations. Wilson's (2000:411) research of terrorist repeat barricades reported, "The database did not contain very many barricades known to have been carried out by the same terrorist organizations. However, there were sufficient examples of barricades to examine whether groups remained consistent in their styles of hostage taking over time. Analysis consisted of 13 barricades carried out by five different terrorist organizations during the 1970's and 1980's. Two by the Japanese Red Army (JRA) (1974 and 1975), 2 by the Armenian Revolutionary Army (1983 and 1985), 3 by the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (1978 and 1979), and 4 by groups of terrorists concerned with South Moluccan issues in Holland (1975-1978)".

Wilson (2000:412) coded behavior of terrorists during the 13 barricades on 12 categorical variables. Analysis located a similarity between barricades carried out by Black September and the JRA in the 1970's, and thus, concluded that the two groups were operating in a similar but not identical style. She reported the analysis fit with intelligence information of the time that "the Japanese Red Army in the 1970's was composed of people who were tactically trained by the then proficient Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These case study authors opine findings from Wilson (2000) are of interest to SWAT teams' because data revealed groups were sharing information regarding SWAT strategies and tactics and adapting counter strategies

and tactics. The SWAT team in this case study demonstrated no ability to conduct post barricade incident analysis; thus, it was unable to adjust operational tactics when confronted with a repeat offender and little to no defense against targeting by a Swatting offender.

Barricade Offender Databases Application for Sanity Evaluations and Threat Assessments

Blair and Martaindale (2014:2-3) reported areas of interest to law enforcement such as eyewitness identification, interviewing, and routine patrols have received scientific based research. However, there has been a lack of rigorous empirical validation (i.e., scientific analysis) related to police tactics. For purposes of law enforcement best practices, Blair and Martaindale reported that it was useful to divide law enforcement knowledge into two broad categories. First, explicit knowledge, which developed from and was subject to rigorous empirical testing (i.e., the scientific method). Second implicit knowledge, which developed naturally and organically without exposure to rigorous empirical testing (i.e., not scientifically validated).

These case study authors opine that limitations of implicit knowledge identified by Blair and Martindale (2014) do not imply implicate knowledge is not used by forensic psychologists. Forensic psychologists frequently use no cost, open source government-sponsored implicit knowledge to place specific offender background information in context. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency posts numbers and percentiles on topics such as language and dialect, reading and writing level of citizens, from different countries in the World Factbook Program (United States Central Intelligence Agency 2017). The Factbook Program website receives ongoing updates. Information from specific countries assist forensic examiners completing cross-national evaluations providing a context for comparisons of language, dialect, educational level etc. for a specific offender and demographic information from offender's country of origin.

Unlike the World Factbook Program, there is no government agency designated as the open source-clearing house publishing implicit knowledge of barricade offenders' characteristics or barricade incidents. These case study authors gathered implicit knowledge regarding barricade offenders and incidents from multiple sources listed in the Sources and

Methods section of this study. Research regarding psychological social factors of barricade offenders included the Louisville Barricade database developed in 1996 by Theodore B. Feldmann at the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science at the University Louisville School of Medicine. Feldman's information was collected from hostage negotiation teams from Louisville Police Department, the Jefferson County (KY) Police Department and the Kentucky State Police (Feldmann, 2001:7).

Research regarding barricade incidents and offender characteristics taken from Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Critical Incident Response Group, responsible for maintaining the Hostage Barricade and Suicide (HOBAS) was cited in this case study. These case study authors examined restricted source database information where possible. HOBAS is a restricted source centralized government sponsored repository for hostage and barricade incident data and resolution outcomes. The system provides data collection functions, search capabilities, and statistical analysis, available only to law enforcement agencies throughout the United States via Law Enforcement Online (LEO). During the Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation and until the final draft of this case study, the police department where the barricades took place were not members of LEO and had no access to HOBAS. The police department had no interest in gaining access to HOBAS. There was no response to authors' request from the national barricade database for data regarding barricade repeat offenders during the Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation or during collection of research for this case study. Because of membership rules, these case study authors could not join LEO.

Problems in Sources and Method of Barricade Offender and Incident Analysis

Murphy (2001) published data regarding SWAT from Georgia Bureau of Investigation GBI using a questionnaire similar to HOBAS questionnaire FD-522. Murphy reported HOBAS covered 1,828 incidents including 120 incidents taken from the Louisville Barricade database (1996). He opined he was unable to gather enough information to run statistical analysis comparing and contrasting data between HOBAS and GBI (Murphy, 2001). However, his publication contained enough data for authors of this case study to derive the number of responses per specific questions and calculate percentiles. These case study authors compared percentiles for specific questions for each

barricade database cited in the research. Throughout the case analysis, facts of this case are compared against percentiles from following databases: Louisville Barricade Database, GBI, and HOBAS.

Murphy (2001) opined HOBAS might be of interest to psychologists because participating police departments completed several FD-522 questions related to mental illness, criminal history etc. For example, FD-522 question 39 allowed law enforcement to choose one of six choices: (1) Committed in Past to State Mental Health Facility subdivided into one of two choices: inpatient or outpatient; (2) No Known or Current problems; (3) No Know Prior (s); (4) Other (specify); (5) Receiving Counseling/Therapy; (6) Residential Treatment Facility. Murphy opined that substance abuse might be of interest to psychologists. FD-522 question forty allowed law enforcement to choose one of six choices: (1) Alcohol; (2) Controlled Dangerous Substance (specify); (3) List Non-Prescription (specify); (4) List Prescription (specify); (5) Unknown; and (6) None. Murphy (2001) reported FD-522 question thirty-seven in Section F - Subject Data questioned offender's criminal history. Police department completing FD-522 were required to answer one of four possible choices: (1) None; (2) Unknown; (3) Prior Charges, subdivided into two additional choices: prior Hostage Barricade or prior Other Crime (specify) and (4) History of Violence." These case study authors noted question thirty-seven did not allow entering offender's National Crime Information Center number, if applicable. They opine cross-referencing offender and criminal history would have been beneficial in assessment of history of violence or escalation in violence during the Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation and assisted in completing the Psychopathy Checklist – Screening Version (Hart, Cox, and Hare 1995) and the interpersonal measure of psychopathology (Zolondek, Lilienfield, Patrick, and Fowler 2006).

Murphy (2001:23) reported that there were four major obstacles related to use of questionnaires completed by law enforcement officers to gather information regarding crime scenes and offenders. First, law enforcement viewed questionnaires as a combination of too lengthy, too time consuming to complete, and of little value. Murphy's findings were consistent with Stevens and MacKenna (1988) in respect to SWAT officer's perception that intelligence collection and analysis provided marginal benefit. Murphy reported, "It is important to factor in aspect of memory to questionnaire completion. The

questionnaires ask for very specific information on a variety of categories and subcategories that a Special Response Team member may not readily recall, if they were ever familiar with those details to start with. This effected questionnaire completion and accuracy" (p. 26). In keeping with findings from Klinger and Rojek (2004), Kraska and Kappeler (1997), and Murphy (2001), SWAT teams' deficit in data collection, analysis, and information processing is a decades long problem perhaps as suggested by Murphy related to the unresolved issues of length and time to complete Post Incident Reports and perception that data collection has no value. SWAT teams' critically flawed reasoning degrading importance of intelligence collection, and analysis was revealed during this barricade Offender's jury trials and absence of threat assessments available at the time of the court ordered discharge from the mental health hospital and ambush during barricade two.

Lipetsker (2004) reported HOBAS contained flaws, in both demographic information, and behavioral probabilities of different outcomes. He compared and contrasted HOBAS database, New York Police Department (NYPD) database, and Louisville Barricade (Feldmann, 2001) databases systems. His research found there were police departments identical to the police department in this case that do not use any SWAT team callouts or barricade database systems. Lipetsker (2004) evaluated validity and reliability of intelligence products produced by many hostage barricade databases by cross-comparing predictions from each database against each other. He found there is still much work to be done before intelligence feed to SWAT units and negotiators can be employed with confidence with his final opinion being intelligence products were not at the level needed for use in the field.

Michaud, St-Yves, and Guay (2008b: 1143, 1145) addressed predicting behaviors of hostage and barricade offenders during critical incidents and reported they could both (a) predict sequence of incidents and (b) predict three turning points of critical incident. Moreover, they reported they could make predictions with considerable precision. Michaud *et al.* reported problems with clinical predictions related to hostage and barricade offenders studied previously were not related to poor selection of predictors, but to ineffective combination of predictors. By using classification and regression tree (CART) analysis, they bypass this problem and made predictions of value to SWAT (p. 1142). These case study authors'

impressions were Michaud *et al.* developed a multiple regression algorithm generating a probability index above chance for probable offender behaviors. These case study authors opine importance of assessment Offender Antisocial Personality traits were in concert with Feldmann (2001), Greenstone, Kosson, and Gacono (2000), Michaud *et al.* (2008), and Murphy (2001). Each of these scholars reported that in addition to specific mental health diagnosis, personality disorders such as Antisocial Personality Disorder and/or level of psychopathology (traits) would be relevant in predicting offender behavior. Rueth (1993) proposed that on-site assessment include a mental status evaluation based on observations of offender and a selective history taken from collateral sources.

These case study authors opine Greenstone *et al.* (2000) differentiation among hostage takers based on psychopathology level had some application to the current case with the understanding that the current case analysis included two different barricades, and during the first barricade, Offender released a potential hostage. These case study authors opine modified items from the Psychopathy Checklist – Screening Version (PCL-SV) and the interpersonal measure of psychopathology (IM-P) used during actual hostage or crisis situations should be considered during pre-hospital discharge of barricade offender threat assessments. Case analysis during Sanity at the Time of the Offense revealed Offender had a police record, had undergone extensive psychiatric observation and in-depth reviews of his background with diagnostic impressions of antisocial personality disorder traits and antisocial personality disorder during different evaluations. Absence of prison records for the ten years Offender was incarcerated precluded full analysis of antisocial behaviors. Offender had similarities with repeat offenders described by Memphis Commercial Appeal (2013), Murphy (2001), and Strentz (2013), in that antisocial personality disorder was diagnosed. In addition, he had similarities to ambush offenders because Offender had a criminal record, violent crimes, and previous interactions with officers he ambushed.

These case study authors' prior experience using government database during court-order evaluations and research, suggested probable difficulty applying statistical analysis-using data from barricade offender database. However, during prior evaluations and research, agencies provided these authors with direct contact with agency data collectors, and analysis. Conversely, during the Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation and this case study, there were no

data collectors or analysis at the jurisdiction where offenses occurred or at the national level (Lichtenwald 2003, 2004; Lichtenwald and Perri 2011; Lichtenwald, Perri, and MacKenzie 2009; Lichtenwald, Steinhour, and Perri 2012). Admission of no data from the police department or SWAT team where the repeat barricades in this case study occurred was consistent with findings from Klinger and Rojeck (2008) and Stevens and McKenna (1988) because in both studies, most SWAT teams and police departments had no data or information. Consistent with the lead author's experience, Klinger and Rojeck (2008) and Murphy (2001), a confounding variable in FD-522 questionnaire analysis was a range of completed and partially completed questionnaires. Specifically, at one end of the range, some questions on questionnaire are not answered and at the other end of the range, all questions on the questionnaire are answered. Therefore, questionnaires with missing information changed the numerator used to find percentages for specific questions and change the reported number of questionnaires initially reported as the number of completed questionnaires.

As predicted by Lipetsker (2004), there were statistical problems comparing and contrasting data used in the Sanity at Time of Offense against barricade databases data. These case study authors were unable to derive percentages for factors when number of reported completed questionnaires did not match number of police departments that answer specific questions. In addition, available barricade and offender database information was contaminated with mixed groups, which did not allow for comparison of repeat and non-repeat offenders. Moreover, changing numerators reflected a pool of questionnaires with changing numbers of barricades with one time only and repeat offenders in which hostages were not taken, were taken and not released, and were taken and released.

Research regarding repeat offenders using data from FD-522 raised two additional issues. First, use of HOBAS to infer barricade responses or predetermine perpetrators was problematic if conclusions drawn from HOBAS could not be analyzed to determine if conclusions were based on chance or statistically significant differences. Second, there were SWAT teams operating and responding to barricades and not reporting incidents or offender characteristics. Therefore, skewed data collection occurred. Murphy (2001:33) reported jurisdiction (city or county) where barricades occurred was not the issue and exact type

of location (apartment, automobile) was. Authors of this case study disagreed. They opine barricade incident and offender characteristics compared with mental health services given to offender are critical. In addition, number of police calls to offenders' residences and offenders' escalation in aggressive behavior was the specific type of data community leaders and court system need to evaluate what is taking place in their jurisdiction and to compare their jurisdiction with similar jurisdictions within United States of America and worldwide.

The IACP and NTOA (2014:4-5) research attempted to compare and contrast incidents across three sections of United States: Central, East, and West. Although commendable, this effort was problematic due to unknown effect of size of police agency and whether size of agency variable distributed proportionately across regions. Statistical method used to address unknown effect of size of police agencies was to generate both weight and unweighted calculations with unweighted analysis reported most often. In this case analysis, authors compared barricade incidents and offender characteristics with both weighted and unweighted numbers.

The IACP and NTOA (2014:4) research was applicable to this case analysis because the police department in this case study was located in the Central section of the United States that submitted 92 unweighted cases used in the National Special Weapons and Tactics research. IACP and NTOA research estimated the SWAT team where these barricades occurred would be involved in activities and incidents similar to the activities and incidents provided in Table 1 and 2. Data provided in the National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 2014 research suggested the local SWAT team would be involved in about three barricade incidents a year and less than one hostage incident a year. However, because the police department and SWAT had no data during court proceedings, neither the police department nor forensic examiner could refute preconceived perceptions derived from Chambliss (1994) RDUs and Kraska and Kappeler (1997) PPU's research regarding lack of professionalism of SWAT officers or what occurred during SWAT callouts including probable constitution violations (Balko 2014; Fisher 2010; Kuzmarov 2012).

The national law enforcement agencies' decision to not respond to this case study authors' requests for information was consistent with findings of Murphy (2001, p. 10) and response rate reported by Klinger

and Rojek (1998), Kraska and Kappeler (1997), IACP and NTOA (2014), and Stevens and MacKenna (1988). Murphy reported there was clear and obvious reluctance among law enforcement agencies to share information. Although his observation referenced community police departments' reluctance to share information with national law enforcement agencies, the observation appeared applicable to national law enforcement agencies' reluctance to share information with forensic psychologists completing court-ordered evaluations or research projects. These case study authors speculated a number of possible motivations for not sharing information. First, motivation for not sharing was derived from the secretive and suspicious character of police agencies (Manning 1978; Skohnick 1996; Westley 1956) and the difficulty of research within what law enforcement considers sensitive topics (Kraska and Kappeler, 1995).

Second motivation for not sharing information was due to the political charged environment related to SWAT research, stemming from the wrong house no knock catastrophes (Balko 2014; Chambliss 1994; Cooper *et al.* 1975; Fisher 2010; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Kuzmarov 2012). Third, many SWAT teams and police department have zero motivation or ability to collect basic data (Stevens and MacKenna 1988) and thus, have no data to share. Fourth, in this specific request for information HOBAS data collection system is missing data to the extent that the authors' requests for explicit "knowledge" such as a statistical analysis of variance comparing and contrasting single and repeat offenders against a forensic case study is beyond the agency's ability to cope, and thus, no response is the response.

One possible motive for government sources sharing open source information in prior court-order evaluations and research projects undertaken by the authors was that, within military and other government agencies, psychologists are valued as instrumental in providing case study analysis, research, and operation support. Police departments and SWAT teams, although gaining access to military equipment through National Defense Authorization Act 1033 and EO 13688 had not trained with or gained only minimal access to doctorate level clinical psychologists trained by Department of Defense and or Department of Justice (Alder, Bliese, and Castro 2011; Kennedy and Williams 2011; Magelsdorff 2006; Williams and Johnson 2006). Review of the literature located the work of Galyean, Wherry, and Young (2009) which

review mental health professionals' services to SWAT team members.

Barricade Offenders' Emotional State at Time of Offense

Research regarding the emotional state of barricade offenders included work of Regini (2004). He opined the majority of barricade incidents, of which single and repeat offenders were not distinguished, are not planned, not hostage related, and offenders are in an emotional state. "The overwhelming majority of hostage-barricade incidents handled by police negotiators are non-hostage. Local and state law enforcement agencies rarely respond to incidents in which a deliberate and methodical offender intentionally has taken hostage to attain a planned goal" Regini further opined law enforcement negotiators more often become involved in incidents in which an altercation, such as a domestic dispute, has escalated beyond an offender's control. He reported during barricade incidents, offenders typically are extremely emotional, and emotions primarily dictate behavior. They are in a crisis state, defined as a situation that exceeds their ability to cope and often is a reaction to a real or perceived loss or a threat to what people expect of their lives. "The threat could be a loss of freedom, as in the case of a barricade offender afraid of incarceration or potential loss of the relationship of a loved one or child, evident in many domestic dispute-related barricade and hostage situations. In all cases, the situation caused offenders to be highly emotional, irrational, and unreasonable. Emotional reaction of individual makes the situation a crisis, not facts and circumstances of the situation itself" (p.2).

Thompson (2014) reported percentiles derived from HOBAS downloaded August 22, 2013. He reported 4 percent of barricades involve a hostage incident, and 96 percent were emotionally driven crises where a person barricaded themselves or with one or more victims, or was suicidal. He did not describe, and was unresponsive to these case study authors' request for an explanation as to what distinguished the two groups of offenders –those with hostages and those who did not take hostages if 4 percent of barricades involved a hostage and 96 percent did or did not have one or more hostages. For purposes of case analysis, Thompson's percentage was considered by these case study authors derived from a mixed group including barricade no hostage, barricade hostage, and both singled and repeat offenders. Feldmann (1996:7)

reported common type of barricade situations in his sample of 120 incidents completed by 144 offenders (some barricade incident involved more than one offender) involved a barricade subject who held hostages for at least a portion of the incident, 67 out of 105 times (55.83%). Most offenders in Feldmann's study were either mentally ill or involved in personal disputes; hostages were most often family members.

Murphy's (2001:31) GBI information report 91% barricade, 4% attempted suicide, 12% hostage and 4% suicide. HOBAS 1999 download regarding types of incidents reported 59% barricade, 12% hostage, 10% suicidal, and 17% attempted suicide. Feldmann (2001) reported barricade offenders without hostages were encountered 33 times (27.5%). Mental illness or substance abuse was most often associated with barricade offender without hostages. Hostages taken without an accompanying barricade in 20 incidents (16.67%); most of these situations involved robbery attempts or students. Six percent of the time, (6.67%) eight cases there were two offenders, 4.17% of the time five cases, there were three offenders, and 1.67% of the time two incidents there were four offenders acting together. Fifteen out of one hundred and five incidents offender did not act alone. Search of the literature for barricade suicide by copy incidents located a 2010 study by Monandie and Meloy. They analyzed 84 hostage, barricade, and jumper cases of officer-involved shooting cases and found most subjects were males, average age 36, involved in an unplanned event that escalated into a suicide-by-cop attempt. Seventy-one percent of officer-involved-shooting offenders in hostage barricade group survived the encounter, while 33% of suicide-by-cop offenders did not. Officer-involved-shooting and suicide-by-cop yielded a statistically significant difference in mortality rate. Of 43 cases where crisis negotiation and verbal techniques attempted with suicide by cop, they made no significant difference in outcome. Length of time did not decrease risk of injury or death. Behavioral resolve to die of offender appeared to be a key determinant of outcome.

Feldmann (2001:21) reported the majority of one hundred and twenty hostage and barricade incidents in his study were associated with suicide intent. During barricade one, Offender in this case study did not create a suicide-by-cop situation. However, immediately prior to barricade one, his sister alleged he attempted suicide by crashing cars. Conversely, during barricade two, he did create a suicide-by-cop incident. Database information reported some planned barricade

incidents. Murphy's GBI reported 54% unplanned, 33% planned, 12% unknown. HOBAS reported 70% unplanned, 24% planned (Murphy 2001, p. 32). In respect to Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation, planned barricade information suggested because barricades were planned, "mens rea" (guilty mind) may have been present prior to and during 20% to 30% of barricades. Murphy's research (see Figures 1 and 2) did not gather information regarding which, if any, of the planned barricades included plans to ambush SWAT.

CASE FACTS AND ANALYSIS

Case analysis compares and contrasts general concepts and specific details from literature, textbooks, and multiple databases information presented in the review of literature above against case facts including offender characteristics, offence incidents, family dynamics, patrol officers repeated calls to offender's home for assistance, SWAT interventions, emergency room evaluations, multiple detainment in custody, inpatient hospitalizations, and two criminal trials. Percentiles from each database factor and variable for each barricade offender characteristic and barricade incidence is provided.

Offender Background

Offender was a 37-year-old African-American male born in southern part of United States of America. He grew up in the Midwest, (East North Central Figures 1 and 2) the location where both barricades occurred. He reported he dropped out of high school in 12th grade, but earned his General Educational Development (GED) degree at a community college. During his formative school years, Offender denied he received special education services, but advised that he may have been in "slow" classes, although he did not know the name of them. Table 3 provides offender education data from each of the databases.

Feldmann's (2001) general demographic information of mixed group of barricades with and without hostages and general demographic information about offenders from different databases is provided in Table 4.

Within a year or two after dropping out of high school, Offender moved out of state. While residing in another state he was arrested for possession and distribution of narcotics. He was sentenced to prison at age twenty where he remained incarcerated until age thirty-one. He was released after serving eleven years of a fifty-year prison sentence. Feldmann's (2001:10-11) study of both hostage and barricade incidents found 52 % of this mixed group of offenders were arrested previously. He reported charges were 17.46% drug related offenses, 11.9% robbery, 11.90% assault, 11.90% alcohol related charges and 8.73% terrorist threatening. Amount of time in prison was unknown.

Murphy (2001:43-44) reported 70% had a previous criminal history, 4% (one incident) had previous hostage and/or barricade involvement, 37% had an unknown criminal history and 8% had no criminal history. HOBAS 34% unknown criminal history, 18% none, 26% criminal history including violent crime and 3.9% previous hostage and or barricade incident.

Thompson (2013) reported 39% had a criminal history.

Following his release from prison, Offender returned to the city where both barricade events occurred to live near his mother. He stated there were periods when he worked several jobs at once because he was trying to make up for time he lost while in prison. He reported he was skilled in woodworking. Feldmann's general demographic information of mixed group of barricades with and without hostages reported nearly 60% of offenders were unemployed at the time of incident; one-third of which were on disabilities due to a

Table 3: Offender Education Database Comparison

	Feldman 2001	GBI	HOBAS 1999*
High School Graduates	52%	29%	NR
Some High School	31%	8.3%	NR
College Graduates	12%	4%	NR
Post graduate Training	5%	NR	NR

Note. Feldman 2001 Louisville database of characteristics of hostage and barricade incidents. Adapted from "Characteristics of hostage and barricade incidents: Implications for Negotiations, strategies, and Training," 2001, by T.B. Feldmann, *Journal of Police Negotiations*, 1, pp. 8-9. GBI = Georgia Bureau of Investigation 2001 data. Adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 43.

*HOBAS 1999 = Hostage Barricade Database NR = not reported. Offenders' educational levels were not reported to Murphy, 2001.

Table 4: Offender General Demographic Information

Feldmann 2001	GBI 2001	HOBAS 1999	HOBAS 2013
Mean Age 29.7 Range 14 to 69	Under 18, 0% Between 18-29 20% Between 30-45 41% Between 46-65 29% Over 62, 0% Unknown 8.3%	Under 18 3.5% Between 18-29, 30% Between 30-45, 46% Between 46-65, 13% Over 65, 1.6% Unknown 8.1%	Between 35-40 40%
Male 97.92%	Male 100%	Male 91% Female 9.5% Unknown 2.5%	Male 91%
White 56.94	White/Hispanic 79%	UTC	White 60%
Hispanic 7.65%		UTC	NR
African American 33.33%	African American 16%	UTC	African American 20%
Asian 2.08%	Asian Pacific Island 0%	UTC	NR
	Native American 0%		
	Race Unknown 4%		

Note. Feldmann data adapted from "Characteristics of hostage and barricade incidents: Implications for Negotiations, strategies, and Training," 2001, by T.B. Feldmann, *Journal of Police Negotiations*, 1, p.9. GBI and HOBAS 1999 data adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 40. HOBAS 2013 data adapted from "Crisis" or "Hostage" Negotiation? The Distinction between Two Important Terms", 2014, by J. Thompson, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, p. 1. Retrieved from <https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/march/crisi-or-hostage-negotiations-the-distinction-between-two-important-terms>.

*Murphy reported number of subjects in HOBAS 1999 database addressing race changed and original number of questions that provided information changed from n=1828 to n=1901 to n=1892. (pp 41-42) Therefore, authors of this case study were unable to calculate UTC percentages. [†]NR = Not Reported.

psychiatric illness (2001). GBI employment information included 41% unemployed, 37.5% employed and 20.8% unknown. HOBAS 1999 provided no information (Murphy, 2001:43).

Offender's ex-girlfriend was in a relationship with him for five years. She was romantically involved with him during barricade one, but was terminating the relationship at time of barricade two. Feldmann (2001) reported fewer subjects were married than would be expected in a random sample of the adult population see Table 5.

The jail-booking sheet completed six months after barricade one revealed Offender self-reported high

blood pressure and seizures. Murphy (2001:49) reported information from HOBAS 1999 download revealed 13 reported coronaries, 2 diabetics, 7 other medical condition, 37 other, 55 unknowns, and 423 no known problems. He reported total for health factors included injuries sustained during incidents was 605. Murphy estimated some health factors reported in HOBAS might have occurred during barricades. He did not report the number for the numerator for offender health problems; thus, percentiles for different medical conditions could not be calculated.

During the sanity evaluation, Offender denied alcohol or illegal drug use. He reported in the past he

Table 5: Offender Relationship Status

	Feldmann	GBI	HOBAS 1999*	HOBAS 2013
Married	46%	41%	25%	39%
Divorced	28%	8.3%	10.1%	NR
Separated	13%	0%	7.8%	NR
Single	11%	33%	39.4%	NR
Widowed	2%	16%	21%	NR

Note. Feldmann data adapted from "Characteristics of hostage and barricade incidents: Implications for Negotiations, strategies, and Training," 2001, by T.B. Feldmann, *Journal of Police Negotiations*, 1, p.8. GBI and HOBAS 1999 data adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 41. HOBAS 2013 data adapted from "Crisis" or "Hostage" Negotiation? The Distinction between Two Important Terms", 2014, by J. Thompson, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, p. 1. Retrieved from <https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/march/crisi-or-hostage-negotiations-the-distinction-between-two-important-terms>.

*NR=Not Reported.

Table 6: Substance Abuse History

	GBI	HOBAS 1999	Use During Barricade GBI Database
Alcohol	33%	24.4%	25%
Controlled Dangerous Substances	17.9%	12.3%	10.2%
Non Prescription	0%	2.9%	2.5%
Prescription	5.1%	2.3%	5.1%
None	2.5%	5.7%	5.1%
Unknown	23%	53.2%	23%
Other	NR	Other 1.9%	NR

Note. GBI and HOBAS 1999 data adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, pp 34-46. Use during barricade from GBI database adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 45.

smoked cigarettes, approximately one pack per day of Marlboro 100s. Conversely, the psychiatric evaluation ten days prior to barricade two reported, "The patient stated he has used marijuana occasionally without any significant abuse and drank alcohol once or twice; the last time was several months ago. Offender stated he tried cocaine once several years previous. He denied abusing any other substances. There was no reported history of any inpatient or outpatient treatment for chemical dependence." See Table 6 for Offender's substance use comparison against barricade databases.

HISTORY OF AGGRESSION

Offender had a history of aggressive behaviors and arrests. During the Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation, the court charged him with a felony Aggravated Battery to a Police Officer [4 counts] and a misdemeanor Violation of an Order of Protection. Consistent with repeat barricade offenders reported by Memphis Commercial Appeal (2013), Murphy (2001), and Strentz (2013), Offender's ex-girlfriend had a restraining order. Prior to barricade one, police had been to Offender's residence five times over the span of three years. Police delivered an Order of Protection during one home visit. Police complete an investigation without incident during another home visit. During the third home visit, mental health workers obtained an involuntary petition for admission for a mental health evaluation. At the time of court-ordered involuntary admission to a mental health hospital, Offender was combative and "tased". There were three taser incidents. One taser incident occurred prior to first barricade and both barricades involved use of tasers.

Six months after barricade two, the Offender was transferred from Jail. Psychiatric transfer documents

reported, "He carries diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder and found very uncooperative in jail. Patient had prior admissions two years apart. Diagnosed with Unspecified Psychosis during both admissions. Was extremely uncooperative during initial hours of his admission to the hospital. He cooperated with initial assessment, but was very evasive, guarded, paranoid, and unwilling to provide reliable information. He denied having any problems in jail. He stated, 'I've never had a mental illness in my life.' Was not going to consider medications for his mood instability. His mood was clearly unstable during the admission process mixed with evasiveness, guardedness, and paranoia. Was unwilling to consider any psychotropic medications for mood instability. Denied any perceptual disturbances. Denied any suicidal or homicidal ideation during assessment."

Following barricade two, a Fitness to Stand Trial evaluation found Offender unfit to stand trial. The court placed him in a forensic mental health facility for restoration of fitness to stand trial. The 90-Day Fitness Evaluation stated he was "placed on frequent observation due to history of violence and history of recent aggravated battery on officers. During the initial part of his hospitalization, Offender was easily irritable, evasive and uncooperative. He could not hold on to this mood stability too long. He was placed in restraints, six months after barricade two, for a physical attack on staff. He punched a security therapy aide during a redirection process. During the time, he was in restraints; his mood instability was at a very uncontrollable level." During the Sanity at the Time of the Offense, Offender advised he had only a few arrests when he was a juvenile - for drinking as a minor and for shoplifting. In addition, he advised that he did not have a driver's license because "they took it for

failure to yield.” During the sanity evaluation, Offender maintained that he did not have a history of violence and that documents would supported his claim. He advised that he had never assaulted anyone and had never had a domestic dispute. Conversely, crosscheck of documents revealed in the week prior to barricade two, Offender physically assaulted his girlfriend and an order of protection was on file. Crosscheck of documents also revealed physical assaults on police officers, correction, and medical staff.

Chronology of police interactions with Offender indicated that before the first barricade when a police unit was dispatched to the home, additional police were sent as backup “due to Offender’s irrational and aggressive behavior”. Timeline analysis of police calls to the home indicated a watershed event occurred when patrol officers, at the mother’s request for a welfare check, took Offender to a hospital for an evaluation where he was involuntarily admitted to an inpatient mental health unit. All barricades occurred after officers participated in the first involuntary hospitalization. During barricade, one, four officers received injuries that required emergency medical services. During barricade two immediately after SWAT opened the door and while coming into the house,

Offender hurled a barrage of forks, kitchen and butcher knives and other kitchen utensils, while Offender had cover and concealment behind the kitchen counter. Tasers failed to connect with Offender. He stalled out the dynamic entry. SWAT data regarding offenders armed or guns found see Table 2. SWAT data regarding lethal force used and less lethal solutions used see Table 2. For weapons found as reported in offender databases see Tables 7 and 8. Ambushes with knives and other sharp objects were the least frequent used weapon (US Department of Justice 2017). SWAT case studies regarding tactical operations originating from family calls to police dispatch for assistance see (Mijares and McCarthy 2015:191-199, 223-230).

During the ambush and after taking cover one SWAT officer recalled during barricade two that he had been in the home during barricade one because he recalled the kitchen flooring and layout of the kitchen. SWAT secured the area and a twelve-hour standoff began. Offender moved to his fallback position, which was the basement and partly concealed himself behind a chair. Study of documents suggest SWAT members remained on the first floor while Offender was in the basement. SWAT members employed a deliberate

Table 7: Weapon Found/Used

	Feldmann	GBI	HOBAS 1999*
Weapon Used	NR	95%	95%
Knife /Edged Weapon	10%	8%	14%
Handgun	61%	29%	28%
Rifles/Shotguns	10%		
Shoulder Weapon		62%	27%
Assault Weapons	2%		
Other		16%	12%
No Weapon	NR	4%	21%
Bombs	2%		
Explosives		3 times	4%
Grenade		1 Time	
Other Explosive	1%		
Ignited Gasoline	NR	1 time	
Gasoline and Dynamite	NR	1 time	
Physical Assault	8%		
Blunt Objects/Motor Vehicles/ BB Guns	<1%		

Note. Feldmann data adapted from “Characteristics of hostage and barricade incidents: Implications for Negotiations, strategies, and Training,” 2001, by T.B. Feldmann, *Journal of Police Negotiations*, 1, pp. 15-16. GBI and HOBAS 1999 data adapted from “Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective,” 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master’s Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 46.

*NR=Not Reported.

entry strategy. After a twelve-hour standoff, they released smoke down the basement and deployed the dog to the basement. In the smoke-filled basement, Offender held a light candle pointed at SWAT members to draw them in to shoot him. The police dog held him while police engaged in intense physical combat with Offender. Consistent with Cooper *et al.* (1975), Klinger and Rojeck (2004), IACP and NTOA (2014), Stevens and MacKenna (1988), and Stratton (1985), SWAT demonstrated excessive restraint. Documents in this case revealed during tactical actions, at a minimum seven different law enforcement officers (three patrol officers and four SWAT officers) received injuries requiring emergency medical services. Study of corrections and hospital documents revealed one correctional officer and one mental health provider required emergency medical services while interacting with Offender. The number of officers receiving medical services during barricade two was challenged during barricade two jury trial. Of the total number of officers reported receiving emergency medical services during barricade two the police department produced one emergency medical service document related to a minor injury to one officer's finger.

Table 8: Comparison between Weapons used by Offenders during Barricade and Non-Barricade Offenders' Ambush of Police to Inflict Injury or Death

	Feldmann	LEOKA
Handguns	66%	35%
Rifles/Shotguns	7%	
Assault Weapon	<1%	
Firearms		
Knives	9%	3%
Other Explosives	1%	
Physical Assault	12%	35%
Hands		
Blunt Objects	<1%	
Motor Vehicles	<1%	
Other		26%

Note. Feldmann data adapted from "Characteristics of hostage and barricade incidents: Implications for Negotiations, strategies, and Training," 2001, by T.B. Feldmann, *Journal of Police Negotiations*, 1, pp. 15-16. LEOKA data adapted from *IACP Police Ambush Fact Sheet* by International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and CNA Analysis and Solutions. 2017. (Cooperative Agreement No. 2011-CK-WXK036). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services. Retrieved July 26, 2017(<https://isdacenter.org/police-ambush-fact-sheet/>).

The Offender in this case was similar to ambush data because offender used knives during the first ambush (US Department of Justice 2017) see Table 8.

LEOKA reported during ambushes of law enforcement officers, firearms were common, and a significant proportion of offenders used hands. (US Department of Justice 2017). SWAT team data regarding offenders located different types of weapons during operations (see Table 2 for SWAT data and Tables 7 and 8 for offender barricade data) In this case, both barricades were resolved by tactical actions. Findings from case analysis are consistent with other repeat offender cases tactical action (Memphis Commercial Appeal 2013; Murphy 2001; Strentz 2013).

During Barricade One SWAT intervened with an Emergency Assault. During Barricade Two SWAT intervened with a Deliberate Assault. These authors opine situational factors during Barricade One indicate an Emergency Assault was prudent. The authors acknowledge during the jury trial for barricade one the jury rejected that the Emergency Assault was prudent. See Table 9 for offender database barricade resolutions and Table 10 for percentage of time SWAT tactical interventions are deployed.

Table 9: Barricade Resolutions

	GBI	HOBAS 1999*
Negotiation Surrender	25%	56%
Tactical Intervention	29%	8%
Combination Negotiation / Tactical	25%	31%
Suicide/ Attempted Suicide	12%	
Negotiation after Tactical Action		0.3%
Resolution Unknown		

Note. Adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 36.

Table 10: Tactical Interventions

	GBI	HOBAS*
Deliberate Assault	33%	31%
Emergency Assault	12%	8%
Other	12%	21%
Overtaken by Hostage / Victim	0%	0.2%
Sniper Shot	0%	0.2%
Suicide by Cop	4%	0.3%
Less than Lethal Means	33%	14%

Note. Adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 17.

In this case, during barricade one, violence occurred after SWAT initiated a dynamic entry. Conversely, during barricade two, violence occurred with the battery of the girlfriend and again the moment SWAT members initiated a dynamic entry and finally during the battle in the basement. Table 11 provides offender database information about when violence began along a violence timeline.

Table 11: Barricade Violence Time Line

	GBI	HOBAS
At Onset	54%	46%
During	45%	22%
Demand / Deadline	12%	10%
Surrender / Conclusion	41%	11%

Note. Adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 33.

Table 12 provided offender database information regarding who was targeted by offender's violence. Law enforcement officers were targets of violence during barricade one and two GBI 54% and HOBAS 27%. The offender did not target his sister or girlfriend during barricades one or two. After barricade one Offenders sister advised she was fearful Offender would kill her and prior barricade two Offender targeted his girlfriend. However, neither sister nor girlfriend were targets during barricades.

Table 12: Offender's Targeted Victim

	GBI	HOBAS*
Law Enforcement Officer	54%	27%
Random Hostage /Victim	4%	12%
Selected Hostage / Victim	37%	30%

Note. Adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 34.

Thompson's 2013 search of HOBAS published in 2014 revealed in 2% of barricade incidents law enforcement officer are injured, 1% bystanders are injured, and 97% of the time there were no injuries. He reported that 62% of the time it was unknown when violence occurred, 30% of the time violence occurred at onset of incident and 11% of the time, the violence occurred during the incident. The offender had access to a weapon 72% of the time, a handgun 37% of the time.

Several scholars addressed the need for SWAT trained medical providers imbedded into SWAT teams. (Jones *et al.* 1996; McArdle *et al.* 1992). These authors reported 31% of SWAT commanders depended on remote Emergency Medical Services dispatch by radio to the scene when injuries occurred. SWAT data regarding SWAT officers killed or injured (Table 2). This examiner noted that in the three years prior to the publication of this article the SWAT team reference in his article included a tactical emergency medical services TEMS with the team. The TEM consisted of an emergency physician, and a para medic.

BARRICADE ONE

Third-Party Intermediary

Barricade one began after police dispatch received a telephone call from Offender's sister for a welfare check on her brother because she thought he might be suicidal, a police callout not accounted for in Cooper *et al.* (1975) or Chambliss (1994) observation of SWAT teams. After police arrived, Offender refused to allow police and his sister to enter his residence. Police allowed his sister to reenter the residence without a law enforcement officer with her. Contrary to Feldman's 2001 finding that hostages were most often family members, police reasoned that the Third-Party Intermediary (TPI) could reenter the residence because Offender's sister was a blood relative and had a master degree in a social service area and thus, Offender would not keep his sister hostage. SWAT used the sister as a TPI to negotiate with Offender leaving his residence to go to the hospital for a mental health evaluation. Offender refused to come outside his residence. He allowed his sister to leave the residence. SWAT data regarding hostages' situations and rescue (see Table 1). SWAT data regarding hostages injured or killed during barricades (see Table 2). Barricade offender database information regarding barricade resolutions see Table 9, tactical interventions including suicide by cop see Table 10, and who is target of Offenders violence (see Table 12).

After she left the residence Offender's sister reported, that prior to barricade one, he had attempted to take his life twice by automobile accident. She reported he was in a state of psychosis and had been acting paranoid and making strange statements. The sister then advised police her brother had talked about leaving his earthly flesh behind and taking her (sister) with him. Offender refused to negotiate with police, review of literature located Strentz (1986), addressing

negotiating with hostage-takers exhibiting paranoid schizophrenic symptoms Offender's sister advised she feared for her own safety because her brother included her in his suicidal thoughts. Research regarding suicidal noted previously (Feldmann 1996; IACP and NTOA 2014; Monandie and Meloy 2010; Murphy 2001). See Table 1. Offender databases for suicide by offender, and suicide by cop. See Tables 9-10.

Police documents revealed at time of barricade one, Offender was a suspect in a home invasion that consisted of a suspect entering a home at night and standing over the bed of citizens as they slept. This offense was reported by law enforcement as possible stalking behavior. The police report did not identify citizens in the report and thus the forensic examiner completing the Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation was unable to complete a search for connections such as social, and geographic locations or other links between offender and citizens. Feldmann (2001:13) reported 34% of barricade offenders stalking of victims in personal/domestic disputes, mentally ill, and workplace violence incidents. Among individuals in the mentally ill category, stalking was a direct result of delusions or obsessional attachment to victim. Feldmann reported that prevalence of stalking was likely under-reported due to the fact that many victims were unaware of its occurrence. Research regarding characteristics of mental health interventions for and law enforcement management of stalking offenders was available in the forensic literature (Davis, Frieze, and Maijuro 2002; Kroop, Hart, and Lyon 2008; Meloy 1992; Pinals 2007).

Law enforcement did not ask Offender's sister if she knew her brother was exhibiting any other thoughts or behaviors other than what she reported to police. Other than one police document, there were no other documents referencing Offender as a stalking suspect. Police reports revealed Offender's sister was not interviewed for information regarding whether Offender had firearms, explosives, or any other type of weapons in the home (See Tables 2, 7, 8). Police did not gather information from TPI regarding the layout of the residence such as location of hallways, bedrooms, basement, or furniture. A medical progress note written six days after barricade one revealed Offender would not sign a release of information. Thus, he blocked forensic mental health providers from gathering information from his sister or allowing his sister to receive additional information regarding Offender's mental health treatment. His rationale for not sharing treatment information between providers and his sister

was that he did not want forensic mental health to have any information that might be used against him. Offender advised he did not recall being aggressive, denied he required mental health services, and did not trust his sister. He accused his sister of poisoning him.

BARRICADE ONE

Offender's Account

When asked to explain what happened during the first barricade, Offender reported, *"Well, my sister comes to my house. She brings the police over to my house, and the police officer asked me would I talk to my sister. First, they asked me could they come in and I say 'No'. Ah, I didn't want them to track up, track mud on my floor, and, asked me then would I let my sister come in. And I said 'Sure'. And I let her come in and she said that she thought somethin' was wrong with me. And I asked her, you know where'd it come from, what do you mean, what do you think is wrong with me? And she couldn't explain it to me. She said she didn't know. And I said, 'Well, until you know, don't come over here bringin' the police to my house because you know, I'm on parole, you know, and I don't want to be associated with the police."*

"So, she leaves my house and I go to my bedroom, and then the police break my door down and come to my bedroom door and shoot me in the chest with a Taser. When they shoot me in the chest with a Taser, I was out, in the process of standin' up to see what the heck was goin' on and my arm came up. That's how the barbs got pulled out of my chest. But they didn't shock me. It shocked, it shocked, it threw me up at the time. And, after they did that, the [unintelligible] officer hit me in my eye, ah, with his palm first, and then he hit me with his fist. And threw me back up against the ah, the drawers, and, then I, I was, at the time I was thinkin' well, you know, what the heck's goin' on. I know this is not supposed to happen. Like, I haven't done anything."

"I didn't, I didn't commit a crime. I didn't bother anybody, and I didn't understand why it was happenin' and I didn't want to go back to prison, 'cuz I hadn't done anything. But, I couldn't sit there and not, and let the guy just keep on hittin' on me for no reason, so I swung back. And I, [unintelligible] this is at that time. And I swung back, and I hit him. And then the other officers came in, they were fightin' me. And they weren't tryin' to cuff me. They were hittin' me with their fists. Like I said, the jury cleared me. They said it was

self-defense. Anybody woulda done the same thing, had it been their dwelling, you know, and you hadn't committed a crime. You don't understand why they're beatin' up on you. You'da fought back as well."

BARRICADE ONE

Mental Health Documents

The hospital social assessment, written five months after barricade one, listed the following referral and presenting problems: reports from police department indicated, "Officers were sent to offender's home in reference to a welfare check, because the sister of Offender advised he was suicidal. Offender refused to answer the door, and entry was forced into the house. Offender fought with officers and was 'Tased', which had no effect. Offender punched several officers, knocking one out, and another one-needed stitch. Three officers were treated at the hospital. These actions resulted in the three counts of Aggravated Battery to a Police Officer. Jail reports indicated that he was hostile, angry, irritable, and uncooperative with intake. He was placed in observation unit due to his unpredictable and explosive behavior. He consistently refused narcoleptic medication and the only medication he requested was Ibuprofen for back pain from falling off a stool for no apparent reason during a visit with his attorney.

"Apparently, Offender's behavior continued to decompensate and a month and two weeks later, he became violent towards his cell mate. When [correctional] officers intervened, he struck an officer causing injury to the officer's elbow when the officer fell. Offender placed in isolation following the incident and observed as paranoid, suspicious and intimidating toward staff and peers. His actions from the incident while in jail resulted in him being charged with assaulting a correctional officer and battery charge towards another inmate." Medical progress notes from jail written two months after barricade one indicated, "Offender refused [night] meds, refused to sign form for refusing meds."

Medical progress notes written three months after barricade one stated Offender called himself, "King of the Universe." He was "holding his arms out in shape of cross." "Says sister put drugs in beverage paranoid episodes of extreme combativeness." "Heard voices when officers arrested him. Single words, but he did not know what they meant. His affect appeared shallow today. Laughing inappropriately." Assessment paranoid schizophrenia. An entry written after barricade one

reported, "Offender denies delusional thoughts, auditory and visual hallucinations. Offender reported that he did not remember charges—said police hurt him. Offender refused psychotropic meds."

Medical progress notes written thirteen months after barricade one and fifteen months prior to barricade two stated, "Referred by corrections administration for deteriorating behavior and medication refusal. Offender relates rambling story regarding he, his wife and two children were the first family at creation. She left. He has been building everything around here. He is not hearing voices. Others are. He does not need meds. No one can help him. His family needs to come together. His wife needs to come back." Spoke of people morphing; someone who looks like him but is not him; galaxy he is from, etc. Assessment is paranoia, history of extremely violent behavior, delusional, psychotic disorder."

BARRICADE TWO

Third-Party Intermediary

After barricade one, Offender was tried, found not guilty, and returned to his residence. A year later, Offender's mother filed a Petition for Involuntary/Judicial Admission again, due to emergency admission by certificate. Unknown to police at beginning of barricade two, Offender had been involuntary admitted to a psychiatric hospital and then court-ordered released six days prior to barricade two. His ex-girlfriend called police dispatch five days after court-order discharge and informed police that she had an Order of Protection and requested a stand-by while she gathered her personal items from Offender's residence (Douglas, Webster, and Hart 2001; Webster, Douglas, Eaves, and Hart 1997). Murphy (2001:46) reported HOBAS database contained 1,781 negative and unknown responses to the question of the presence of restraining orders on offenders. He opined the high number of negative and unknown dictates that the issue be dropped from further discussion and research in his project. Repeat offender case summaries provided by Memphis Commercial Appeal (2013), Murphy (2001), and Strentz (2013) revealed that three out of four repeat offenders were involved in assaults on girlfriends or ex-girlfriends; and the barricade that did not involve an ex-girlfriend, involved a passenger aircraft hijacking. Van Hasselt, Flood, Romano, de Fabrique and Dalfonzo (2005) published research regarding hostage taking in context of domestic violence.

An hour after barricade two began, Offender's ex-girlfriend told a SWAT member, "in the 5 years she had been dating the offender she had noticed a change in his behavior." She advised it started the previous year. He attempted suicide two different times. The ex-girlfriend advised police transferred him to a lock down Mental Health Facility from February through January of the year preceding barricade one. Offender's ex-girlfriend advised after the mental health facility released him, he was on medication and was doing well. Sometime around three months later, she again noticed a change in his behavior. He began telling her he could communicate via telepathy. He began telling her he was "God." A second police report, filed by the SWAT member who interviewed the ex-girlfriend after dynamic entry two stalled out advised. "On the evening of, seven days before barricade two, offender began telling his ex-girlfriend that he was God and began slapping her in the face. He did this several times throughout the night and into the morning. She advised her children were present during the incident. She advised there was a witness who saw him slapping her in the face. Once he fell asleep on the morning six days before barricade two, she took her children and left the residence. She did not call the police instead she went to a relative's house and spent the night. She later contacted a battered women's shelter who helped her obtain an Order of Protection" (Meloy 2000).

BARRICADE TWO

Offender's Account

During the sanity evaluation, completed seventeen months after barricade two, Offender was asked to describe the events leading to barricade two and his subsequent arrest. He was asked to include his thoughts, feelings, specific behaviors and presence of any unusual perceptions (e.g. hallucinations) prior to, during, and after the barricade incident. Offender stated, "Well, when the police officers come to my door, and they had just came to my house the day before, a sheriff's officer, to [unintelligible], some paperwork over there (reference to the Order of Protection paperwork). I got the paperwork, and I thought they was comin' over here to talk to me. I don't, I don't know why they came to the house. I opened up the door, and as soon as I opened up the door, the guy tried to shoot me with a Taser. When he tried to shoot me with the Taser, the barbs hit the door and hit, bounced into the wall, and I go back into my, ah, to go into the hallway, leading downstairs."

"And the officers come in, three of 'em, come in my, come into the, ah, that area, the dining room area, the hallway, and the living room. And I said, 'Well what, I said, what are you doin'?' They said, 'You're under arrest.' I said, 'I'm under arrest for what?' They said, 'Violation of Order for Protection.' I said, 'I didn't violate an Order for Protection.' I said, 'I'll come out.' I said, 'Just don't shoot me with the Taser.' So, I tried to come around the corner, and he shot it at me again. And I ducked back around the corner. I mean, then I, I threw the screwdriver down at the floor. Goin' 'What the fuck are you tryin' to shoot me with a Taser for, man? I haven't done anything. I'll come out.' You know, and they, I guess, at that time, they, sensed that I was getting' upset, and they backed out of the house."

When asked what happened next, Offender stated, "Oh, well, then I went to the door. I was gonna try to come out, but they were pointin' the gun at me. And I'm like, I'm not goin' out. I'm not gonna step into that. I don't, they had no reason to "tase" me, so I don't know if they're gonna shoot me or not. So, I just sat down and said, well, I guess they're gonna, I went back downstairs and sat down. I assumed they were gonna come in there and get me."

"And then they did. Just later. You know, I, I wasn't, when they came to the house to begin with, I was washin' clothes and ah, and tryin' to fix my lawnmower. That's why I had the screwdriver to begin with in my hand. Well, then when they come, when they did come in, I was downstairs in the laundry room, sittin' down in a chair. They propped the door open, and they, well, I, Name of defense attorney redacted read the report to me. He said, 'They said, come out,' when they didn't say, they didn't say nothin' to me. They just opened the door and sic'd the dog on me."

"And, you know, I was thinkin', God, what the, why they sicin' the dog on me for? I'm, I don't have any weapons, I'm not doin' anything. I was sittin' down. I'm not runnin', you know. I don't understand why they sic'd the dog on me, and then, I don't know the guy's name, good guy, pulls the dog off me. And then, I got ready to sit up, and he, they Tasered me. I didn't understand it. And then they hit me with their helmets. Hit me with their helmets. They was wearin' all black. They had a shotgun pointed on, at me. And I'm like, you know, I knew they were gonna hurt me when they came in, but I didn't, I, like I said, it wasn't justified."

"I didn't do anything. I could understand, they said in the report that I hit and kicked at the officers. Not

once. The only thing, the only time my arms flailed, and my legs flailed, was before I got bit by the dog. That was the only time. And the officer, he said well, I heard his report, and he's the only one told the truth. He said they came in, they sic'd the dog on me, and they tasered me. And he said, then there was a slight struggle, when they was tryin' to put the handcuffs on me. I explained it all to Name of defense attorney redacted. I said, 'I didn't fight with the officers, though. I didn't commit aggravated battery. I'm not tryin' to go back to prison for no reason. I've already done time. I know what it's like, and I don't have, I'm not tryin' to break no law.'

When asked to describe what he was thinking and feeling (e.g. emotions) during the barricade, Offender reported, "It's just what happened. I don't know if I took any emotional part of it. I'm sayin'...." When pressed further regarding the emotional aspect, Offender stated, "Ah, well, I suppose, I don't, I can't really say that there's an emotional part. I can say that they came to my house two weeks prior. They tasered me. They came to my house a couple years ago and tasered me. That thing hurts, like, I, you don't know what. It feels like you're dyin' when you get struck with that thing. And, all I had to do, if they're tryin' to tell me that all I had to do was walk out of my house, well, all they had to do was step to the side and let me walk out of my house. I was at the door, I opened the door, you know, it wasn't a problem. And, it was, I own the house, anyway, so I shouldn'ta had to leave to begin with, but I'm sayin' that wasn't the issue at the time. I didn't know I had to leave."

When asked whether he had stated to the police that he did not have to follow the Order of Protection, Offender responded, "No, I'd never say anything like that. I got the, I got the Order of Protection from a young lady. Well, I wouldn't say she was young, but a lady officer, and she asked me does girlfriend stay there? I said, 'No, she hasn't been here for weeks.' And she said, 'Well, what did she say?' I said, 'I don't know. I haven't, she hasn't contacted me.' And that was the extent of the conversation I had with her. I never said I didn't have to follow any Order of Protection."

When asked if there was any problem with following the Order of Protection, Offender replied, "No, an Order of Protection is for a person." When asked if he was doing anything illegal during this incident with the police coming to his house, he responded, "No. That's what I, I kept tellin', I was tryin' to find out through Name of defense attorney redacted. Well, did I violate the Order

of Protection? I didn't do anything. He said, he kept tellin' me, he told me 'No, you didn't violate the Order of Protection.' I said, 'Well, why did they try to tase me?' And he said, 'Because I wouldn't come out of the house,' is what he said. He said, that's what's in the report. I'm sayin', 'Well, they didn't, I didn't get an opportunity to come out of the house. They tried to taser me immediately, like I did somethin.' That's the whole point. And that's what I was tryin' to explain to you. The psychologist who completed the fitness evaluation, he said, well, it sounds like it was just a misunderstanding. And I said, that's what it was, but it wasn't on my part."

Offender explained his version of the events leading to his arrest. He stated, "Well, I don't, like I say, I was at my home, let's see, I don't know what day it was, I know it was warm out. But, I was at my house, ah, someone knocked on my door. I looked out and see the police officers and, you know, I didn't know why they were there. I just opened the door, and I [unintelligible] you know, what, what the problem was, and they didn't say. They just shot me in the chest with a Taser. The next thing I know they're pickin' me up, takin' me out of my house. They're takin' me to the hospital, and then they checked me in at Name of state hospital redacted."

When asked what behavior he exhibited that might have warranted the police's actions, Offender responded, "I didn't do anything for them to Taser me to begin with. And they don't have any codes on that. I don't know why they keep doin' it." Offender's reference to, "I don't know why they keep doing it was a reference to the fact that on three separate occasions, police officers tased him.

When asked to explain his behavior such as telling others he was God, Offender said, "I never said that I was God. And I said, and I told her, I tried to explain to her, I said, well, to my dog and my cat, I am God. If I don't feed my dog or my cat, well, they're gonna starve to death, okay? I said, in a sense, you could say that, you know, ah, you are God. But I'm sayin', I didn't say I was, you know, God, God." When asked when this conversation took place, Offender stated, "I don't know, but my, ah, defense attorney brought it up. I don't know [unintelligible] place, I'm sayin', that's, that's what I tried to explain to her once. What she's tryin' to say is I, I said that I was God, and she tried to say all kind of things. She said that I tried to commit suicide twice. I never tried to commit suicide."

When asked to explain why he had thoughts of people wanting to hurt him or “get” him, Offender responded, *“That’s not the way it seems, because I haven’t done anything for this to happen to me.”*

When asked regarding the car accidents reported by his sister that occurred the year previously, Offender stated, *“No, I didn’t try to commit suicide. I can’t really say what happened. But it wasn’t suicide.”* When asked if he intentionally hit someone with his car, he said, *“I, I [unintelligible], no. Unless you’re talkin’ about an accident I had, like, 2003 or somethin’ like that. I hit a car, I rear-ended, not payin’ attention. Lookin’ at my checkstub that was on the dashboard. Reachin’ for it, actually. And it was at a green light. They were supposed to been gone, but they stopped. There was only two cars in front of me. They, they, they weren’t gone when I got there. It was a green light, though.”*

A hospital psychiatric evaluation written twenty-eight months after the first barricade and ten days prior to the second barricade reported, “The patient described his mood as ‘okay’ and he is unable to score his mood on a scale of one to ten. His affect is flat and blunted during the interview. Patient denies current suicidal or homicidal ideations, intents or plans; however, when asked regarding the reported suicide attempt prior to admission, he stated that he was trying to ‘fly’ and ‘high authority God’ told him he could fly when he was trying to go over the road blocks.”

When asked if his position was that he was not mentally ill when the police came to his residence, Offender responded, *“I never said I was mentally ill. I never said I was mentally ill to begin with. That’s what the officer said when... I guess that’s their justification for tryin’ to shoot me with a Taser. They’re sayin’ that I’m mentally ill, and they keep tryin’ to shoot me with a Taser when, as opposed to talkin’ to me like I’m a grown man.”*

Offender further stated, *“You, you, you just asked me, ah.... I told you there’s somethin’ wrong, but I don’t know what it is. I can’t remember, there’s a lot of things goin’ on. I can’t focus, I can’t complete a sentence. That’s why I’m takin’ that medication.”*

When asked if he believed his medication helped him with his problem, Offender answered, *“No. The medication does not help me. It just slows me down and disorganizes my thoughts. I cannot finish my sentences. There’s a lot of things the medication is doing to me.”*

When asked to clarify what he meant when he said there was something *wrong* with him, Offender stated that he was working two jobs – 12 hours per day for a company that employed him, and the other hours for himself doing remodeling and wood working. He claimed that Wednesday was the only day of the week in which he slept get 8-10 hours. Offender stated that he kept this schedule up for a while, but then he just “burned out” and stated he *“doesn’t know what happened.”* When asked if he had been taking his medication at the time of the second barricade, Offender replied, *“No, I, no, I don’t [unintelligible] week, I had the medication. I took it a couple of times, right, but, like I said, I can’t, it had me droolin’ at the mouth, I can’t think and everything else.”*

When the forensic examiner asked him if he had taken the medication when police came to Offender’s residence, he replied, *“No.”* The psychiatric evaluation completed by the hospital that housed the forensic unit provided the following information regarding Offender’s chief complaint six months after barricade two. “The offender’s version of the story was that there was a huge misunderstanding between him and his girlfriend, which led to him being arrested.”

BARRICADE TWO

Mental Health Documents

Progress notes from the hospital immediately after barricade two indicated, “Single Black Male was brought to emergency room by police after a disturbance at his home. Has been very paranoid and making strange statements. Last year sent to Hospital for several months after he assaulted a police officer. Has refused treatment for his mental illness. Cooperative with admission, making bizarre hand movements. Paranoid. Refused to sign papers and would not answer all questions. Confused to time and place. Non-threatening. Ate sack lunch and went to room, stated he was very tired.” Forensic mental health staff at the jail reported when Offender booked into jail they were unable to do assessment. “Client is unable to answer questions. Not oriented to time or place. Does not know why he is here. He is unable to care for himself—danger to himself and questionable to others. 4 pt. restraints. Sleeping poorly—awake.” Under mental health history, a note stated, “None reported—but client appears delusional in thought.”

Psychiatric nursing assessment reported that Offender reported his spiritual preference as Muslim. In

previous reports, he reported his spiritual preference as Christian. Offender reported his most recent psychiatric hospitalization was at a different hospital. When questioned regarding why he was brought to jail at this time, he reported, "Police came to my house and told me I had to leave and I did not leave." Offender's behavior was guarded, suspicious, passive, and his mood was incongruent and blunted. He refused to sign any papers and he used bizarre hand gestures. His insight and judgment were impaired. Offender denied risk factors for suicide, impulsive behaviors, past history of aggression and legal issues. However, stated he had attempted to take his life by being in an automobile accident. His comments referred to an assault against a police officer a year before.

Shifting Relationship between Third-Party Intermediaries, Offender, and Police

Murphy's GBI data reported 91% of the time, law enforcement makes first contact with Offender and 20% of time family members make first contact. HOBAS reported 71% of the time law enforcement makes first contact and 14% of the time family members make first contact (Murphy 2001:34). In this case, each time a barricade occurred, police had responded to a telephone call from dispatch. Barricade one involved a TPI in the residence, who after police arrival, reentered the residence. Barricade two involved a TPI parked in a car a block from the residence. During barricades one and two, TPI had either talked to or observed Offender prior to telephoning police dispatch.

In this case, basic elements in relationships between Offender, TPIs, and police shifted significantly across time and incidents. First, the biological mother initiated a police response to force Offender to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation, which police did prior to first barricade. During barricade two standoff, Offender's mother joined a crowd that had formed in the street outside his residence shouting she would sue police if they killed her son, while at the same time knowing her son wanted to die in a suicide-by-cop. The paradox dynamic of SWAT team receiving the callout from a family member for assistance with a barricade mentally ill family member and then the family member joining the crowd of neighbors and shouting SWAT team was the aggressor had been discussed in literature (Balko 2014, Bernstein *et al.* 1997; Chambliss 1994; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Kuzmarov 2012). Review of the literature located the scholarship of Javeline and Baird (2007), who analyzed who sues law

enforcement special operations teams and why. Mijares and McCarthy (2015:200-208) who provided an analysis of SWAT tactical actions during the same incident that resulted in multiple lawsuits.

Because SWAT members did not complete Post Incidents Reports, authors of this case study were unable to determine the frequency of SWAT team operations in the neighborhood where barricade one or two occurred other than two barricades occurred at the same house. Therefore, there was no data to evaluate neighbor's personal experiences with SWAT. For example, there was no data to identify how many neighbors who had formed a crowd in the street experienced SWAT operating like RDUs described by Chambliss (1994). Moreover, there was no data to identify how many neighbors who had formed a crowd in the street experienced SWAT operating like, PPU's described by Kraska and Kappeler (1997). Finally, there was no data to know how many neighbors had experienced no knock warrant wrong house missions (Balko 2014; Fisher 2010; and Kuzmarov 2012) or otherwise at the time neighbors, gathered on the street.

Second, medical documents revealed at time of barricade two, Offender considered his sister, the TPI during the first barricade to be the enemy and involved in poisoning him. During barricade two, police were unaware Offender considered his sister an enemy. Mijares and McCarthy (2015:191-199) provided a barricade case of offender who had increased mental health problems with paranoid ideation, attacked a neighbor, thought his mother was poisoning him. During the barricade, an extended family member – cousin – provided intelligence. Third, the TPI (his ex-girlfriend) in the second barricade did not fully disclose Offender's mental status until an hour after the 12-hour standoff for barricade two began. Moreover, at onset of barricade two, the extent to which Offender had included his ex-girlfriend into his delusional belief system was unknown to police.

Review of literature did not provided information regarding shifting dynamics between TPIs and offenders or TPIs and law enforcement. Murphy (2001:35) reported a comparison between GBI and 1999 HOBAS information indicated TPIs were largely not used in critical incidents. When they were used, they are largely ineffective and usually are family members who do not change the situation or make it worse. He reported lack of actual questionnaires submitted to HOBAS prevented a detailed analysis of this subject.

Murphy (2001:49) reported hostage/victim mobility in four classifications, allowed free movement, guarded, restrained and escaped. He reported GBI hostage/victim mobility as follows: 0% allowed free movement, 25% guarded, 16% restrained and 12% escaped. HOBAS reported 13% allowed free movement, 9% guarded, 7% restrained and no information if any escaped. GBI percentages indicated of the victims that escaped, two actively escaped and one had the written response of "fell asleep". Murphy did not specifically state that the offender fell asleep and the hostage escaped. During barricade one, Offender allowed his sister mobility to enter and leave the house prior to police emergency entry. Thus, during barricade one, TPI had free movement. Prior to barricade two, Offender's ex-girlfriend waited until Offender fell asleep and then escaped with her children to a relative's house and then a battered women's shelter.

In this case, a shift between Offender and TPIs occurred. Moreover, a shift between what TPIs were willing to tell police at different points in time occurred. Romano (1998) provided a best practices approach regarding role of TPIs during barricades. He did not address TPIs who withhold critical information such as the fact Offender had a psychotic belief system and wanted police to kill him. This case revealed shifting internal psychological factors TPIs bring to what on the surface would appear to be similar barricades. Of note was extent to which TPIs were incorporated into Offender's delusional belief system. In this case, during barricade one and two, TPIs were aware Offender had incorporated them into his delusional belief system but delayed informing police (Corcoran and Cawood 2003; Monahan and Steadman 1994).

Mental Health Diagnostic Classifications

Booking sheet six months after barricade one reported diagnosis was negative for depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia, but was positive for Bipolar Mood Disorder. Medical documents revealed self-reported seizures but could not provide date of diagnosis or medications. Offender's falls off a chair in front of his defense attorney was not considered seizure-related. Mental health documents reported the following diagnostic impression: "Offender clearly exhibits mood swings leading to functional deterioration. Patient certainly has a mood disorder and he has had a history of aggression in the past, along with grandiose delusions. Patient is very paranoid and guarded and is unwilling to consider any psychotic

medication now. Placed on court-enforced medication during his last stay. He will be monitored closely and placed on court enforced medicines when the need arises."

Diagnosis rendered from American Psychiatric Association (2013) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders presented below. The diagnosis at time of admission for the second barricade Fitness to Stand Trial listed as:

- Axis I: Mood Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, with psychotic features
Rule Out Bipolar Disorder with psychotic features
- Axis II: History of Antisocial Personality Traits
- Axis III: None
- Axis IV: Unfit to Stand Trial (UST) Incarceration, Chronic Mood Swings with non-compliance leading to aggression
- Axis V: Global Assessment of Functioning 30

The diagnosis at time of discharge for the second incident listed as:

- Axis I: Mood Disorder NOS, with psychotic features
- Axis II: History of Antisocial Personality Traits
- Axis III: None
- Axis IV: Unfit to Stand Trial, Incarceration, Chronic Mood Swings with Non-Compliance leading to Aggression
- Axis V: Global Assessment of Functioning 35

Feldmann (2001:17) reported psychiatric diagnoses found in 140 offenders with Antisocial Personality Disorder diagnosis occurred primary in the criminal group. Murphy (2001) with an n=23 reported multiple answers were provided on some questionnaires but did not report number of multiple answers or number of questionnaires with multiple answers. One questionnaire answer was Paranoid Schizophrenic (p. 44). HOBAS 1999 download with a n=1,983 contained multiple answers; however, no numbers were provided to calculate number of multiple answers or the number of questionnaires with multiple answers (Murphy 2001).

Table 13: Offender Mental Health Background

	Feldmann	GBI	HOBAS
Psychiatric Diagnosis	97.2%		
Depression	22.14%		
Schizophrenia	6.43%		
Alcohol Intoxication	6.43%		
Cocaine Abuse and Dependency	5.71%		
Polysubstance Abuse / Dependency	7.14%		
Antisocial Personality Disorder	20.17%		
Conduct Disorder	5.71%		
Borderline Personality Disorder	9.29%		
Commit in past to state mental health facility		26%	8%
Receiving Counseling/Therapy		4%	14%
Residential Treatment Facility			14%
No Known current problems		30%	36%
No Prior mental Health Problems.		8.6%	21%
Other		17%	16%

Note. Feldmann data adapted from "Characteristics of hostage and barricade incidents: Implications for Negotiations, strategies, and Training," 2001, by T.B. Feldmann, *Journal of Police Negotiations*, 1, p.18. GBI and HOBAS 1999 data adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 44.

See Table 13 for offender database information regarding offenders' mental health background.

Feldmann (1996:7) advised barricade offenders without hostages were encountered 27.5% of the time. Mental illness or substance abuse was most often associated with this type of incident. He reported most offenders in the hostage/barricade study regardless of category of incident fell in the classification of having a psychiatric diagnosis (p.10).

Feldmann (1996:11-12) reported most frequent setting for hostage/barricade incidents was a private residence (42.5%). This site was associated primarily with personal/domestic dispute and mentally ill categories. See Table 14 for comparison of offender database of location of hostage incidents.

Both barricade one and two took place in Offender's residence. Feldmann (1996) reported demands occurred in 31.66% of cases and bizarre demands directly related to an underlying psychotic disorder

Table 14: Location of Hostage Incident

	Feldmann	GBI	HOBAS*
Private Residence	42.5%		
Private Residence / Farmhouse		41%	52%
Barn/Out Building			0.4%
Apartment / Condominium		4%	20%
Mobile Home		37%	4%
Office Workplace			3%
Automobile			2%
Public Transportation			0.05%
Other		16%	15%

Note. Feldmann data adapted from "Characteristics of hostage and barricade incidents: Implications for Negotiations, strategies, and Training," 2001, by T.B. Feldmann, *Journal of Police Negotiations*, 1, pp.11-12. GBI and HOBAS 1999 data adapted from "Hostage and Barricade Incidents: A Profiling Perspective," 2001, by R.A. Murphy, (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from CSU ePress, Paper No. 48, p. 33.

occurred 16.13% of the time. In this case, during barricade one, Offender demanded police leave. Days prior to barricade two, the ex-girlfriend reported bizarre demands (i.e., that she could read his telepathic messages but was refusing to do so) made by Offender. However, no such demands were made to SWAT team members. During barricade two, Offender refused to talk to police after police announced themselves and their intent. It was unknown if or to what extent Offender may have tried to communicate with police during barricade two by telepathic means or hand gestures.

Murphy (2001) reported GBI communication classifications of exposed face-to-face, cellular phone, existing phone service, bullhorn, voice contact from cover. HOBAS existing phone service, voice contact from cover, bullhorn, exposed face to face, hostage phone. Murphy did not provide the number of answered and unanswered questionnaire responses, and thus, percentiles could not be calculated. Murphy reported, in respect to the question regarding communication, this was another multiple answer question. The difference regarding communication method used during barricades are clear, but only summations from available information should be made. There are a number of possible explanations for the differences, but more research is needed prior to analysis of his phenomenon at that level” (pp. 34-35). Thompson (2014) reported communication method using: existing phone 39%, bullhorn 31%, Voice from cover 25%, and face-to-face 22%.

BARRICADE CLASSIFICATION

To address issues of considerable overlap among mixed group of offenders and issues of psychiatric diagnosis, alcohol and drug use, and personal relationships, Feldmann (1996) classified offenders into six categories: Personal/domestic disputes, criminal acts, mentally ill, workplace violence, alcohol /drug related, and students. He reported most offenders in his study had a psychiatric diagnosis. Moreover, offenders used alcohol or drugs who were not in the alcohol/drug related category. In each case, Feldmann’s category referred to primary motivation of the offender, which appeared to outweigh all other facts. Thus, an offender who took hostages in response to delusion or hallucinations was placed in the mentally ill category. An offender who was depressed and suicidal following a separation or divorce was placed in the personal/domestic dispute category.

In this case, Offender’s mental health diagnoses were consistent at the time of both barricades. Moreover, the authors of this case analysis opine Feldmann’s report of psychiatric diagnosis among offenders was consistent with psychiatric diagnosis rendered pre- and post-barricade one and two. Case analysis was discrepant from Feldmann’s 2001 finding to the extent that Offender had been diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder traits, a finding frequently found within Feldmann’s criminal group. Furthermore, in case summaries of repeat offenders, Murphy (2001) and Stentz (2013) reported diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. Feldmann’s category system as applied to this case considered Offender had a mental health history with diagnoses of mood disorder, drug abuse, and Antisocial Personality traits, which preceded the first barricade by three years. Throughout years of mental health interventions, Offender denied he was mentally ill, although documents revealed both mental health diagnosis and antisocial personality traits. Offender’s primary motivation during barricade one was mental illness. His primary motivation during barricade two was mental illness in addition to a personal/domestic dispute because Offender refused to obey an Order of Protection. Although Offender’s mother was reported to his defense attorney to have a diagnosis of schizophrenia, there were no documents to support or refute the diagnosis.

Valuation of mental health diagnosis underscores the importance that examiners gain access to prison records. Examination of prison records provides information as to whether Offender was a management problem, and/or receive mental health services and if Offender did receive mental health services, why and what type of services were receive. If Offender was a management problem, what types of problems occurred. Was Correctional Emergency Response Team (CERT) called for situations similar to what SWAT in this case responded to? For example, did an inmate in the housing unit tell Corrections there was an issue with Offender and correctional officers and then CERT responded? Without prison records, it is unknown if or to what extent Offender created situation to which authority figures – either patrol officers, followed by SWAT or correction officers followed by CERT were lead into a situation Offender could control. For example. Offender creates situation to which authority responds, Offender escalates situation through non-communication and implications of self-harm and then faults authority figures for responding.

Rules of engagement and corresponding opportunities to assess Offenders motivation(s) are highlighted in this case. For example, Offender demonstrated non-communication within the context of no active shooting, no hostage and no physical assault immediately prior to call for police support. Given Offender non-communication could a “throw phone” have been presented to Offender. The rationale for presenting the “throw phone” to Offender would be to gauge Offenders response to the throw phone. When Offender was in the basement could SWAT then have attempted to engage Offender with a throw phone? Another SWAT consideration would be de-escalation. For example, prior to the dynamic entry during barricade two, if SWAT was out of sight and only a patrol car was within sight, how would Offender respond? SWAT interventions such as cutting off water or power to the home would present other opportunities to engage Offender. Each of the different interventions within the consideration of safety to the community and SWAT, allow SWAT to observe Offender’s behavior and gauge Offender motivation. Several scholars have developed classification systems for hostage/barricade incidents as well as a schema of internalized psychological factors of the hostage taker (Call 2003; Feldmann 2001; Regini 2004). Call classified crisis into three types and three types of interactions (Table 15).

During both barricades, Offender had no hostages and was unwilling to communicate with police. Noesner and Webster (1997) reported barricades during which offenders provided no verbal communication to police and communicate primarily through behavior of frustration, outrage, passion, despair, anger or other feelings; therefore, the role of negotiators would appear to be limited. Murphy (2001) reported role of negotiation team in tactical action was 4% provided diversion, 16% set-up of offender, 25% stalled for time for tactical preparation. HOBAS reported 7% provide diversion, 5% set-up the offender, 5% stalled for time for tactical preparations. It was unclear to the authors of this study which database Murphy was describing

when he reported, “Furthermore, false concessions were communicated to subjects 14 times, and there were 124 other uses of negotiators in tactical interventions HOBAS reported 121 non-answers to this question” (p. 37). During barricade two, after Offender refused to communicate with police negotiators, SWAT commander assigned a SWAT member to go into the crowd in the street and gather intelligence during which the SWAT officer located Offender’s ex-girlfriend. Case analysis revealed barricade one and two met Call’s Crisis Incident Typologies classified Barricade-No Victim. Call recommended a behavioral analysis consisting of combining the type of crisis incident (see Table 14) with the type of siege (see Table 16) and hostage taker (see Table 17).

Both barricade one and two met the no hostage barricade category, which supported a Crisis Intervention Classification of Spontaneous Siege. During barricade one and two, the siege followed Offender’s reactions to police. Both barricade one and two met Call’s third classification of emotionally disturbed paranoid, various types (See Table 17).

Consideration of additional subtype of barricade offenders based on Call’s Hostage Taker Typology (see Table 17) included Offender’s sister reporting he had been in a car accident and she believed he suffered from brain damage. Although there was a police report of car accident(s), and Offender was suspect in hit and run crashes, there was no indication he complained of or received medical treatment for a head injury. There were no documents to support or refute Offenders sister’s report of brain damage. Police involvement in barricade one and two began with a TPI call for help by an individual who had been in a relationship with Offender. The first barricade was the result of Offender’s sister (sibling relationship). The second barricade was the result of ex-girlfriend (romantic relationship). Although Call (2003) included family dispute as part of the classification, authors of this study opine the primary classification was

Table 15: Crisis Incident Typologies

Type	Interaction	Description
Hostage Situation	Offender-Hostage Third Person(s)	Hostage taker makes substantive demands (usually in-instrumental some may be expressive) of a third party threatening harm to hostages if the demands are not met
Barricade-Victim	Offender-Victim	Offender does not make substantive demands of a third party. Any demands made are typically non-substantive in nature.
Barricade –No Victim	Offender	Offender may or may not make demands and may or may not be willing to bargain.

Note. From “Psychological Consultation in Hostage Barricade Crisis Negotiation”, 2003, by J.A. Call, in H.V. Hall (Ed.) *Forensic Psychology and Neuropsychology for Criminal and Civil Cases*, p.74.

Table 16: Siege Typologies

General Category	Description
Deliberate	Offender deliberately initiates the siege situation – wanting to provoke a response from the authorities. Depending upon other factors i.e., whether or not the incident is a Hostage Situation or a Barricade –Victim situation, substantive demands may or may not be made
Spontaneous	Offender inadvertently precipitates the siege situation. Hostages/victims may or may not be present. Substantive demands may or may not be made
Anticipated	Offender expected that at some time or another the authorities would seek his or her arrest. Substantive demands are usually not made in a Barricade-No Victim situation. Substantive demands may or may not be made if the siege is also a Hostage Situation

Note. From “Psychological Consultation in Hostage Barricade Crisis Negotiation”, 2003, by J.A. Call, in H.V. Hall (Ed.) *Forensic Psychology and Neuropsychology for Criminal and Civil Cases*, p.75.

Table 17: Hostage Taker Typologies

General Category	Possible Subtypes
Emotionally Disturbed**	1. Brain Damaged 2. Elderly/Senile 3. Depressed, Various Types 4. Paranoid, Various Types 5. Schizophrenic 6. Substance Abuser 7. Family Disputes
Political Extremists	1. Reluctant Captors 2. Deliberate Hostage Takers
Religious Fanatics	No subtype offered
Criminals	1. Antisocial Personality Disorder/Trapped Criminal 2. Antisocial Personality Disorder/Kidnapper
Prison Inmates	Antisocial Personality Disorder
Combination	No subtype offered

Note. From “Psychological Consultation in Hostage Barricade Crisis Negotiation”, 2003, by J.A. Call, in H.V. Hall (Ed.) *Forensic Psychology and Neuropsychology for Criminal and Civil Cases*, p.79.

**Forensic examiner notes that the Offender has received the diagnosis of History of Antisocial Personality Traits.

emotionally disturbed paranoid type. The authors reasoned the police call was not for an active family dispute at the time of the barricades. Therefore, although relationship dynamics were evident, they were not the salient factor as was emotionally disturbed paranoid various type.

Offender’s characteristics and incident factors for barricade one and two (see Table 18) appeared consistent with Call’s Barricade Classification System. Although further research is required, Call’s classification system appears suitable for use by forensic psychologists as an implicit knowledge source for court-ordered evaluations and mental health court Therapeutic Intervention Programs’ assessments of barricade offenders. These case study authors opine a significant advantage of expanding Barricade Incident and Offender Characteristics Classification system,

such as Call’s system into Post Incident Reports and offender databases, is that it could be used by mental health providers for assessment of violence potential at time of discharge. Such a classification system would include consideration of offender characteristics from a historical, clinical and risk management perspective using the HCR-20 assessment tool (Douglas, Hart, Webster, and Belfrage, 2013). The Psychopathy Checklist – Screening Version (PCL-SV) and the interpersonal measure of psychopathology (IM-P) for use during actual hostage or crisis situations (PCL-HN and IMP-HN) (Kosson, Steuerwald, Forth, and Kirkhart 1997; Snowden, Gray, Taylor, and MacCulloch 2007).

COURT RULINGS

During validity interviews, defense counsel reported that following Offender’s arrest for barricade one,

Table 18: Offender Characteristics and Incident Factors Barricade One and Two, Mental Illness Diagnosis, Personality Features, Offender Characteristics and Barricade Incident Facts

Barricade Number	Offender Characteristics	Barricade Incident
One	Antisocial Personality Disorder Mood Disorder NOS Psychotic Features Denied Mental Illness Hostage Taker Type Emotionally Disturbed Paranoid various types	Home TIP sister provided intelligence Communicated with sister not police Unknown time barricade Multiple officer hurt Crisis Incident Type Barricade No victim Siege Type Spontaneous Siege
Two	Antisocial Personality Disorder Mood Disorder NOS Psychotic Features Denied Mental Illness Prepared for SWAT Ambushed SWAT Suicide by Cop Hostage Taker Type Emotionally Disturbed Paranoid various types	Home Restraining order TIP ex-girlfriend did not initially provided intelligence No communication 12-hour stand off Prepared ambush Multiple officers hurt Crisis Incident Type Barricade No victim Siege Type Spontaneous Siege

Offender exercised his right to trial by jury. During trial SWAT and police department could not provide any information instructing the jury regarding emergency entries in general, in their jurisdiction, and in the case before the jury. The jury found Offender not guilty. The legal defense argued that police did not have a proper warrant to enter Offender’s home during the emergency entry. (See Table 19) The jury verdict was consistent with research regarding perceptions that SWAT constitution violations (Balko 2014; Chambliss 1994; Cooper *et al.* 1975; Fisher, 2010; Kuzmarov 2012).

Table 19 indicated that in Central Region of the United States, where this case occurred, unlawful entry

complaints were lodged 14 times or 4.3% of the time, and across the United States, 42 times or 4.8% of the time. (IOAT and NTOA 2014:18) The International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers Association 2014 study did not identify how many unlawful entry complaints were related to barricade with or without hostages, in which offender was or was not suicidal or incidents involving one time only or repeat offenders. Following the finding from the jury and the ruling from the court, the court freed Offender within the hour and the not guilty jury opinion resolved all legal issues associated with barricade one. Five days prior to barricade two, the order for treatment or discharge from mental health hospital was dismissed

Table 19: International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers Association Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Study Operation Complaints 2009 through 2013

Complaint	All Regions		East Region		Central Region		West Region	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Excessive use of force	119	13.8	78	21.5	29	8.7	12	7.3
Unlawful tactics	14	1.6	7	1.9	7	2.2	0	0.0
Unlawful search and seizures	41	4.7	24	6.5	11	3.3	6	3.6
Unlawful entry	42	4.8	27	7.5	14	4.3	0	0.0
Property damage	327	37.8	119	32.7	139	42.4	68	40.0
Wrongful death	41	4.7	20	5.6	14	4.3	6	3.6
Decision to deploy / activate SWAT	88	10.2	24	6.5	39	11.9	25	14.5
Other	261	30.2	102	28.0	97	29.3	62	36.3

Note. Adapted from "National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Study: A National Assessment of Critical Trends and Issues from 2009-2013", 2014, by International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA). Retrieved from <https://ntoa.org/pdf/swatstudy.pdf>

On Motion of State Attorney; it was further ordered that patient be discharged, and there was a judge's signature. The Discharge Violence Screening Questionnaire, not completed at time of discharge, had a note written by the psychiatrist on the form: Patient was discharged by court. Patient not assessed at discharge." These case study authors opine assessment methods for evaluating potential for violent behavior classified by weeks, months, and years among offenders are available and warrant consideration by a court during court order discharge hearings (Douglas *et al.* 2013; Monahan and Steadman 1994; Snowden *et al.* 2007; Webster *et al.* 1997).

After Offender's arrest and detainment in jail following barricade two, he was adjudicated unfit to stand trial. After Offender completed restoration program and returned to county jail, forensic psychologist completed the Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation seventeen months after barricade two. The defense attorney who represented Offender during the first trial represented him during the second trial. Absence of any SWAT documentation during barricade one and two was inconsistent with National Special Weapons and Tactics SWAT Study (IACP and NOTA 2014:13) report that "almost all of agencies (94.7%) reported an after-action report was completed after every SWAT deployment". The study reported the following officers or individual department heads had access to the reports: 4.6% Magistrate/Judge, 9.5% District/State attorney, 30.0% Chief of Police/Executive level law enforcement, 29.7% SWAT Team, 10.3% Law Enforcement Personnel, 4.7% County/Town Executive, 2.9% City Council, 6.2% Public Record, 2.1% other (p. 13). IACP an NTOA reported that out of 782 cases, SWAT team documents were reviewed by the following: 9.6% agency legal counsel, 30.7% agency leadership, 54.1% SWAT team personnel, 0.0% Local government, and 5.7% other.

Absence of any SWAT documentation was consistent with findings of Klinger and Rojek (2004:14). During trial, defense argued Offender was not guilty due to insanity. Conversely, during trial, Offender insisted on the legal defense used during barricade one trial, which was he was not mentally ill, his behavior was reasonable during barricade two and the SWAT team was at fault. The argument SWAT team was at fault for the barricade two was consistent with several researchers (Balko 2014; Cooper *et al.* 1975; Chambliss 1994; Fisher 2010; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Kuzmarov 2012) who reported SWAT did not just react to emergencies but rather manufactured highly

dangerous situations. During barricade two jury trial, SWAT and police department were unable to provide any data or information other than police reports completed by patrol officers that were organized, analyzed and presented to the court by the forensic examiner. The court called the examiner to testify regarding foundation of and conclusions derived from the Sanity at the time of offense evaluation. The jury found Offender not guilty due to insanity. Immediately after the verdict, Offender was remanded into custody. Offender underwent the evaluation process and treatment insanity offenders receive. There was no document indicating how long Offender was confined to a secure facility while he received court-ordered mental health treatment. However, approximately seven years after Offender had been remanded to the state due to the insanity conviction, Offender had returned to the jurisdiction of the barricades and again was arrested for domestic battery. His mother was listed as the victim.

SUMMARY

Comprehensive analysis of Ditto Block a repeat barricade offender as part of a Sanity at the Time of Offense evaluation was presented. Case analysis ranged from micro to macro level. Every factor and variable of Offender's characteristics and offenses were gathered, organized, and placed in context of stable or fluctuating relationships across his life time.

Preparations for Sanity at the Time of Offense evaluation search for publications regarding barricade offenders and incidents located sociological studies published in the mid-1970s. Understanding sociological perception of Special Weapons and Tactics teams, barricade offenders and incidents, especially sociological foundation in socialists/communist perspective was essential because sociological perspective defined the narrative of Special Weapons and Tactics operation publications for decades (Cooper *et al.* 1975; Berstein *et al.* 1977; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997). In-depth study of sociological literature revealed barricade and hostage offender characteristics and incidents were ignored when not related to communist ideation, and provided no information about mental health diagnosis and treatment.

In late 1980's, a turning point in literature occurred when Stevens and MacKenna (1988) published a Special Weapons and Tactic study. In concert with their scholarship, numerous publications addressing attributes correlated with successful hostage negotiators appeared (Tatar 1983; Gelbart 1997;

Royce 2005; Miller and Clark 2006; Strentz 2006; Van Hasselt *et al.* 2006; Charlés, 2007; Donohue and Taylor 2007; Van Hasselt, Romano, and Vecchi 2008). Scholarship from 1988 forward frequently provided descriptions of offender characteristics and incidents.

In 1994, a divergent but parallel series of equally essential publications emerged one path addressing barricade offenders and incidents and the second, no knock search warrants. What confused research results were each publication path referenced Special Weapons and Tactical teams as single entities when in reality, research described diverse teams within a wide professional spectrum. One research path described teams that mutated into paramilitary units who believed and behaved as if they were above the Constitution and principally engaged in no knock search warrants, with poor to nonexistent intelligence prior to operations and rarely, if ever, responded to barricade offenders or incidents. The second research path described, the small number of teams who remained faithful to original Special Weapons and Tactics creed and principally responded to barricade offenders and other operations callouts such as security details etc.

In late 1990's a third research path added a third layer of confusion to the literature. Specifically, literature connecting Department of Defense Special Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement was published. This literature correlated law enforcement special operations response to civil unrest, mob actions, and narcotics manufacturing and distribution as similar to law enforcement special operations response to barricade offenders and incidents (Balko 2014; Chambliss 1994; Fisher 2001; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Kuzmarov 2012).

The chaos generated by three research paths, each claiming to describe Special Weapons and Tactic team's operations, barricades with or without hostages, civil unrest, mob actions, narcotics manufacturing and distribution and connections between Department of Defense Special Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement while ignoring scholarship published in other research paths created three separate research echo chambers. Special Weapon and Tactic teams' case examples described operations successes or abuses with no organized collection or analysis of frequency, duration, or identification of factors that escalated or reduced violence during special operations within or between police jurisdictions. In 2000, Special Weapon and Tactic Teams operational studies emerged. (Klinger and Rojek, 2004; 2008). With assistance from National

Tactical Officers Association (NTOA), Klinger and Rojek (2008) conducted research into what was and what was not occurring during Special Weapons and Tactic operations and training. In 2014, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) conducted a second research study about what was and what was not occurring. Both studies generated information and some data describing barricade offenders, incidents and Special Weapons and Tactics teams' behavior and behavior of individual Special Operators. Both research projects revealed glaring deficits within Special Weapons and Tactical teams' motivation, skill, and leadership required to gather data for analysis.

These authors case analysis of Ditto Block compared and contrasted similarities and difference between Offender during two different barricades and information generated from research paths identified above.

In addition, case analysis compared and contrasted similarities and differences between barricade one and two and Offender's characteristics against three frequently overlapping offender incidents databases (Feldmann 1996; Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) 1999 Hostage Barricade and Suicide Database (HOBAS) 1999).

CASE FINDINGS

Twelve findings were generated from case analysis.

First, social factors across the barricade timeline were inconsistent with early sociological studies because prior to any barricades, law enforcement consistently rendered assistance to Offender and his family, including transportation to a hospital for mental health assessment. There was no support for sociological position that Offender was being repressed by society's elite. In every barricade incident prior to police involvement, individuals intimate with Offender (sister or girlfriend) called police for help.

Second, case analysis findings were inconsistent with early sociological studies because once SWAT was called, SWAT remained engaged with Offender and family during barricade two despite a crowd gathering on a street, including a member of Offender's family, taunting and threatening to sue SWAT and patrol officers, if Offender succeeded in creating a situation where police would have to kill him. Findings

of Offender's family not filing a law suit due to death of an offender, which did not occur during either barricade, was consistent with Fisher (2010), Javeline and Baird (2007), and Mijares and McCarthy (2015) scholarship about Special Weapons and Tactics teams law suits. Case analysis revealed findings consistent with International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers Association (2014) judicial outcome data because during the first jury trial Offender successfully argued Special Weapons and Tactical team engaged in unlawful entry. Findings were consistent with National Tactical Officers Association (2011) guidelines because police interventions began with the least invasive and restrictive tactics and escalated in concert with force necessary to assure safety.

Third, case analysis findings were consistent with SWAT operational studies because SWAT did not manufacture barricade incidents.

Fourth, case analysis findings revealed SWAT behavior during barricades was consistent with SWAT operational studies because SWAT demonstrated excessive restraint during both barricade incidents. Case analysis revealing frequency and type of injuries to special operators during barricades in this case study was consistent with research advocating inclusion of Emergency Medical Services as part of Special Weapon and Tactic team operations (Jones *et al.* 1996; McArdle *et al.* 1992). Findings from the study of documents revealed corrections and medical staff were injured while working with Offender during his detainments. Because access to prison records were denied, case authors could not analyze Offender's experience with close quarters combat with Correctional Emergency Response Teams (CERT) as opposed to SWAT combat episodes, single staff or other detainee assaults. The authors could not complete a pattern analysis between community and Corrections special team interventions.

Fifth, case analysis findings revealing absence of SWAT logs, and pattern analysis of callouts during barricades one and two was inconsistent with National Special Weapons and Tactics SWAT study which reported a significant number of SWAT teams generated such reports (IACP and NTOA 2014). Absence of any SWAT operational documentation was consistent with findings of Klinger and Rojek (2004).

Sixth, case analysis findings provided examples of significant injury to Special Weapon and Tactical

Officers and potential life-threatening consequences as a direct result of absence of intelligence, including target assessment and previous time on target analysis. Only after barricade two ambush began, did a team member recall having been in the house previously. Special Weapon and Tactic literature suggests a wide range of reasons team members do not know a Special Weapon and Tactic team has been to the location previously.

Seventh, case analysis findings revealed similarities between Offender in this case study and offenders who ambush police in non-barricade incidents. Research from the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) project indicates offenders were likely to have prior interaction with police, and tended to use hands and knives (ICAP and CNA Analysis and Solutions 2017). Of extreme importance to law enforcement special operation community are findings revealing Offender demonstrated applied knowledge from prior experience with SWAT when setting up the ambush. Offender's ability to predict Special Weapons and Tactics teams first order response was consistent with Wilson research (2000). Case analysis cross-referencing Wilson scholarship with terrorists and terrorist groups against individuals engage in Swatting revealed both demonstrate skill in predicting and triggering Special Weapons and Tactics team responses. Findings revealed Special Weapons and Tactic teams and leadership demonstrated no counterintelligence consciousness. After a Swatting repeat incident (same home targeted twice), one police department advised they had no counterintelligence capability to confront individuals engaged in Swatting (Longaecker 2017).

Eight, case analysis findings revealed there is no open source government-supported barricade databases and request to access the closed database for purposes of completing court ordered evaluations or research can be denied. Offender and incident comparison to GBI and HOBAS was generally beneficial for descriptive purposes. However, Feldman's (2001) database offered what is need to compare Offender's characteristics and incidents to other offenders and to Call's (2003) barricade offender and incident classification system.

Nine, case analysis findings supported Romano (1998) scholarship about unreliable Third-Party Intermediaries. Findings revealed complicated shifting relationships among Third-Party Intermediaries, Offender, and police. Moreover, relationships changed before, during, and after barricades standoffs. Findings

revealed, at any given point along the barricade timeline, Third Party Intermediaries provided information they considered in their best interest based on the nature of their relationship with the Offender at that point in time, and only when questioned by a member of Special Weapons and Tactics team. At no time did Third-Party Intermediaries provided full disclosure to police or court officials. Findings revealed no community or hospital based mental health professionals advised law enforcement at any time, including immediately prior to barricade two that Offender was agitated, physically abusive, psychotic, and had antisocial personality traits.

Eleven, case analysis findings of mental health documents provided no consideration of Offender's characteristics, barricade incidents, or situational factors in any threat assessment during any mental health or forensic hospitalizations. Due to Offender's court-ordered release from a mental health hospital, days prior to barricade two, a violence potential assessment was not completed. Mental health diagnostic impressions, including those generated within forensic mental health settings, only considered the observations of Offender and information provided by him. This analysis revealed what Offender said was frequently unreliable. It was not until the Sanity at the Time of the Offense evaluation that documents were collected, organized, studied, and triangulated with Offender's behavior and statements, research, and databases.

Twelve, case analysis findings revealed police department, attorneys and community leaders denied membership or knowledge of Law Enforcement Negotiation Support (LENS), Hostage Barricade Database (HOBOS), and Psychological Profile Module (PPM).

BEST PRACTICES

Case findings support the following best practices.

1. Police departments must be members of Law Enforcement Negotiation Support (LENS)
2. All Special Weapon and Tactical officers must be members of the National Association of Tactical Officers.
3. Special Weapon and Tactical teams must follow National Association of Tactical Officer guidelines for organization of Special Weapon and Tactical teams and operations. Police

leadership must generate operation logs for every callout, and operational pattern analysis reports. Reports must be reviewed by police department and civilian leadership responsible for continuous comprehensive oversight and communication with mental health providers, community leaders, and court officers.

4. Police departments must be trained to use and have access to the full Hostage Barricade Database.
5. Police departments must have behavioral specialists responsible for data collection and analysis, including completion of individual post-operation reports gathered during debriefing. Behavioral specialists' additional duties may include liaison with community and mental health leaders as directed by law enforcement commanders and or civilian leadership.
6. Special Weapon and Tactic team officers and leaders are responsible for "training up" behavioral specialists, assuring these specialists have "walked through" training and demonstrated skill and proficiency in philosophy, procedures, and special operations culture for valid and reliable data collection and dissemination. Behavioral specialists are tasked with addressing police departments' request for data during National Tactical Officer Association research projects. Behavioral specialists are tasked with developing special operation callout database with characteristics similar to Feldman (2001), assuring information such as mental health diagnosis is collected so that proper offender classifications (i.e., Call 2003) are available to community leadership.
7. Emergency Medical Services must be part of Special Weapon and Tactic team callouts. Emergency Medical Services must be "trained up" identical to behavioral specialists. In addition, Special Weapon and Tactic officers must be "trained up" in relevant special operation first aid consistent with type and frequency of injuries occurred by special operation officers. Many years of Special Weapon and Tactic team research revealed law enforcement and civilian leadership are required to anticipate injury to Special Weapon and Tactical officers.
8. Special Weapon and Tactical officers and hostage negotiators must serve on a rotation

basis with other teams assuring each officer is familiar with the full range of special operation procedures and to develop peer-to-peer relationships with other team members in the special operations community.

AREAS FOR DISCUSSION

Below are topic areas members of community leadership, law enforcement, mental health providers, emergency medical services, and court officers should discuss and work towards developing a consensus of mutual support specific to their community needs.

Special Weapon and Tactic Operation Logs

The critical need to distinguish SWAT callups and callouts related to barricade offenders as opposed to other callouts such as no knock search warrants is required for reasonable discussion regarding what, if any, roles SWAT may or may not have in a particular community and cases being heard before the court. Without question, as demonstrated by the neighborhood crowd that gathered during barricade two, community members' personal experience with no knock search warrants provided a possible influence on potential juries in barricade offender trials

Among the majority of SWAT teams, data collection and analytic sources and methods never existed or stagnated. Consistent with this finding, this case study identified a series of obstacles that either immobilized, impeded, or delayed data collection and analysis. At the top of the list of obstacles are police departments receiving military tactical gear through National Defense Authorization Act 1033, Homeland Security grants, and EO 13688, while simultaneously not receiving expertise in data collection, organization, and analysis commiserate with expertise using equipment. In most cases, zero time is spent on education and training in intelligence activities. Research indicated additional key obstacles. First, SWAT members are too tired to complete post-incident data collection. Consistent with findings from this case study, many SWAT teams consist of members who are part-time and return to other duties. Second, team members may not have ever had access to information necessary to provide data. Third, team members may not be able to recall details of callouts when data is not immediately collected.

Research indicated there are attitude problems among some team members resulting in no data

collection. The attitude problem originates from the irrational belief that following the callout, the real work is completed; therefore, team responsibility ended. Consistent with findings from this case study, the attitude problem manifests in the belief that precision shooting skills are a replacement for precision target assessment, analysis of tactics employed, assessment of mission outcome and offender, and skill at collecting intelligence during time on target.

Analysis reveals Special Weapons and Tactical Teams cannot operate without behavioral specialists. Community leaders' continuous comprehensive oversight of Special Weapons and Tactical Teams is required for appropriate communication among professionals and policy decisions derived from pattern analysis of Post Incident Reports. Offender risk assessment require law enforcement, corrections, and mental health contributions. Repeat barricade offender scenarios are required components of professional development for Special Weapons and Tactics teams, mental health providers, attorneys, judges, and community leaders.

Militarization of Police Departments

Studies indicated some law enforcement officers embrace the militarization of police with a misplaced belief which accommodates embracing use of military combat equipment in an urban setting and rejection the United States constitutional principles as well as the military code of conduct principally consideration for non-combatants. Some members act in an overly aggressive manner consistent with the perception officers provoke the crisis they are asked to subdue. Law enforcement officers who behave in a manner contrary to military combat forces including Special Forces' quiet professionals who embed themselves in the population and remain in place for extended periods or for the extended strategic mission of supporting the population. During peer review completed prior to submitting this article for journal peer review, the feedback from law enforcement was as follows. The literature reporting constitutional violations was challenged as an unknown experience and had not been observed by officers. There are research studies that concluded that some, if not most, SWAT teams, due to their deployment for dubious high-risk warrant callouts driven by absence of original core SWAT callout work in their jurisdiction and the department expense in maintaining the team, engage in no knock warrant searches and mutate into police paramilitary units. Field studies indicate police

paramilitary units have been identified because of their rogue culture evidenced by constitutional violations of citizens which paramilitary members justified by believing "This is the jungle. We rewrite the Constitution everyday down here". In this case study, there was no information supporting that the SWAT team had mutated.

Special Weapon and Tactical Officers' Attitude towards and Skill at Applying Total Force to Contain and Control Life-Threatening Incidents

Literature suggests many team members become caught up in warrior fantasy supported by police leadership and SWAT command structure that does not exercise due diligence related to SWAT callups, callouts, and tactical actions. During peer review completed prior to submitting this article for journal peer review, the feedback from law enforcement was as follows. The literature reporting the warrior fantasy was challenged because this had not been observed or experienced by law enforcing reviewing this article. The literature citing the warrior fantasy was unknown to law enforcement and challenged. In this case during each barricade SWAT demonstrated excessive restraint.

Reasons for Intelligence Failures

In this case study, SWAT members deployed to the same house twice, engaged the same offender twice, and used the same tactics twice with no awareness that a SWAT team previously engaged Offender at the same location. A consequence of not having intelligence was that the team walked into an ambush. Nonlife-threatening consequences of absence of intelligence for barricade one or two resulted in criminal cases proceeding to trial with no data to clarify what happened and why SWAT tactical operations were reasonable. Extensive literature and some research is available addressing SWAT teams' no knock warrant callouts. Analysis indicated target assessment flaws were not related to dynamic intelligence (e.g., the offender had moved from that location) but static intelligence (e.g., wrong house address) or corrupt intelligence (false information given to police). Research cited in this case study revealed reasons for static intelligence failures and the same cited research revealed solutions to fix the problem. Literature revealed community's erosion of trust and respect for individual SWAT members and/or SWAT teams because of specific incidents that occurred in the community are issues present during criminal trials. In this case, the jury in the first trial found SWAT team

was in error and Offender was found not guilty. During the second trial, SWAT's tactical actions was not found in error and Offender was found not guilty by reason of insanity and remanded to the state department of mental health for assessment and treatment. Seven years after being remanded, Offender was arrested and charged with a domestic battery on a family member.

To address the problem with collection of callout information, police departments must designate behavior specialists, who have received training beyond the scout specialization, preferably licensed clinical psychologists with understanding of research design and analysis. Behavior specialists must be responsible for data collection during debriefings and generation of analytic reports, including pattern analysis derived from Post-Incident Reports. Behavior specialists should interview family members and the offenders as part of an assessment of not only SWAT tactical actions, but the issues leading up to the necessity of SWAT interventions. Analytic reports must be available to community leaders including members of the city and county counsel, directors of community social services, forensic mental health services, court-ordered examiners, court-ordered treatment programs, and officers of the court including attorneys and judges. Behavior specialists may serve as the hub linking multiple professions together, assuring that each profession in the social network has a link to communicate with each other and receive information.

The Third-Party Intermediaries Dynamics

A number of questions regarding Offender's relationship with TPI and the different professionals remained unanswered. For example, what was the life long relationship between Offender and his sister? Why did the sister go to the Offenders house? Was the sister called to the house by the Offender, biological mother, or someone else? Were Offender's statements and actions consistent with his sister, mother, girlfriend, police, medical staff, corrections officers, and the examiner who completed the Sanity at the Time of Offense evaluation? If inconsistency in Offender's verbal statements and behavior was present, was there a pattern to the inconsistency? For example, did Offender acted one way with sister, another with police, medical, etc.? To what extent did Offender tell each person what Offender thought the person or profession wanted to hear? One such inconsistency was Offender denied to the forensic examiner he said he was God; yet reported, he was God to his girlfriend.

Role of Forensic Examiners

In the opinion of these authors, forensic examiners cannot compensate for absence of due diligence by police departments, community leadership, and SWAT teams who do not generate Post-Incident Reports. It is critical the court and forensic examiner assess as quickly as possible where a specific SWAT team and police department involved in a case before the court fall on the professional continuum derived from the community support given to the Police Department and the specific SWAT team. At issue is whether SWAT teams or individual operators function as quiet professionals that have insight into and support the community or braggadocios conflict-seeking military-equipped set of want-to-be Special Forces Bolos'. It is essential each community review the level of support provided to their SWAT team and engage in solution-based discussion as to what their unique community needs are and whether the community can manage the resources to support a SWAT team including comprehensive oversight with generation of Post Incident Reports pattern analysis.

If police departments elect not to participate in national database systems, it is essential a database system specific to their jurisdiction be developed similar to Louisville Barricade database. Research provided a barricade offender characteristic and incident classification model applicable to forensic evaluation for both threat assessments and Sanity at the Time of Offense. Consistent with facts of this case, repeat barricade incidents result in high numbers of injured SWAT members who consistently demonstrate restraint during tactical operations. The number of injured and killed in repeat offender incidents greatly exceed the numbers reported for the one time only with or without hostage incidents. Repeat barricade offenders' case descriptions report recurrence of Antisocial Personality Disorder, taking of hostages, and domestic violence. Repeat barricade incidents appear to be a low occurrence with excessively high violence. Research into repeat offenders' level of psychopathology is required.

Ambush Problem

Similarity between Offender during barricade two and terrorists revealed that each learned from prior interactions with SWAT teams. Both demonstrate skill at applying what they learned. During barricade two, Offender exploited what he had learned and lured SWAT team into an ambush, and after a twelve-hour

standoff, attempted to incite SWAT members to shoot him. Engagement with Offender lead to a catastrophe that resulted in team members requiring emergency medical services in magnitude of dozens of times above national average. After barricade two ambush, SWAT team still did not collect data and analyze what happened. Case timeline analysis revealed patrol officers had successfully intervened with Offender multiple times. However, after patrol officers facilitated Offender's transportation to an emergency room for a mental health evaluation that resulted in an involuntary admission to an inpatient mental health unit, and Offender denied any mental illness, the next patrol officer interventions resulted in barricades. Review of the literature found that a SWAT team that had been "Swatted" to the same house twice and did not know they had been there before.

Community Support Issues

Communities that cannot muster or choose to ignore resources to support a SWAT team, need to consider disbanding the team. These case study authors opine that a reverse SWAT trend which consists of a significant decline in SWAT teams operating within the United States of America is probable. During the reverse trend, SWAT teams operating on the low end of the SWAT professional continuum without community support go into a safety stand down. One possible reason for civilian leadership demanding a safety stand down would be as a consequence of wrong house no knock warrant operations. During the safety stand down, community leadership investigate the feasibility of community SWAT teams' needs meet by SWAT teams operating on the upper end of the SWAT professional continuum from different jurisdictions or the development of law enforcement joint special operation centers wherein each jurisdiction contributes it very best elements (e.g., emergency medical staff, behavioral specialists, special operators, attorneys). If needed, memorandums of understanding should be written between jurisdictions to assure clear understanding post-incident data is collected and that specific details of post-incident reports are provided to the court. By definition, and consistent with the findings of this case study, a joint law enforcement special operation center cannot function without behavioral specialists' and community leaders' continuous comprehensive oversight.

Authors of this case study raise the question of Tarasoff duty to protect and warn as related to third parties informing police about the mental state of the

barricade offenders. Specifically, in this case, what duty did mental health providers have to warn police that they had been informed offender was delusional and acting on his delusions? Moreover, given that mental health providers had assisted in supporting the girlfriend seeking an Order of Protection and knowing that she would be returning to a situation where Offender would most likely be present, would that change the duty to warn police? Knowing Offender had not received treatment, would that change the decision not to inform police? Would mental health workers' fear if they informed police, Offender would find out and hurt them, change the duty to warn?

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