

Soviet Cultural Canon in 1930 – 1950

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Abstract: The article contains the rationale for the methodological principles of studying the history of values in culture. The most important theoretical provisions are given, which allow to determine the essence, structure and historical sources of the study of values in culture. The structure of culture is analyzed in detail in its superficial and deep versions, that is, as a producing value model (canon) and a derivative system of artifacts. The historical types of values in culture are described, that is, their historical typology is proposed. The value model of Soviet culture is studied in detail in all its key components, such as social institutions, communication, technology and technology, pedagogy and medicine, economics, material culture, language, art, and the type of person.

Keywords: Soviet culture, values of soviet people, soviet society, soviet science, soviet art, soviet everyday life.

1. INTRODUCTION

Soviet culture was a complex historical phenomenon with a clearly defined structure. In this paper, we shall discuss how soviet culture was designed and build, and what specific characteristics and historical dynamics of it were in Josef Stalin's time. The perspective of this paper is not properly historical: the factual account of historical *realia* lies beyond our goal, although we are obliged to admit that reaching it can't do without history. We see our task not in the restoration of artefacts and technologies of their objectivation/de-objectivation in soviet culture, but in constructing an axiological model of it, the one that more than once determined its history.

By virtue of soviet culture's total character, its all-encompassing effects upon all and any imaginable domains of human activity, it had a material, written expression in the form of laws, government decrees and journalistic/popular science works by soviet leaders, and as an intuitively perceived system of values clear to any soviet citizen.

We are entitled to apply the term 'model' or 'canon' to such a complex structure due to the fact that the concept 'canon' is exactly what expresses the intricate synthesis of the written law and oral norms. The most integral and complete existence this soviet culture canon we find in the times of Jozef Stalin, i.e. in 1930-50ies, in the urban environment.

2. PROJECTS OF THE MAKING OF SOVIET CULTURE

Soviet culture was being built with the active involvement of the soviet government, i.e. we may

assert that it was introduced as a policy, implanted "from above" by repressive and control soviet powers as the only possible official culture, instead of being developed "from the grassroots" as traditions or creative innovations. I.e. at the basis of soviet culture were projects of ideology. Not all of these projects were implemented, many were dissimilar.

In the 1920ies, the gist and essence of the new soviet culture was hotly disputed among party leaders, ideologists, etc. In the next decade, however, the number of soviet culture projects was reduced to one, and a cultural model was shaped and approved that was determinative for all the main future trends of its developments.

All the cultural projects in the 1920 – 30ies had something in common, although differing in other respects. First, all of them declared their relation to the *historical materialism*, the teaching of K.Marx and F.Engels, which is the science studying the drivers that affect historical development of the human culture. According to these tenets, an appropriate cultural morphology was proposed encompassing both material and intangible culture. The former, in its turn, had a two-tiered structure comprising productive forces (production means and products) and relations of production (political, economic and legal relations between people). Forces of production were declared to be 'the basis' and looked at as the cause for relations of production, or 'the superstructure'. Any imaginable changes to the 'basis' were directly projected onto the 'superstructure'. The driving forces of historical dynamics were proclaimed to be changes in the means and products of production, which allegedly defined the nature of the ownership of the means of production, i.e. the political and economic relations that are consolidated, in their turn, in the legal framework.

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Immaterial culture (religion, science, art) was seen as relatively independent from the 'basis', that is a phenomenon having its own causes of development in addition to material ones. In this light a very illustrative is a characteristic given to Rafael who "as any other artist, was determined by the technological developments in arts achieved before him, by organization of the society and division of labour in all the countries with which his land was in relations" (Marx, Engels, 1955, 392), and further: "In respect to art, we know that certain periods of its blossom are not in the least in correspondence with the overall development of society, and consequently, with the development of the material base of the latter" (Marx, Engels, 1958, 736).

Culture history in this light was considered as a change of historical types over the course of time in respect of material culture and relations of ownership on it. Social revolutions were accounted for as caused by a lag in the changes to relations of ownership against the change of material culture types. Lack of ownership, linked to the appropriating type of economy, is what determines the emergence of primitive communal pre-class relations of production entailing a collective right to the means of production.

Practicing productive economy leads to the emergence of a class-based society where there are proprietary classes (those who exploit others) and underprivileged classes (those who are exploited). The change of types of exploitation is what we call the change of historical types of culture or socioeconomic formations: slavery relations are characterized by directly turning the working classes into instruments of labour; feudal and capitalist relations mean personal or economic dependence. The crisis of capitalist economy and society was thought to be aggravation of the contradiction between the public nature of hired labour and appropriation (alienation from the producer) of its products by capitalists.

Within the framework of historical materialism, Marxist thinking assumed the material (technical and technological) ripening of the prerequisites for social revolution, i.e. objective historical changes to the type of relations of production. In politics this was linked to a timely intervention of the 'progressive forces' into the process of deepening economic contradictions', i.e. the Communist Party's interference in the crisis of capitalism, because the party is to express and protect the interests of the exploited producers (proletariat). Those critics of Marxism whose arguments seem to be

most convincing fairly point out that there is a weak point in the theory – the socialist proletarian futurology. Marxist forecasts of the imminent worldwide proletarian revolution have fallen through. Karl Marx underestimated the role of immaterial culture as the driver of historical process and, accordingly, made a true fetish of material culture, the 'basis'. In the context of a traditional culture (i.e., using the language of historical materialism, of the primitive communal, slave and feudal formations), such a 'basis' comprised not only productive forces but also religious traditions, while within a modern creative culture (capitalist formation) the technological 'basis' was aptly complemented by science.

My viewpoint on culture morphology and its historical typology shall be discussed below; here let's just note that the project of soviet culture turned out to be a success (at least, provisionally) exactly because the bolshevist leaders in their political decisions managed in a way to take Marxism's drawbacks into account. Vladimir Lenin in justifying his point that socialism is possible in a feudal country, did realize that it is utterly in contradiction with historical materialism tenets, but he planned to proceed on the idea that in this case productive forces are secondary to production relations.

Building socialism provided a 'basis' for appropriate production forces ('superstructure') that were only to be further created due to the proletarian revolution and new political and economic relations (this is treated in Lenin's work "State and Revolution" (Lenin, 1978, 227 – 324). These relations were to be created not on a material basis that was simply lacking, but on an immaterial one, i.e. ideology. Thus, the bolshevists' socialistic experiment in its entirety was a weighty argument for the leading role of values and ideologies in cultural history. The essence of such values Lenin posited as though they were derivatives of material culture: "the order of production determines social, political and purely spiritual processes of life" (Lenin, 1967, 135). However, as this order was nowhere implemented at the moment, it was constructed in the mind and texts of political leaders as a program of action, the more so as Marxists always strove not to explain the world but to change it according to their ideas.

Lenin himself wrote that politics (i.e. ideology) must always determine entirely the content of all culture spheres (as was the case earlier in the class-based society where there were two tiers of culture: that of the

exploiters and of the exploited (Lenin, 1973, 120 – 121, 129)), the old culture is to be used to the degree where it is no hindrance to the new one, while the latter is to be created as a systematic implementation of socialist values; the new culture “generally cannot be an individual task not related to the common proletarian cause” (Lenin, 1968, 100). The content and essence of this new proletarian culture, however, became the object of hot disputations. PROLETKULT leaders – A.A. Bogdanov, A.V. Lunacharsky and others – argued that it must be independent of the state and at the same time proletarian, its socialist content being the function of the level of perfection of the common human culture, i.e. the more advanced is human culture, the more socialist shall be its content (Bogdanov, 1990, 321 – 335).

That is the reason why A.V. Lunacharsky went as far as expressing such unorthodox ideas as positing that proletarian ideology and culture are not the same thing (Lunacharsky, 1967, 410). Proletarian culture was to be a result of reworking the best achievements of world culture in the spirit of socialist values. Leo Trotsky claimed that, conversely, the state has to have a certain amount of influence upon culture, but it's content can't be proletarian: culture, thanks to socialism, is to become universally human in the true sense: “Proletarian culture does not exist and never will, and we must not regret this fact: the proletariat took power exactly to do away with the class-based culture once and for all, and pave way to the human one.

Quite often we sort of forget this... Surely, the proletariat shall leave its imprint on culture, its effects being that culture shall cease to be aristocratic, but mass culture, universal culture, people's culture... Our yardstick is definitively political, imperative, impatient... It is not a government contract; it is a historical criterion” (Trotsky, 1924, 137, 161, 166).

Nicolay Bukharin was the one who most systematically propounded the idea that the state and ideology are to have influence upon human activity, going as far as the utter denial of the culture of the past for the sake of the pure culture of the future. Very characteristic is Bukharin's judgement concerning the poets Sergey Yesenin and Fyodor Tyutchev: “We have to do away with this decay! The sooner the better, we do not need walking icons... What we need is the literature of the energetic and cheerful, of the living in the midst of life, of brave builders who know what life is, who despise the rotten, the mould, old grave

digging, drunken eyewater, sloppiness, vanity and folly” (Bukharin, 1927, 14).

At the same time, the contradictions between these culture projects seem to be perceived as less conspicuous than their similarity in what is substantial. All the radical what was in there was gradually smoothed, all the moderate built up and implemented. It was Lenin's conception of culture that combined the radical and the moderate components in the most effective and viable way. The new culture became proletarian but retained its links to the universal human culture; it was controlled by the state and yet, thanks to its inherent features, left space for man's free and creative self-expression.

3. STUDYING SOVIET CULTURE: A BIT OF THEORY

Theoretical aspects of culture studies comprise culture morphology and historical examination of its typology. A special aspect is analysis of soviet culture variants (subcultures), first and foremost the urban subculture as the one that expresses and models its key characteristics in the most consistent way.

3.1. Morphology of Soviet Culture

We understand culture as the most important form of objective reality which comprises a range of persistent types of social anthropological activity and its results/products.

Soviet culture had a structure that was characteristic of the historical type of culture called 'creative', i.e. differentiation of its modes was determined by fundamental parameters of differentiating the spheres of human activity and artifacts, presented (the parameters) in the most systematically developed rationalized form. Unlike the archaic culture syncretism, or the canonical traditional culture (e.g. medieval), the creative culture type presupposes a degree of autonomy for its main forms, too.

Relying on the theory of culture morphology developed by M.S.Kagan (Kagan, 1996; see also Dokuchaev, 2005), I differentiate between the kinds of creative culture, in general, and soviet culture, in particular, as follows: social institutions, types of man, artifacts of science and arts, values, technologies of human activity, things and signs. The key principles for this separation are: types of being, differences between

culture products and activity that produces them, ways of produced objectification and types of related activity.

The types of being comprise: nature, culture, society and man. Conventionally culture, within the system of being, was opposed only to nature; such were, for instance, the teachings by J. Herder or E. Cassirer. This distinction is based on the formula considering whether the genesis of each of the types is natural or artificial. Neither man nor society, however, can't be distinctly rubricated as 'nature' or 'culture'. The scope and content of each of the above types do not match fully, although intersect. Man is not just spontaneously organized matter or its conscious reworking. Man is a psychophysical unity of substances and properties attained by him/her due to biological inheritance and sociocultural learning. It is perfectly clear that not all of the properties and substances may be ascribed to nature or culture: the first because they are uninheritable, the second as they are unique in each and every person. A human being is an individual, i.e. the traits and characteristics of each one are not simply quantitatively different, but qualitatively unique, which uniqueness always impacts both society and culture. If and when society declares them a value, actively supports and develops (i.e. in the creative culture situation), man attains the type of individuality called 'personality'.

Among human body characteristics, however, there are both natural ones and those shaped in an artificial way. Therefore, we can speak of human nature and human culture. Herein, I shall be interested in the characteristics of human culture, his body and soul, i.e. the bio-cultural and sociocultural ones such as sex, age, occupation, education, social standing, etc. All these features, in the soviet context, jointly formed a very special mental and corporal type of man, the one that was tagged a *quasi* bio-sociological term – Homo sovieticus. The same holds for society. It is a constellation of individual people linked by stable relations (institutions) and concrete joined activities (or abstract relations of participation in social institutions or natural classes, e.g. the state or biological sex).

These links, relationships and totalities can't possibly be termed natural, since they are not hereditary, or cultural, as they are not stable in their concreteness, i.e. not always can be called 'institutions'. On the other hand, social institutions are cultural phenomena and as such are eligible for cultural soviet studies.

At the same time, culture morphology can't be determined solely by reorganizations within the regions of being that are different in relation to it. Inside culture there are distinctions, too, that define its structure. These are distinctions between culture products and related activities, and the ways of objectification of such culture products and activities, which leads to the emergence of a range of complications and to refinement of the above culture morphology. Let's start from the typology of human activities. Man and society together is a multifaceted and open bio-socio-cultural system that needs to have information exchange with its environment of different types.

They also need information that fits the requirements of the human species and human individual; and they get it thanks to their own praxeological (transformational) work. Transformation of nature produces things and their meanings (objectified directly in the things themselves and in purposefully created signs, most important of which are various semiotic systems and, first and foremost, language), transformation of society brings to life social institutions, while transformation of man gives us the psychophysical type of a human. Man and society also need a 100% reliably information on their environment, which they get through their gnoseological activity, in the form of knowledge objectified in various things and signs. They need holistic information about the environment, and they create it in the works of art.

At last, all the types of information have to gain a synthetic form that is created through value orientation activity, i.e. in the form of values contained in any culture artifact, primarily in mythology; within creative culture (particularly, soviet culture) we find values in ideology. This is the basic structure of the inward dimension of culture that is determined by the relations between man/society and various regions of being, and between each other. This structure begins to have a more ordered look if we take into account the fact that each culture artifact can be either a product, or a technology of production; a product has both the material and intangible form. The material form of values may be any culture artifact, while the value itself is spiritual. The physical form of knowledge are various material and linguistic media of abstract information: signs, models, etc.

The physical form and spiritual content of the works of art cannot be separated at all, so tightly they are intertwined. The material expression of spiritual social institutions are concrete people consolidated in the

form of social strata, plus the types of their joined activity. The material expression of a man's culture is his body, while spiritual expression of the same is his psychotype. Each of these artifacts has its own technology of transformation. Values are the result of evaluation and creation of values. A psychophysical human type is the result of physical/spiritual upbringing/education – or correction (by medical or penitentiary means). Cognition has two main forms: experience (observation and experiment) and its logical analysis.

Social activity is human communication regulated by law and ethics: coordination or subordination (control). Transformation of nature is objectified in various manufacturing/economic technologies. Eventually, we have to consider another human activity, which is communication. Communication has no manufacture dimension; it is an activity whose sense is in itself. This sense does not constitute transformation or reflection of the environment for the existence of man or society; it is limited to seeking an adequate or similar environment for such existence, to holistically partaking in or reunifying to another person or society that have the same ontological status as those who are partaking.

Unlike transformational communication whose participants aren't equivalent or never present themselves in the plenitude of their being, those taking part in proper communication (even when they use it to solve tasks beyond communication itself) accept fundamentally the equality and a unique holism of their mutual life worlds. They strive to make those life worlds common, no to transform them. There are the two processual types of communication among many others: the representative and interpersonal. Representative communication, i.e. the one participants where to strive to represent not themselves but the society and its sub-groups (according to certain rules), is divided into two main classes depending on the nature of distance separating these groups and their representatives.

If the distance is minimal, i.e. when the 'essence' of a person is effectively reduced to the essence of a society represented, such a situation can be called 'ritualized (functional) communication'. If, however, the distance is at its maximum, that is the communicating person is aware of the difference lying between the script of his/her behavior and his/her personality, or there is an optional choice between a range of scripts, this is the 'play' or 'role communication'.

Communication per se turns out to be the most adequate environment for man, the key mode of his life and leisure apart from work and education. It was on the lines of what I have described above talking about the creative culture model that soviet culture was designed and shaped, being one of the historical types of the former. Its structure was isomorphic with the creative type, however, the circumstances under which it originated determined some of its peculiar features. Drawing on the old forms, fathers of soviet culture endeavored to fill each of them with a new wine. As I.A.Smirnov demonstrated in his thesis, dealing with the motives underlying the process of soviet culture design, its key result was that the emerging culture looked largely schematic and artificial (Smirnov, 1993). It was designed as an apartment block; none knew when and who would occupy it permanently, yet it had to be urgently populated by anyone, even by temporary or indecent tenants. The place must not be vacant. As this controversial project went on, a natural, spontaneously arising culture was also present on the scene either coinciding with the official one or resisting it. This complicated the structure of soviet culture and gave it a variative touch (a system of sub-cultures, in a way), which was contradicted in any way possible by the totalitarian essence and nature of the official project. From among the types and subcultures of soviet culture there emerged a hierarchy that gave totality and solidity to the edifice that was ostensibly losing integrity. The two most important modes of culture were the *value-orientational* and *transformational* – in its social&political and economic&manufactural variants – with appropriate products gained by these types of activity (values, workforce associations, production technologies and things).

3.2. Soviet Culture as a Historical Type of the Creative Culture

Soviet culture was a version of the creative one, viz., a version of its crisis that came in the XX c. At the basis of the historical typology of culture I use, lie the conceptions put forward by M.S.Kagan, F.Brodel, R.Aron and others (Kagan, 2000; Kagan, 2001; Braudel, 1986; Braudel, 1988; Braudel, 1992). Within the framework of this typology, the key differentiation criterion between historical types is the nature of material culture. At the heart of their axial differentiation (creative vs. traditional), there are, nevertheless, two more criteria: the axiological and gnoseological. That means that to the drivers of historical process (that determine the causes of culture's historical dynamics and the nature of its historical types) we have to

attribute the processes due to which not only material culture changes over time, but also value systems do. In the context of creative culture, science begins to come to the forefront as another dominant historical driver. Thus, the orthodox view (going back to Marx' historical materialism) that material culture is to be taken as the 'basis' when we define the driving forces of history, is to be adjusted taking account of the up-to-date theories describing the post-industrial society and culture, where (e.g., see the conception by Daniel Bell) attention is drawn to the main imperfection of Karl Marx's futurological ideas: "Giving the definitive weight to technology, he discarded (perhaps, could not realize) the role of theoretical knowledge" (Bell, 1999, 94). Traditional culture is taken as a complex of artifacts and the technologies to objectify and de-objectify them, which collectively arises and is translated due to a traditional activity of man and society, i.e. the underlying principle of such culture genesis is reproduction of what already has been, according to a standard. From this circumstance do follow several other substantial features of traditional culture, primarily collectivism of its technologies and social institutions, along with integrity i.e. close intertwining of all morphological forms; also the primacy of value-orientational activity and its artifacts over all other modes of culture. The point here is religion and its forms, such as magic, myth, ritual, etc. Thus, we can talk of three principal values of traditional culture: traditions, social collectives and religion. In the following paragraph of the paper we shall consider and justify this classification in more detail. The value-orientational activity has always, i.e. over the whole span of human culture history, defined the gist and essence of culture, impacted the changes to and contents of historical types, been the driving force of historical process. Fernand Braudel wrote: "At the heart of each and any civilization there establish themselves religious values" (Braudel, 1992, 60).

This, however, seems to hold fully only for traditional culture, and only partly for the creative one, if we take into account that religion is a version of value-orientational activity that doesn't lose its lead even within a creative context. In traditional circumstance this role is largely limited by the development level of material culture. The first historical type of traditional culture is *archaic* characterized by very weak differentiation between all its morphological forms, and by the appropriating type of economy (hunting-gathering) (Childe, 1941; White, 1959). Yet, in this syncretic chaos we already can discern the semens of

a future order, namely, the types of transformational activity, which were gathering, hunting and manufacture of instruments.

After the emergence of productive economy, each of these types began to modify itself into a more sophisticated concept: agriculture, cattle-breeding, trade and commerce. This differentiation was so deep that it created a basis for and brought about the rise of three new historical types of traditional culture, accordingly, farming, cattle-breeding and trade-commerce. But the next historical type of traditional culture – the medieval one – came to being not only due to the dynamics of transformational activity and material culture, but also to the dynamics of value-orientational activity. This is linked to its rationalization – the process given a systematic treatment in Max Weber's works (Weber, 1990). Rationalization of traditional culture leads to its crisis, ruin and the rise of the medieval culture. This process is also crucial for explaining what totalitarian culture is like, a version of which was soviet culture. Rationalization sorts out and normalizes culture, it creates a rational standard against which any produced artifact can be measured and checked up. Obviously, the cause and need for such rationalization is the growth of information, i.e. the development of material and spiritual culture and the technologies of their objectification and de-objectification. This growth places man and society in a situation of constant choice between possible behavior scripts, culture variants, a necessity to orient oneself in the most complicated world.

The sole faculty of man and society that still seems to be capable of solving the problems that arise before them, is intellect. But rationalization comes into conflict with its own object, i.e. tradition, which was clearly felt throughout Middle Ages and led it steadily to crisis and fall. A creative culture arises, new rationalized values establish themselves, among which cognition per se and its context are at the first place: a cognizing personality and his/her free creativity. The very principle of culture genesis undergoes a shift from reproduction to creation of new, to modernization. To define more precisely the gist and essence of the transition from traditional culture to creative one, we have to point out that the appropriate terminology cannot be reduced to traditionality and creativity as the principles of human activity. It is clear enough, that such principles are universal and characteristic of any historical type of culture; however, the hierarchy of their relations changes over time.

In the context of traditional culture, reproduction takes the lead, while in a creative culture modernization prevails. Had creativity as a human activity feature not been around in a traditional culture, it would not have developed and changed; we can see that this is not the case. Human and social nature cannot be fully stripped of creative potential, even if it is at a minimum. The same we can say of creative culture, too: it would not have been possible, i.e. preserved even in the most flexible and open form, had it not been for traditions. We date back the arisal of creative culture as early as Western European Renaissance. It was at this precisely time that creative culture values finally took shape and place while the values of traditional culture, in their turn, entered the period of imminent crisis and destruction. Some elements of creative culture, of course, can be found earlier in the history of traditional culture, primarily in Greco-Roman Antiquity.

Economically the Antiquity was trade&commerce, concentrated in towns and cities; the culture was defined by craftsmen's creativity and individual commercial activity of merchants; however, its rationalization did not reach the level sufficient to destroy the traditional culture values that finally took the lead in the next epoch – Middle Ages, although that victory was won at the price of their rationalization.

For the purposes of this paper, important is that the combination of creativity and traditionality in culture may take opposite forms. Thus, Soviet culture if compared to Antiquity is a contrary phenomenon: it was a creative culture with a considerable ratio of traditional elements. Creative culture dynamics demonstrate impressive velocity. It is clear enough that such a rate has more than once led, on the one hand, to premature attempts at modernization of the traditional, and on the other – to occasional endeavors of its revival, which exactly are what we call 'totalitarian cultures'(unlike the conventional interpretation of totalitarian culture going back to H.Arendt works and based on its XX C. temporal and space localization in Germany and USSR, we construe the concept in a wider sense rather drawing on the reasons offered by T.Adorno and M.Horckheimer. See their collective work: "Dialectics of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments" (Adorno, Horckheimer, 1997)).

Such extremes couldn't be but extremely painful sociocultural phenomena since violence was required for their success. The later came a modernization attempt at a traditional culture, the larger-scale and bloodier was violence used to assert the culture being

revived. Thus, totalitarian culture turns out to be a crucial stage of both assertion and crisis of creative culture values.

Through periods of totalitarian rule went almost all ethnic versions of creative culture. As such we classify European absolute monarchy, nationalistic fascism, communist regimes and Islamic fundamentalism. Which version of the past is being revived, can differ. Sometimes it is the real past, as is the case of Islamic fundamentalism. The idealized past was preferred by fascism. In communism, in general, and in soviet culture, in particular we find a future that is construed with reliance upon certain specimen and archetypes of the idealized past.

Yet, we have to admit that no such project of the revival of the past has achieved success. What actually took place could be called a *conservative modernization* (The term was proposed by A.Vishnevsky. See his work "Sickle and Rouble. A Conservative Modernization in USSR" (Vishnevsky, 1998)), within which the past was falsified and the present negated for the sake of either the falsification itself of the future.

In XX C., creative culture entered an era of the global crisis of its most important values; totalitarianism became one of manifestations thereof. This crisis also affected rationalism, creativity, and personality. Its forms were varied. To the crisis of rationalism, we attribute such phenomena as totalitarianism, global environmental and democratic problems caused by the development of science and technology, a threat of a global nuclear apocalypses, other man-made disaster, terrorism. The crisis of creativity manifests itself in the stratification of culture into the mass one and the elitist one. Mass culture, being the result of wider political freedom and better wellbeing of people, represents an obvious refutation of the key principles of creative culture because it rests not on creative search, but rather upon an averaged psychophysical standard meeting the needs of the maximum number of people.

Considering the forms and content of mass culture, we find there quite a few equivalents of *traditional culture revival*, implemented forcibly and under totalitarian rule. In its turn, what elitist culture proposes as a protest against mass culture values, are artifacts that are overcomplicated sometimes to the degree of senselessness; it tends to create the new for the sake of itself, which also testifies to a creative crisis.

The personality crisis, in my view, entails the destruction of almost all key social institutions within both traditional and creative culture – the situation aptly described by Jilles Lipovetski as the “era of emptiness” (Lipovetsky, 2001; See also: Lasch, 1979) and loneliness: the pointless and unceasing process of self-identification and self-assertion both of a single person and of various “narcissistic” social groupings, which leads to their total isolation and loss of language capable of ensuring mutual understanding, joint activity and being. Today we are on the threshold of a new historical type of culture beginning to shape itself, within which the crisis of creative culture is to be solved under the threat of the destruction of mankind. The project of postmodern culture, however, as a synthesis of the mass and the elitist, is still in the implementation phase where we can’t access the degree of its achievement.

The postmodern synthesis is also the outcome of the imminent destruction and fall of totalitarianism, in particular, soviet culture, the outcome that hardly satisfies the needs and expectations of today’s Russian society. The same holds true for a postmodern overcoming of the personality crisis. A search for middle ground between the striving to group socially and individual self-assertion is only at its start.

Summing up this theoretical preamble wherein I have made an attempt to offer an explication of the methodology used in soviet culture studies, and taking into account the fact that the subject of this paper is the soviet *urban* culture, we have to consider another important taxonomy class that pertains to culture variation – i.e. *sub-culture*. It shall allow us to refine the morphology and historical typology of soviet culture we have deducted above, and apply them to the culture’s urban version.

3.3. Urban Sub-Culture as a Projection of the Typology and Morphology of Soviet Culture

Town, as opposed to village, has become one of the patterns of human settlement since the so called Neolithic revolution. That radical shift in civilization implied a range of processes and factors, such as: professionalization of trade/commerce/craftsmanship; a sharp rise in private property accumulation; class division; emergence of the state and centralized government. As the centre of power, trade, and craftsmanship, a town was at the same time the focus of population density growth and the place where quite a sophisticated culture was being worked out; in

comparison with the latter, the village culture that was being shaped from agricultural economy. This shaping of urban/rustic cultures was one of the oldest and most important culture divisions, a distribution of its types and typological characteristics between the two sub-cultures. The urban subculture is found in both traditional and creative culture types. In cattle-breeding peoples, due to particular characteristics of this type of economy (first and foremost, to its nomadism), this division of culture into the *urbs* and the *rus* did not take place whatsoever. This circumstance was what made the cattle-breeding nomads culturally very similar in several of its artifacts (social division, psycho-physical organization of man, value-orientational activity) to the archaic traditional culture that also did not know neither town nor village.

In ancient agricultural civilizations of the East, the town played no decisive role; although its culture was dominant politically, in praxeological and axiological aspects it had no such impact on the dynamics and content of history as in the village culture. This hierarchy of subcultures underwent a principal change in Greco-Roman Antiquity. Both in Greece, where material culture stemmed from trade and craftsmanship, and in Rome whose material culture was borne by war and economic expansion, the town began to play a crucial role in shaping the content and dynamics of historical cultural transformations.

In the Middle Ages, the situation was also complicated by the fact that the urban culture of the Greco-Roman world and of the Orient went through a differentiation resulting in two subcultures which various researchers termed ‘the burger’ and ‘the aristocratic’ (Gurevitch, 1984; See also: Le Goff, 1992). The same process affected the rural culture that divided into that of the church and of the monastery. Each of these cultures in European Middle Ages had very ancient roots. The folk culture of Romanized Teutonic tribes gave rise to the culture of the village, the Judeo-Christian tradition – to that of the church and monastery, the Greco-Roman antiquity – to the culture of burgers and nobility (the former to a much higher degree than the latter). In Middle Ages, the burger culture was the most dynamic one, it was the main source of crisis for the Medieval culture and the cause for the emergence of the creative culture of Renaissance; at the same time the dominant culture in this period was not that of the bourgeoisie but of the church and monastery. The creative culture that was born as a result was principally urban from the outset, its history being linked to a gradual degradation of all

medieval subcultures and their assimilation by the urban one. A town was the centre of creativity, individual initiative and rationalization – the demands of trade and industry. The culture of aristocracy was slowly dying– due to revolutions and democratization processes; after the Reformation the monastery had a role of no particular significance, and the rustic culture began to shape itself along the urban lines.

The famous soviet slogan that asserted and heralded “the merger of town and village” was, surely enough, based on real tendencies of the creative culture evolution. Obviously, all and any versions of the creative culture, including both the totalitarian and open species of it, were urban. Their sub-cultural stratification did no longer rely on the principal difference between *urbs* and *rus*. As was already noted above, a new distinction emerged – that between the mass and the elitist, i.e. the opposition of ‘culture – counter-culture’; this division is particularly important for characterizing the soviet period since various versions of protest against its official edition could be termed a ‘soviet counter-culture’. It was built under the influence of the stereotype it denied, and demonstrated a scale of radicalism degrees from an open dissident rejection and various reformist projects to the indifferent pattern of “digesting” totalitarianism and turning it into an ordinary everyday cultural environment.

Urban culture developed its own version of each creative culture artifact; this variation grew as the number of historical creative culture types did multiply. Urban culture had its own values, social institutions, psychophysical types of man, arts, even its own science along with its own arsenal of praxeological artifacts. When we consider the peculiar features of urban culture artifacts taken as a projection of the creative one, it allows us to define a range of sources for this study, i.e. the list and character of sources and materials to be analyzed to be able to reach our research goals.

Urban culture values, as is principally typical for all kinds of values, found their embodiment in each and every of its artifacts, but primarily in ideological doctrines that would appear in print as political party programs, school textbooks, nonfiction books, etc., and in mass media (papers, radio, cinema, television). In addition to this, urban culture values were realized in the very planning of the town and its districts, parks, squares, in the design and layout of the town centre and its monuments, in the architecture of individual

buildings and in sculptures; last but not least, in the social stratification of urban inhabitants. It was exactly these values that formed the integral generative model along whose directives every sphere of an appropriate historical type of the creative culture was built. Logically, soviet culture as a totalitarian phenomenon, shaped itself in a particularly consistent way, and its value model was especially clear and expressive.

First and foremost, a ‘town’ means houses and people, industrial and residential districts, administrative and public buildings, streets, squares and parks. A town as a tangible artifact is closely tied to a town as a piece of art, although urban arts can’t be reduced solely to the architecture of individual buildings and their distribution among the area. A town means different social groups, primarily blue and white collars, corporate management, services and the intellectuals. A town is always the focus of attraction for large masses of people, due to which reason it is here that healthcare, education and production acquire their classic forms. A town is a centre of science and art, because it is the creative, personalist traits of the urban population, their engagement in trade and industry that creates the best conditions for the development of science&arts infrastructure, of museums, universities, exhibition and concert halls, theatres, libraries, etc.

In this connection, to do urban studies in the age of creative culture means in fact studying culture *per se*. Each and any source of culture, its monuments, its chef-d-oeuvres can and must become the subject of cultural analysis. If, however we base our analysis on the axiological approach to culture (which in my view has the potential to reveal the specific integrity of a historical type of culture), what we have to take into consideration first are: urban ideology, mass media, journalistic and artistic reflection, urban toponymy, architecture and urban planning, social makeup of the population, industrial capacities (whose results are recorded both in material objects and in written sources such as archival statistics), its scientific, artistic and everyday life. The psychophysical traits and characteristics of the urban man are also of no small importance as a specific urban cultural feature reflected in art and ideology.

Soviet urban culture demonstrated all of the above features. From the outset, it fully conformed to the entirety of the classical urban culture requirements. Its ideology consistently realized itself in all possible artifacts. Finally, industrial production as the sole respected activity of the key revolutionary class – the

proletariat – could be deployed primarily in the town. Thus, if we consider an analysis of the urban culture, it seems to be the leading aspect of soviet cultural studies in general.

It is only natural that in a newly built town the peculiar features of soviet culture are to be implemented more fully than in a town with a history. In a new urban settlement everything – structures, population, ideology – can be designed, planned and built as it ought to be. Construction of new towns was dictated by both ideological (axiological) and economic (praxeological) considerations. A ‘new town’ in the USSR became the economic and ideological firing ground of the soviet culture.

In this perspective, we first of all have to busy ourselves with the task of recreating the axiological model of the soviet culture.

4. SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND VALUES

In this paragraph our goal is to demonstrate the strength of the axiological approach in relation to the main problem of this study; to show the content and scope of the concept ‘a model of the soviet culture’, and to illustrate the structure of the model. Most of the properties of the model will be analyzed in connection with the study of appropriate types of artifacts; however, in view of the holistic, integral nature of value-orientational activity and its results, their particular characteristics are to be considered first, which we shall do while characterizing existential values.

4.1. The Concept of an ‘Axiological Model’ and the Morphology of Soviet Values

We shall apply the term ‘value’ to the subjectively (here we mean personal/social subjectivity) understood ideal image of a phenomenon that fits into a certain holistic worldview of man and society that takes place (the worldview) at a particular location in space and at a particular moment in time. Thus, a ‘value’ is the attitude that allows man and society to guide themselves in the world and build this world. A value is to be distinguished from a praxeological norm and law. Although norms and laws, in the specific historical being of a value, accompany and determine each other, in a theoretical perspective they are dissimilar (Kagan, 1997; See also: Rickert, 1998).

The praxeological norm is dictated by the essence of the object, i.e. the harm and benefit done to it by normative actions. In relation to this ‘essence’ a

discussion is possible that can be resolved in favour of this or that position. The value, however, is subjective and is determined by an array of factors, primarily by a free and individual choice made by man and society. Values are different, you either accept or reject them; on the other hand, each such choice relies on various logical and practical reasons. This said, we have to admit that it is the norm that is always relative while the value is absolute, i.e. norms are viewed as permanently evolving, specifying, only approximating the reality, and values as already regulating human action here and now.

Values can evolve, too, but this development either follows a contradictory logic, or has none. They often change due to external circumstances, for instance, as a result of shifts in the practical or political life of man. Frequently, the change is caused by unexplainable or post-factum subjectively explainable reasons. This last fact is what complicates extremely a search for the driving force of values’ historical dynamics. We can assert that values correspond to the nature of man or society only in the most general sense. Since this ‘nature’ is subjective as such, it eludes definition. A distinction between values and laws is defined by a somewhat different set of principles. More often than not, a law is a synthesis of a norm and a value. On the one hand, a law is a variety of a praxeological norm, i.e. it constitutes both a social norm and benefit. But the social being is saturated with values, unlike the being of the nature and the physical being of man. A social law is what produces the notion of social good.

Inasmuch as society is the result of certain objective processes brought to life by man’s need to exist in specific natural and societal circumstances, then this law is a norm. But insofar as society is a unique and freely acting social subject, this law is a value. The same holds true for all possible norms as they exist in the holistic social&anthropological world. Each and any object, when it gets into this world, becomes not only useful, but also valuable.

A most remarkable example of this was the famous discussion between soviet biologists Nicolay Vavilov and Trofim Lysenko and their adherents. This debate was basically a praxeological one as it began from the so-called scientific&practical reason. The argument touched the question of different agricultural technologies, their relative use or harm, the labour productivity ratio, cost cutting, etc. etc. It would appear that the object itself, i.e. the agro technology, is what would determine the outcome of the debate. However,

in the context of soviet culture where axiology was not less significant than praxeology, the victory went to the value, not to the norm.

I understand a value as a model/pattern for a phenomenon or activity, as its subjective idea. Models and ideals are not always axiological. It is fairly possible to speak of praxeological or gnoseological models (Wartofsky, 1988). Such a model is a way of recording objective or useful knowledge. Unlike an abstract notion, this is specific and due to this fact very promising heuristically. What it does is a vivid demonstration of an object's features instead of simply naming them, which paves the way for revealing its new characteristics. A simple analysis of a concept can never produce this as it only specifies the knowledge we already have, not finds out new one. The majority of such models is tangible; intangible ones also do exist, for instance mathematical.

A value does not constitute such a tangible model. Materiality of a value is a particular case. Normally it has no appropriate material expression. Not each and any culture can shape such expressions. On the other hand, a value is contained in each culture artifact. A culture thing is always an artificial product, i.e. it always has a function, a specific purpose. This function, or purpose, in its turn, at all times contains a value, although it is perfectly clear that benefit or good can also be there.

The morphology of such a model is decided by the essence of cultural morphology, i.e. is the latter's projection. Obviously, there are anthropologic values: physical and mental. The former belong to esthetic values, the latter to ethical ones. It is a model of man's habitus and his psychological traits, his behavior.

Values can be:

- social, that are partly ethical and partly institutional; these are the models of family, state, workforce;
- cultural; these are artistic, scientific and tangible values;
- technological + particular evaluation technologies, i.e. those ascribing an artifact to a value; and technologies of value creation;

Finally, there is a special type of values – existential ones, that unite all other values within a single model. Occasionally this model appears to be very open and

shapeless; inside it, however, all its elements are always interconnected, which connections are derivatives from existential values. In cultures of the traditional type, existential values often had their own tangible expression; they were preserved in mythology and rites, in religious canons. In creative cultures this ceased to be obligatory, but still it was not lost altogether. The most popular way of expressing values was now ideology.

In soviet culture, by virtue of its totalitarianism, values always were more or less organized, 'canonized' and contained in different versions of ideology artifacts. In this connection I already mentioned mass media, political journalism, social and political relations, toponymy and onomastics, arts (above all the monumental art, various visual arts, literature and cinema). The value-orientational activity in the Soviet Union enjoyed a privileged place in the system of culture, competing in this with praxeological activities. Within this structure value and usefulness were always critically important, although at times other activities made attempts to rival with them, e.g. at the time when physics were romanticized in 1960ies. The structure of the soviet culture value model was also hierarchical. The praxeological pathos of soviet culture almost brought to naught the concept of the nature's value; even the idea that it needs to be protected and preserved was beyond public awareness for decades. The nature was seen as a raw material to be transformed; valuable were its size and resources but not integrity and pristineness. Meanwhile praxeological values were coming to the fore. Only social and political ones could compete. The values of man and culture were produced in the manner of the latter. Existential values, including among them the very value-orientational activity, were also very important.

It should be noted here, that soviet culture changed over time and went in its evolution through at least three phases, as follows:

- the time when its canonical model was beginning to shape itself (1917 – 1920ies);
- the time of its classical form (1930ies – 1950ies)
- the time of differentiation and then decay of the established canon (1960ies – 1991) (Kostyurina, 2000).

In each of these periods, the value model was modified and yet retained its key characteristics. The second period turned out to be most illustrative for our

understanding of the nature of the soviet culture model and perspectives of its evolution.

It should be also noted that in a totalitarian context this model could not but differ from the reality it modelled. Analysis of specific soviet culture artifacts provides us with remarkable examples of such digression. Occasionally the model could not be implemented because it was either chimeric or impracticable due to a lack of resource and technologies, or to its unsuitability to the nature of the object which was to be changed; in other cases, there was a distance between its directives and the minds of the executors, the one unremovable by violence and coercion and only becoming larger.

Our characterization of the soviet culture model begins from its core –existential values.

4.2. Existential Values

Within the framework of a traditional culture, existential values were part of various religious systems. Their goal was to help answer the key question of human life – the meaning of it. Man is a subjective being to the extent that this subjectivity creates a major existential contradiction to be solved every individual and by the society: that between the infiniteness and unique content of a human life and the universal finiteness of its temporal and spatial form. From the very beginning man becomes a hero of a tragedy with all the attributes of the latter: exclusiveness, fatality of the end and a fight against destiny.

The traditional culture could remit this conflict in the two main ways: first, by reducing man's exclusiveness to that of his kinship and, second, by proclaiming that a victory over man's destiny is to be found in the other world, which remits the temporal & spatial finiteness of human existence. Such decisions proved rather inefficient in the context of the creative culture, although they have been preserved in various modifications. The meanings of life were now many, and everyone in this world had to either choose among them or invent his own meaning. In the final analysis, this choice always meant a sacrifice in favour of public needs, as the latter were the only possible environment for its implementation.

And most importantly, each instance of the choice was felt as not final and satisfactory, as a substitute of a kind, to be accepted only for lack of anything better.

After all, in the world of atheism the existential choice of man cannot principally remit the contradictions and tragedies of his life. What soviet culture did, due to its totalitarianism, was to fully revitalize the methods used to resolve the existential contradiction within the traditional culture (primarily following Russian national patterns but not always consistently so). The exclusiveness of man was reduced to the exclusiveness of a society to which the latter belonged, while overcoming the finiteness of human being was relegated to the other world – that of the future.

All this was atheistic, i.e. the value of the future was thought of as being related to a specific historical world where the justification of any human death takes place. The present was also valued but only as a comparison with the past and present of other states and peoples, and considerably less than the value of the future.

The meaning of a human life was considered to be found in sacrificial work for the benefit of the society, which will create, in future, the material and spiritual conditions of being that would conform to the true nature of man and society. The inevitable ineffectiveness of this work and the social and mental depression resulting from it, were remitted through a range of compensatory mechanisms, such as:

- appealing to the only possible and ethically (and even scientifically) grounded nature of such work,
- building a society that would provide everyone with equal conditions for and results of their work (at least, as a model, although often as an implementation as well),
- shifting the effectiveness of such work to a point in future,
- creating a climate of social unity, which is necessary to achieve the vast tasks that are being complicated by inner and outer deadly threats.

In contrast to the traditional culture, this specific meaning of life was to be better protected because it was not only taken for granted as the only possible, but also considered to be the 'right' one. The XX C. was the age of a skyrocketing growth in science and technology, which ensured better information awareness for the people, which always left some room for doubt concerning the uncontestedness and optimality of soviet values. It was necessary to

constantly support and substantiate them in all sorts of ways. This end was served even by the concept of a free choice as a 'conscious necessity', in favour of the best/only possible being. Such interpretation covered not only the idea of freedom, but also that of equality, brotherhood, democracy and other values of the modernization of culture/society. All these values received a socialist air.

The victory of the proletariat (in virtue of this class' 'historical mission' and hence exclusiveness) presupposed only 'proletarian' freedom, equality and democracy, i.e. it was a hegemony. The real power, at the same time, was in the hands of another social grouping – the party bureaucracy, while equality and freedom found themselves altogether beyond reality.

Implementation of the existential value model was ensured by several sociocultural systems, primarily the political one. The one-party political system with its rigid hierarchy and strict discipline, turned out to be a parallel system of power that actually governed the country in lieu of rather fictitious executive and legislative authorities. This system was the carrier of the ideology (i.e. of the value-based model of soviet culture) into each workforce 'collective' and eventually into the consciousness of every citizen. The values were translated directly and indirectly. The direct translation of ideas was carried out as part of the activity of thousands nuclear party organizations. Indirectly this was realized as the 'leading and guiding role' of the party in all other forms and types of human activity, chiefly in production, education and culture. The number of party members was not stable, it slightly varied over decades, but the general trend was a steady increase; by mid 1989ies it reached 20 mln. This progress was notable even in 1930ies despite cruel purges and the mass extermination of communists by Stalin: "in 1926 the party counted 1088 thousand members and candidates, in 1930 – around 2 mln, at the beginning of 1934 – 2.8 mln, in February 1941 – over 3.8 mln members" (Dmitrenko *Ed.*, 2001). What should also be noted are youth and children organizations (the Komsomol, the Pioneers and the Little Octobrists) through which they Party organized ideological work across the whole spectrum of age groups in soviet society.

The means by which the ideology was translated were papers, cinema, television and radio. Each important social institution and organization had its own newspaper to help broadcast the soviet ideology. The work of mass media available to all and any (cimenta,

radio, later television) was under strictest control and regulation; no publication was immune from censorship. Fiction, monumental and visual arts implemented soviet values through their imagery, trying to make their object look more appealing to the public. Town planning and architecture also embodied this model in the very existence of a certain types of buildings, architectural ensembles, their décor, etc. Both urban toponymy and human onomastics consistently reflected the life meaning of a soviet citizen by immortalizing appropriate events and heroes. At last, the system of official holidays with their mass parades and processions gave the soviet culture a would-be cheerful and emotionally positive air.

In a greater detail we shall consider these artifacts later, in appropriate paragraphs of the paper; what is important at the moment is to demonstrate which exactly artifacts did embody and realize the model of soviet culture in its integrative ideology, i.e. the existential values that help humans comfortably exist in a meaningful world.

The following paragraphs will treat specific aspects of the model under consideration.

5. SOVIET SOCIETY AND HOMO SOVETICUS

Herein I treat the 'soviet society' and 'soviet man' solely as the two components of the axiological model of soviet culture, pointing out just the most universal characteristics of its implementation.

Surely, the totality of such characteristics can't be the object of this paper, so we shall dwell on those that are most peculiar to the creative culture in general and soviet culture in particular.

First, these are social institutions (state, workforce collectives, family and several informal associations). Within the framework of soviet culture, the latter group was practically lacking, while class-based and party organizations were very influential. Second, these are characteristics of man to which within the creative culture belong the biosocial (sex, age, somatic, esthetic) and sociocultural ones (ethics, vocational, educational)

Unlike in the traditional culture which practically identified man with its group turning an individual into the *ethnophor* of appropriate values, in the creative culture these characteristics were manifold, varied, and man had a choice between series of corresponding standards or could even create his own ones. The

soviet culture narrowed this choice considerably, although not eliminated it altogether.

5.1. Social Institutions

The soviet society was considered to be the greatest value by itself. Implemented in it was one of the major totalitarian properties as such – the primacy of the social over the individual. In traditional cultures this hierarchy was always reinforced by the belief in the original *status quo*. The soviet society couldn't rest upon 'sacred ancient traditions', instead it was offered new ones – those sanctified by a moral ideal and science, reinforced by belief in the bright future and by fear of the loss of this all due to some hostile acts.

These new traditions were doomed from their birth because they contained a manifest contradiction: they relied on culture artifacts that were deeply antagonistic to any traditions whatsoever, which in its turn brought about a necessity to reconstruct these phenomena considerably, first of all, a need to ideologize science and the society in general.

The soviet society was conceived and designed in a way that envisioned it as being integrated and unified to the utmost, and despite the ideas of equality its pivot was a stringent hierarchy and consistently implemented bureaucratic red tape. At the same time this society was postulated as the only possible condition for the true existence of man. All the problems and pains of man were treated as the outcome of society's wrongs where he lives. The source of injustice, they thought, was private property that sanctioned economic exploitation, alienation of man from other men and from means/products of his labour (i.e. from culture), political lawlessness, immorality and superstition, i.e. in fact the traditions that had up to then endorsed this unfair status quo.

A fair society was thought of as the one where equal opportunities would be provided for all culture creators. Since private property was a hindrance to this, it had to be collectivized. In future the society was conceived of as the one where there would be no deficit, everything be reasonable, ordered and having the existence that conforms to man's nature, if only that nature would not be improved somehow. It is in such a society that the true freedom, equality and democracy would be feasible.

Material prerequisites for the creation of such a society were lacking, however; they were planned to be

provided ASAP through mobilizing for this end of each an any soviet citizen. In other words, the 'soviet project' largely deviated from the core Marxist notion of material culture primacy over social and economic relations, which was justified by a need to ensure an outstripping modernization – the one that Russia had to face at the turn of XX c. What was needed to realized the soviet project was a full control over man and his activity. In these circumstances, any informal social groupings were viewed as threatening and unacceptable. Even official non-governmental organizations were modelled on the same standard as any soviet public institution. The key ones were the Party and the Soviet State. We already talked of the role of the Party, which consisted in translating soviet values to any specific individual throughout his/her life, in order to be able to regulate all forms of his/her activity.

In this context, the soviet state acted as a repressive and managerial means of solving all possible axiological and praxeological tasks. The soviet army, state security, police – were stringently hierarchic and disciplined; the exact number of people directly involved in the work of these agencies and bodies or cooperating with them as informers or agents, is not countable, yet it surely was very large. After the model of the army, the soviet 'civil society' was built; very characteristic were militarized 'amateur societies' like DOSAAF (Rus. abbr. for Russian Army, Air Force and Navy Volunteer Society), mandatory reservist refresher training camps, firing range drills, paramilitary sports, etc., etc. The true power and property was at the hands of the party and government people; yet none of them was really protected from purges and physical elimination. The repressive bureaucratic machinery, in its turn, was subjected to an ongoing staff rotation. The class of red tape was constantly fuelled with new blood. The society's hierarchy structure was very permeable and social mobility high. Indeed, the soviet government solved many social problems, at least partly, it guaranteed it's people the right to work, to lodging to education, to partaking in authority; all this, however, was paternalistic in character and never corresponded to a real demand. The dissidents or those capable of resistance (occasionally random people) were eliminated: first the bourgeoisie, then the clergy, aristocracy, freethinkers, at last the proletariat and peasants. This terror was directed against everybody, since each soviet citizen as to feel, on the one hand, his/her lawlessness, and on the other – the their full engagement in an absolutely fair social whole (See

new data on the number of the repressed by Stalin in: Ostrovsky, 2000).

A specific axiological institution was shaped – the cult of the leader/chief. As E.V. Samoylov demonstrated in his book, these are characteristic features of this cult: “paranoidly exaggerated self-assessment, theatricality and public posturing (Samoylov, 1993, 141). The leader is always presented in a paradoxical manner when he is at the same time a representative of the people and a creature that in all respects excels the ordinary man, why he is called ‘the father’. All possible parallels with God the Father, Creator of the Universe are acceptable and appropriate, and even consciously welcome. Mythologization of the personality and inexistence of genuine information on him are characteristics of how his value was created.

Axiologically the soviet society was modelled as an international one. The ideal of nation was looked down at as survival of the past; in fact, at the same time it was introduced the notion of a new national (supranational) entity – the *soviet society* the one that has integrated and assimilated in itself all other nations. In such a society, consolidation was always supported by the specially created system of anti-values, to which belonged the threats to the soviet society posed by hostile capitalist states and their governments.

This was what created conditions for the emergence of the soviet cultural isolationism and chauvinism. Preparing for a war and intermittently waging it was an important component of this consolidation and isolation. Another side of that was the policy aiming to shape notions about the internal foes of the soviet values (“the enemies of the people”) whose goal it was to destroy them. A reference to emergency was a typical prerequisite for justification of any forms of violence and terror in the soviet society. At last, as the major social value was regarded the proletariat and the so-called ‘labour collectives’ (organized groups of hired personnel – proletarians – at enterprises and organizations). Proletariat is the leading and most important cohort of the population, the creator of today’s culture, but concurrently the most oppressed and underprivileged group. In this connection, each and every ‘labour collective’ was seen as the key social unit whose values were proclaimed to be above all other ones. This state of affairs was enhanced by the specific soviet attitude towards labour. It was labour that was viewed as the activity most appropriate to human nature, capable of building a just society,

bringing material well-being and protecting one’s right to exist in a fight against enemies.

Other social classes were considered to be less valuable and acceptable only in virtue of their closeness to proletarians. The nearest class were peasants, then office workers, brain workers. To be close to the proletariat meant to be engaged in a non-exploitation activity which was, in turn, necessary for the proletariat to solve their own problems. The notion that a family is a value in the soviet society shaped itself only gradually and went a long way in its becoming from total rejection, which corresponded to F.Engels who taught that this institution was economically patriarchal, to its partial rehabilitation in Stalin’s years. The value of soviet family was treated first and foremost in its educational and physiological aspects. Family is the environment where children are born and brought up, consequently it is the key means of reproduction and an ideological institution of shaping new society members as the carriers of a certain axiological pattern. All other aspects of a family were declared to be private and even harmful to the soviet society.

5.2. Homo Sovieticus

The *Homo soveticus* was a specific sociocultural historical type of man with its somatic and mental characteristics. The value model of it was secondary and derived from the model of the soviet culture. I already noted that strictly speaking we ought not understand this derivation as that of the ethnophore of the traditional culture whose characteristics were fully determined by appropriate sociocultural standards. Under totalitarian circumstances, there is always a space between a model and the reality of culture. At the same time, totalitarianism jealously looks at how its standards are being implemented, and successfully enough in many a case.

The soviet frame of society actively blocked the shaping of a genuine unique personality of the creative culture, largely it only created various forms of mass culture to which we have every reason to attribute the culture of political dissidents. When a soviet individual showed unusual activity (e.g. the Stakhanovism or a socialist competition) it was something strongly stimulated by the society and not an expression of some personal creative needs. This activity was the result of either a ‘social contract’ that one way or another conformed to people’s expectation, or direct violence against them (the people). Any initiative lying

beyond the established social standards was either punished or found no support/acceptation and died out.

Let us now consider the biosocial characteristics of *Homo soveticus*, i.e. those that are the result of acculturation of the biological peculiarities of humans. Among these we count first of all sex, age and somesthetics. These features had no particular weight among other traits of the soviet man (this society was not, after all, an archaic one, at its heart lay something more than simply the species survival and reproduction), although in the framework of a totalitarian culture in the making they could not but become standardized.

For the soviet ideology, it was originally characteristic that everywhere they saw potentials for convergence: of labour and intellect, of town and village, of the two sexes, of social classes, etc. Under Joseph Stalin, there were still no laconic formulations that would determine the gist and essence of this coming together; however, in the form of a value canon felt by many it already existed, which was visually attested to by the sculpture and cinematography of the soviet times. The soviet workman was only slightly different from the soviet peasant, as both were perceived as the men of the same ideas, worked within the same soviet culture, and were looked upon as the two versions of the same value model.

The same holds true for the sexual characteristics of man. A male and a female are equal in everything; first of all, they are both workers who manufacture 'significant public goods/products'. Frankly, a woman was always regarded as a mother, but this maternity was only a version of 'productive activity', i.e. in this case we are to speak of the 'manufacture' of soviet people. The expression of all other sexual characteristics of women and men (for instance, their sexuality) which occasionally found place in the rigid configuration of the soviet model, were at all times viewed as only a concession to human nature. Love is what distracts one from production and from a fight towards the bright future; therefore, it can't be taken as a true value. This conflict was very much relevant for the soviet art in the 1930ies. Its positive solution was sought in innovative applications of sexual energy, i.e. its redirection to the 'right' – industrial – purposes.

That was the context in which the somesthetics of the soviet people was contemplated and construed. Both male and female bodies were represented (portrayed) as powerful but sexually unattractive. What

a soviet artist depicted was not the prominent accentuated muscles or appealing forms, but rather the industrial potential of the body, its strength, determination and modesty. This approach was not hampered even by the realistically formed genitals, although often quite schematically depicted. It was the peculiar intellectual expression of the soviet body was that remitted or smoothed the contradiction between the physical and mental aspects of human existence. Physical development was not its own end; it was viewed as a precondition for meeting the accepted social standard, as an opportunity to attain the goals put forward by the society. There was, however, another standard of the soviet corporeality: an exhausted by hard labour, lean, sickly hero with glowing eyes. This latter stereotype was accompanied by peculiar temporal characteristics, namely it was associated with the tragic conditions of life in the past, of a revolutionary shaped by the severe constraints of the feudal and bourgeois Russia of previous times. Both standards, however, had something in common: the hero is at all times (thanks or contrary to his/her body) a fighter who overcomes all obstacles swiftly and powerfully, constantly the victor thanks to his belief in the justice of the cause he advocates.

At last, the axiologically significant age of soviet man is always that of his full vigour (youth was only a variation of this flourish, slightly different from maturity). Even children and the elderly were, respectively, the young and the experienced workers. Childhood was viewed as only a preparation for the future adult state and not an independent period of human life. The value of childhood was always on the agenda; on the other hand, the age specificity was never reckoned with. On April 7th, 1935 the USSR passed a legislation providing for capital punishment for political and criminal offence by "persons under 12 y/o", i.e. children. The boundary between childhood and adulthood remained vague and was constantly shifted back towards birth. Ideologization of childhood (i.e. formation of an exemplary soviet person) was total; it accompanied a youngster if not from his/her first days then from the time of the first instances of socialization. The Octobrists' and Pioneers' organizations were very bright examples of such.

Old age was either perceived as an 'experienced maturity', or simply discarded. The value of old age was seen not in individual longevity but in the continuation of work and in its quality. Death was significant and valuable only as a sacrifice, as part of the picture of a fight and heroism; it was never seen as

a tragedy, as destruction of human personality or the end of its sinful being for the sake of eternal life. A brave death left traces in the memory of descendants; practically speaking, the social eternity of human memory was one of the main methods used to resolve the existential contradiction mentioned above. (Subsequently, the soviet attitude towards senility and death would express itself in the culture of soviet urban cemeteries and ritual complexes).

Sociocultural characteristics were a stronger factor in the shaping of soviet man's typological specificity than biosocial ones. In the context of soviet society's ideologization and its modernization, other characteristics of man like morality, education and vocation came to the fore. Soviet morality was the subject of many dissertations on the ethics. Today they constitute an excellent material for the cultural analysis of 'soviet man'. The key property of a 'soviet virtuous deed' was its conformity to the collective ideals, i.e. sacrificial devotion to the 'Soviet Motherland' and 'the Cause of Socialism'. Being true to soviet ideals and an optimistic faith in their realization – this is the second virtue of a soviet man. He should be happy to sacrifice everything (including his own life) to the triumph of communist ideals; it is the sacred duty not only of a communist but also of every soviet citizen. Personal plans and interests – all this is only a flaw in the edifice of soviet morality, another unwelcome concession to human nature. Education and professionalism could not but take a certain place in the structure of the soviet man's model. The conditions of technological modernization of the soviet culture required that the share of skilled labour should expand. The pursuit of education was stimulated politically. However, education, professionalism, and qualification were seen as valuable inasmuch as they provided additional opportunities to consolidate soviet values and material culture.

Knowledge, nevertheless, always brings with it expanded horizons and premises for a conscious personalized attitude to the subject of cognition. The growth of knowledge always leads to the shaking of traditions. Due to this reason, in the USSR education was under suspicion at all times; brain workers' salary was smaller than that of the manual ones. The machinery of ideological control over knowledge and its production was immense, particularly concerning such knowledge that had a direct relation to the soviet values. Suffice it to recall that philosophy in the USSR had long been out of curriculum altogether, while

axiology as a discipline did not have a legal status till the very last days of the system.

The majority of scientific frauds took place in the social sciences. Dissent was suppressed harshly; for its prevention, criminal and administrative cases were initiated on the basis of fabricated evidence. In a more detail, the value models of science will be characterized in further paragraphs dealing with cognition, transformation and their results.

6. PRACTICAL ACTIVITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE OF SOVIET MAN

In this section of the paper I shall talk of the sociocultural spheres of soviet man's existence that were most important to him and consumed much of his consciously spent time. I mean relations of production and intersubjective relations, i.e. the communication that found its expression in the system of leisure and everyday life of a soviet man, his education and healthcare.

6.1. Production

In this section by the term 'production' we shall mean creation of new things – implements and consumer goods – and transformation of nature (transformation of man will be our subject in further paragraphs). We have already seen that nature per se did not belong to the soviet culture values. It was important as a source of materials (assets, resources) for industrial transformation. The latter wasn't of equal worth in all its structural components, whose value was the higher the closer they were to the standards derived from the core of the soviet axiological model.

Its crucial transformational aspect was industry, large-scale extraction and processing. Important, too, was the infrastructure that accompanied these activities, i.e. power engineering and transport. Building new towns/cities belongs to industrial infrastructure, of course. Supplying electric power and gas, building motorways and railways, towns/cities and plants, extraction and processing of natural minerals, heavy engineering – such are the key sectors of manufacturing employment.

A special role falls on the armaments industry. USSR strove to modernize itself quickly along the lines of the leading western countries, and to surpass the latter. The global economic isolation the soviet republic found itself in after the October Revolution of 1917 complicated this task greatly as foreign investment in

the soviet economy was impossible in principle. But the military pressure on the USSR from hostile, industrialized and military powerful countries was really serious, despite the fact that in the soviet ideology this threat was largely hyperbolized.

Under such circumstances, industrial growth, including armaments production, was the requirement *sine qua non* of survival of the soviet statehood. The growth eventually turned out to be considerable, both in absolute terms and in its rate. During the second five-year plan (1932 – 1937) the amount of electricity production rose by 280.6%, oil/gas production – by 136.5%, iron ore – by 238.3%, steel-making – by 334.1%, machine-tool construction went up by 52%.

By the end of this time, the USSR ranked five in heavy engineering (and second in the production of lorries) (Kiselev *et al. Ed.*, 1996, 424 – 425, 432). At that, the entry level from which it all started was rather low if compared with the leading producers (USA, GB, France) and in many a sector did not conform to the plan. Thus, the *de facto* amount of capital works by 1935 was 50% short of what had been expected.

According to soviet ideology, industry was not only the most useful, but also the most valuable sphere of human activity. Rejection of private property and individual entrepreneurship as the main evil that impedes implementation of social justice, the only opportunity left for legal labour is that at large state-owned enterprises, i.e. industrial plants. I have already mentioned that the system of historical materialism postulated that it was the proletariat who due to their number and the undoubtedly significant contribution to the global economic wellbeing, was seen as the most valuable class for the erection of an absolutely fair society and its culture that would perfectly correspond to human nature.

Consequently, industrial labour was a model for human activity, its most prestigious sphere. This situation was emphasized by the whole soviet ideology, arts and the system of economic incentive.

But industrial progress in the XX C. always welcomed automation, R&D and high-tech. This gave birth to the two social economic development trends that were very dangerous to the soviet ideology: first, contraction in the proletariat share of the employment structure and an increasing proportion of R&D workers and managerial/service personnel. The number of personnel in soviet management was always large, first

of all due to the cohort of party functionaries, government red tape, military and the repressive political police. The rise in the number of R&D personnel fell on 1960ies, of which we shall talk later. The service sector remained underdeveloped. At the time of Josef Stalin, the mentioned trends had not yet gained full expression but were only indicating their presence; later on they gathered momentum and led to the fall of the whole edifice of the soviet state and culture. In that early phase we are talking about now, modernization was only beginning, and yet under a strict ideological control, which allowed the soviet axiological model to take root and consolidate itself.

Its strengthening and establishment was due to human enthusiasm and heroism actively stimulated by the soviet state, and due to large-scale violence and coercion: physical elimination of the unwanted and dissenters, limiting civil rights and freedoms (e.g. a new 'enslavement' of the peasants, stripping them of national passports; preventing several social groups from entering colleges and universities), forced labour.

The 'labour heroism' I have already mentioned was a soviet reality. Many soviet citizens were very sincere and active in their engagement in the modernization plants proposed by the bolsheviks. This could not be otherwise, under the conditions of total ideological control and a strictly censored and unified propaganda, of the system of enculturation of the approved values. Among other things, the industrial growth indeed led to the improved prosperity of soviet people, or at least gave them opportunities to earn a decent living. The other component of successful industrial modernization has always been coercion. The most illustrative forms of it were the collectivization of soviet peasants and mass employment of the 'special contingent' (political convicts) at the great Stalin construction projects.

We should remember here that forced labour was possible (and efficient) only in the starting phases of modernization when demand for skilled labour was low and what was needed was people's physical force. Even regular extermination of engineers and other technical intellectuals who were being lacked sorely, could not stop the industrial progress although hampered it considerably. The soviet industry as a part of planned economy did not take into account particular needs and interests of its own population, which was always justified by 'emergencies' that 'besieged' the young soviet state, in the form of an external threat, etc., and by a 'future solution' to all problems. The industry had its high strategy to follow (primarily the

ideological consolidation of the state) and understandably did not have much resources to cater for the needs of ordinary humans. We already saw that meeting such earthly needs was looked at as unavoidable concession to human nature, which was valued very low. A soviet man, to the extent of his experience and imagination, could have dreams of a better life; however, he viewed every specific step toward this comfort as an anti-value, philistinism and a mean-spirited love for 'things' unworthy of a soviet citizen. Economic prosperity for all was true happiness, a comfort for one fell very short of a transgression. At the same time, a real economic stratification was always ingrained in the fabric of the soviet society. The most well-off were the party and executive bureaucracy, high-ranking official artist and scholars, industrial management and several very well-paid categories of skilled workers.

A certain contradiction inherent in the soviet planned economy should be noted at this point: it could resolve social problems but it paid no attention to the real demand and made no attempt to supply to it; in a sense it knew what overproduction was like in respect of several segments of consumer goods. And yet, what ordinary soviets knew was the unceasing shortage of food, clothes, etc. etc. Under Josef Stalin there were years of true famine. Only decades later starvation began to be seen as something absolutely out of tune with the modest but cozy little world of a soviet man. Automation of everyday life in the USSR was being attained also very slowly if anyhow. Private enterprises and cooperation had been nearly extinguished and now were utterly insignificant. Agriculture, even in 'fat' years, turned out less food that was really needed; it was not enough even for a soviet man's more than humble purchasing capacity.

The soviet salary, even the largest one, always had a limit beyond which even the General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee could not earn a Rouble. Coupled with the mentioned shortage of goods on store shelves, all this made fertile ground for a shadow economy and illegal earnings.

6.2. Education and Healthcare

The production activity of a soviet man was always directed both at manufacture of material things and at himself and the society. This 'transition' form of activity between subject-object transformation and personal interaction can be called communication. The crucial aspects of such communication are linked to the most

important sides of human existence, body and spirit. Transformation of the body is intended to ensure its preservation, improvement and recovery; the spheres of culture that correspond to these tasks are: healthcare, mass sports, various sorts of psychosomatic rehabilitation.

Transformation of the human spirit means education (acculturation and socialization of an individual, the forms of his/her adaptation in the world of culture and society that are to become his/her appropriated forms of being) and upbringing (formation of a personality, i.e. of a socially and culturally significant, unique and creatively active member of society and culture). These processes did often cross each other as they were directed at the same thing – the integral, holistic existence of man; but still in real practice their implementation attested to a difference, because strictly speaking the object of each was its own aspect of being. All this allows us to study the two separately not losing sight of the said link. Education and upbringing in the USSR were largely isomorphous and overlapping. Despite the fact that soviet philosophy and pedagogy tried to distinguish between the two, in reality they constituted a single technology of organization of the soviet psychosomatic type. In Stalin's time, all experiments in the area of education and personality formation were stopped, and a unified multilayered system of specialist training emerged. The final goal of upbringing was now not a unique personality but 'a member of the soviet society'. At the same time, upbringing retained some of its specific forms that institutionally if not essentially distinguished it from education.

Education was unified, which meant that no deviations from the accepted methodology of teaching and 'the right' choice of material were allowed. Pre-school, secondary school, college and post-graduate education was the same all across the country. Local history aspects only emphasized that, in fact offered a variation of this single methodology and contents of the soviet education that found expression appropriate sets of teaching materials (handbooks, manuals, study aids, recommendations, study materials, readers, journals). The ideological component of this system was always the core and pivot of this unification. The system of soviet values was endorsed and taught by the example of the most expressive forms of being where it was contained, i.e. in humanities and social/cultural subject fields. Several subjects in the soviet system of education were particularly vivid illustrations of what I've just said. In secondary school it was history and

literature. In tertiary education this included the history of the Communist Party, the scientific communism, and the Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

Education was universal although occasionally limited to general literacy, primary and secondary school. Tertiary education became a soviet reality only in 1960ies but remained very scarce till the end. It had an encyclopedic coverage which also corresponded to the totalitarian soviet culture and its principles; it was designed to determine the consciousness and practices of each and every soviet citizen, and to satisfy all his/her spiritual or material interests. Even such subjects as physics and chemistry that treat mostly the world of inanimate things and consequently have no direct ideology in them, began to have such in the form of historical excursions, declared political goals of learning them, etc. References to the authority of Marxism-Leninism classics and current leaders of the Party was a must both for scholarly dissertations and for educational materials.

Another target for education was to provide for the planned economy needs and the appropriate social demand (practically or ideologically-based); at the same time, it always retained a semblance of encyclopedism, formalized for the most part, thanks to its ideological component. This approach had some advantages of a kind. First, practical illiteracy was effectively done away with, and the value of education, particularly the tertiary one, rose sharply. “By year 1930, the number of the literate if compared with a decade before had nearly doubled (from 33 up to 63 %)” (Dmitrenko *Ed.*, 2001). I have already pointed out that this value more often than not had no financial reinforcement, and even was given a secondary place in the hierarchy of social statuses being largely inferior in this to the value of labour activity. Still, it existed and was supported by the state. Secondary schools and universities became plentiful in the soviet times; the wider public got access to education at any level due to its being free of charge of inexpensive.

Second, due to the strive towards universality and orientation to practical needs of the economy, soviet graduate specialists in some of the fields (primarily in the fundamental science and engineering, and in the social studies and humanities that were less ideologized) had their knowledge and skills at the world level and even better. Isolationism of the soviet training system (that became apparent, for instance, in the foreign language education that did not imply practical fluency which appeared to be needless) was offset for

a long while by powerful governmental aid and did not result in stagnation and deterioration. This counterbalancing effect, though, could not eliminate the defects. In fact, soviet education was called upon to rather conceal the true scheme of things and replace it with a convenient mythology and ideology of the soviet culture.

We already talked of upbringing when we gave characteristics of the psychophysical type of soviet man. Among its proper forms of expression were various kinds of social institutions (ideologized children's and youth organizations like the Octobrists, Pioneers, the Young Communist League), a wide system of educational and auxiliary labour competitions (metal scrap gathering, subbotniks – Saturday communist volunteer works-in), forms of social encouragement or punishment (comrades' courts, wall newspapers, etc.), and at last, the system of mass public events (official holidays, political information sessions, mass manifestations). Let us emphasize ones again that the unification of education corresponded to unification of upbringing, and the product of all this was the standard psychophysical type of man – Homo soveticus. The whole system of existential values (sense of life, happiness) was thought of as corresponding to the type, while what opposed it were officially declared anti-values and the dissenters' counter-values.

The health of a soviet man had value insofar as it could provide for the reproduction of soviet people, society and industrial processes. On the one hand, heroic labour, famine, devastation, miscalculations of the planned economy and their results, mass repressions, etc., etc., took its toll on human life, so healthcare took second place or got cancelled altogether. On the other, the system of healthcare and health rehabilitation in Stalin's time grew and improved steadily; it was available to the wider the population as being free and systematically widespread. In Stalin's constitution, the right to labour was supplemented by the right to leisure, i.e. to after-work rehabilitation; labour legislation provided for the length of a working day, the number of weekends and holidays, the age of the start or end of one's woklife. Child labor in the industry was also brought down steadily and by 1950ies became very rare.

Similar tasks were solved through the so-called 'physical culture', i.e. healthy lifestyle, active leisure and mass fitness/sports. A physically strong and enduring body was what one needed for efficient work,

therefore physical culture was proclaimed as the primary form of soviet pastime throughout one's life. The Soviet government set up various social institutions for physical culture promotion and consolidation (mass sports/athletic associations and societies, a system of children's sports schools and teams); a resource bases for mass athletics was formed (building stadiums, gyms and swimming pools, manufacture of sports gears, apparatus, clothes, etc.). All this, of course, promoted the value of physical health and helped its implementation. Athletic events and festivals, a systematic propaganda of mass sports and healthy life – that was what fueled mass enthusiasm for it and readiness to improve physically. In a situation of long working hours and a lack of financial resources to get one's own quality sports inventory and gear, large masses of ordinary people including children went in for mass sports.

Part of the physical culture was proper sport. Officially (according to the labour legislation) USSR had no professional sportsmen; prize money was regarded not as a salary but as a bonus. Sportsmen and women were recorded as manufacturing workers or managing personnel. Nevertheless, in Stalin's time and later, when Soviet sport was largely isolated from the outer world, the rare international competitions where the Soviets attended were equaled to large-scale political events on which the prestige of USSR somehow depended. A victory gained by a Soviet sportsmen or women was seen as a confirmation that the Party's policies were right, otherwise was a political defeat. Therefore, the training of big-sport professionals was for the Soviet government and Communist Party a very high priority.

6.3. Everyday Life and Leisure in USSR

A peculiar mixture of the official and unofficial, the exclusive and casual – has always been a characteristic feature of the traditional culture, particularly in its archaic version. The same holds, with certain limitations, for the totalitarian culture (in many a parameter overlapping with the former), which is the reason why we constantly find similar phenomena in its Soviet breed.

A totalitarian state, with its never ceasing attempts to standardize all and everything, the intricate and manifold texture of facts and artifacts, people and things, trends and tendencies, always tries to put the life of the ordinary man under control using physical and emotional coercion, with a view to closely unite

and tightly knit many individual lives into one single collective one. Such a life can't fail to be ordinary (due to its standardized condition) and at the same time unique; more exactly, its very uniqueness turns out to be its ordinariness, and vice versa. Heroic deeds become an indispensable component of life for everybody, while the title 'hero' is awarded according to appropriate procedure. One's right to being unique went solely to the leaders of the Soviet state. At that, it is a very peculiar uniqueness: instead of emphasizing the distance between the unique and the casual, it seems to try to remit this difference.

In virtue of Soviet ideology's spatial totality, we find in the Soviet culture the standard forms, which developed themselves, even for the unofficial types of human existence, i.e. for everyday life and leisure, together with the types of communication appropriate to them. Communication in the creative culture was of the two main versions: it could take place either between individuals (interpersonal communication) who represented none else but themselves, or between people representing groups (role communication). While in the traditional culture where people always represent a 'collective' there is no distance between their individual personalities and the 'personality' of the group (functional communication), so in the creative culture this distance is always present, as we already noted, either as a choice between behavioral scenarios, or as a simple reflection on the differences between the man and the society by which rules he abides. The Soviet state strove at all times to 'functionalize' communication, deprive it of its autotelicness and reduce to something auxiliary, i.e. to establish standardized relations between people and minimize such by dissolving them into the subject-object types of activity: at work or in communication. Social contacts between individual people as such (autotelic communication) always were a threat to the completeness of the Soviet culture, because they paved way for the degree of individual self-assertion that stroke right at the roots of the culture's totality.

The daily chores of an individual had no independent value in the Soviet culture and could not become a context for intersubjective relations. We already discussed the material side of Soviet life, surely not a value in itself and therefore not deserving any improvement. Soviet man lived in the context of a total limitation imposed on his consumer capacities, which (the limitation) was declared to be a value *per se* and viewed as a method of the so-called 'socialist thrift', i.e. it was a definitely positive although a provisional and

rather enforced aspect of Soviet life. Everyday routine, however, means not only things but also other people around. The Soviet humdrum, as a projection of the official culture, arose from a regular, measured working day and from the consequent leisure filled with political, sportive and festive activities. For each of the events they had a standard procedure, a scenario of its implementation which fitted it into the integral system of the Soviet culture and justified its existence ideologically. It seems quite acceptable to view 'Soviet leisure' as a continuation of the working day, with its industrial and ideological components, or as a preliminary stage for the next working day. Soviet holidays and games, in their turn, emphasized their labour-related contents. Even the New Year holiday was, although indirectly, linked to labour activities as a festivity that marked the unrestrained flow of time and which therefore celebrated labour achievements and the 'bright future' that was awaiting everybody. The collective 'soma' of the Soviet society did not suffer from the anguishes of its members, it never rejoiced *serio* over their delights either. Only the birth/death days of Soviet *fürers* were a legitimate cause for collective celebration or grief.

The privacy of a Soviet man, the phenomenon that on the one hand should not have existed and yet could not but come about and eventually did, was regulated in the most severe way being merely a version of the sole officially approved model. Normally the Soviet man did have an idea of the sense of his own life, of what the Soviet family and the Soviet 'collective' were/should be like, of what had to be done to become a full-fledged member of this group, all of which did not imply social contacting. Those who participated in such relations were not normal human personalities but the 'Soviet people', a special breed each of whom symbolically stood for the whole society. As I already noted before, even the dissenters' counter-culture – in virtue of its auxiliary in relation to the official one – could not shape the social contacts of its members beyond the framework a certain fixed layout or scheme that was based on the same soviet worldview with its classical opposition: a fellow creature is either 'brother-in-arms' or 'foe'. I.e. not a unique personality whose significance is irreducible to his/her social role of function, but a technically designated 'individual', positive or negative, who only performs a role or function. Even kindred relations between siblings, children and parents, spouses were seen to be determined by the same sort of patterns.

It should be noted, however, that as the Soviet society progressed, the totality of its control over an individual life rather shrank than expanded, which was due not to the weakening of the repressive function of the state, but to the growth of education and self-consciousness of the people which was predetermined by modernization and its laws. Step by step, a distance appeared and then widened between the official norms and the posture of an individual person, which gave birth to private life as a social phenomenon. This privacy, as a form, needed some filling and found it in creativity, social contacts/communication, housekeeping. By late 1970ies, the share of privacy in one's life overgrew all sorts of Soviet officiality. Of course, the official culture was retained, and widely at that, in many if not all spheres of life, but individuals had learned to adapt it to their particular needs and to distance themselves from it, which fact found expression in an ironic attitude or conscious conformism.

The years 1970 – 1980 was the period when the Soviet culture effectively lost its inherent unity, i.e. fell into a slow disintegration. Self-assertion of the 'private man' gradually entered the Soviet culture as its component thus perplexing and changing it. Remarkably enough, the Soviet ideology was 'psychologizing' itself; the experiences and feelings of an individual, his/her love, search for a sense of life, etc., were rehabilitated; the former 'industrial' emphasis inherent in the Soviet culture shifted and received a more intimate, humane interpretation thus becoming not so much the 'sense/goal' of human activity as its 'context', which all was utterly impossible under Stalin when private life was an outlaw driven deep underground.

7. SOVIET ART AND SCIENCE

For our analysis of the Soviet art and science in this chapter, I shall proceed along the lines of the methodology once put forward by Prof. M.S. Kagan and intended to be used for characterization of artifacts expressed in a tangible form. Each such artifact is a 'physical' structure with 'spiritual' contents (primarily axiological); in addition to this artifact is the result of a socially organized activity. Its very existence entails that both the creator and recipient of the value are already here or should be provided (trained/taught) for this end. Because even scientific knowledge in the Soviet culture had a weighty axiological component to it, our analysis of science can have the same structure as that of art.

7.1. Soviet Art: Forms and Substances

Art is a way in which one takes a holistic stance towards the world around; it can also be called 'replication of the world' as the process results in producing a small 'copy' of it. Integrity of art is a very special 'organic' one. Integrity of an artifact is expressed not simply in that each of its components is an indispensable and inseparable aspect of the whole without which the latter can't be. A piece of art even if it is the image of only a fragment of the world, relates itself to the actuality in whole, emphasizes the most characteristic features of it and reconstructs its axiological design. The meaning of an artistic image (principally its axiological component) cannot be revealed in the form of a certain axiom. This sort of definiteness can be contained solely in how the image is interpreted by the recipient: in his peculiar completion of the author's drafts and hints, development of potential understandings, which all have been provoked by the image. It is due to the indefiniteness, interconnectedness of the components and a relation to the whole world, that the integrity of an artistic image comes possible. Its indefiniteness is never remitted or annulled, although it can be reduced to a minimum. Where it disappears together with it goes art itself, by transforming itself into some other form of human culture.

Art, as an independent class of artifacts, shaped itself only in the context of the creative culture. In the traditional one there was a synthesis of artifacts that accumulated in one type of activity – religion – a multitude of other ones, primarily such significant human accomplishments as cognition, evaluation and art. Religion and art have been in a very complicated interplay all along. The key constituents of religion – myth, ritual, holy books and holy traditions – display the 'substantive integrity' (i.e. integrity of their contents) that is characteristic only of artistic images. This precluded any possibility of a rational interpretation of many a doctrine of religious teachings (since such interpretation is inapplicable to artistic imagery), but determined the significance of each and any individual construal, at the same time moving it away from finality. What religion also created were traditions of how its artistic images ought to be interpreted, thus limiting individual freedom in this aspect but not cancelling it altogether. It was religious art with its emotionality, anthropomorphism, availability (that was largely higher than that of science, e.g., as the latter required years and years of preparation simply to understand its findings) that made religious events the property of wide masses of people.

In the creative culture all this underwent a change. Art had ceased to serve ideology or religion, though not drifting too far away as it reflected in itself the whole world within which it existed. At the same time, the possible ways in which artistic imagery could be interpreted had steered clear of external regulation or censorship, and thus its complexity had risen exceedingly, which made many an artifact unavailable (incomprehensible) to a majority of recipients. The attitude in art that always demanded 'unique results' led to the stratification of art into the mass and the elitist. The mass art virtually ceased to be art as such; it focused on the average needs of an ordinary man, on entertaining or threatening, inspiring passions, offering a rather simple way to grasp the sense of one's life. Such art was the expression of certain ideological and axiological attitudes.

The Soviet art began to shape itself as a typical, even a radical form of the creative culture, with various modernist and futurological experiments. It asserted its authenticity at the background of the total negation of the 'old regime's art'.

After consolidation of totalitarianism, however, the status quo changed principally. The complexity of artistic modernism did not fit into the totalitarian simplistic integrity of culture that entailed that the art served the ideology. In the Soviet totalitarian society, the elitist culture was impossible and only the mass art was accepted, whose main characteristics was not so much that it focused on the ordinary man and his world (although it also came to occur; it was this goal to make art available to the mass public that can explain the fact that the Soviet art stuck so faithfully to realism), as that it guided itself by a specific ideology first and foremost. In art, the form is always intimately interrelated with the substance, being in a way a derivative of the latter; on the other hand, the form is an important aspect in itself (both the material used for artistic imagery and the latter's peculiarity can be likewise ascribed to the form and to the contents). At the same time, we can and have to be able to clearly differentiate between the form and the substance. Despite their interrelatedness, they are situated at different distances from the world expressed or rather depicted by art. The substance of imagery is the closest while the form is primarily a way of creating an autonomous artistic entity.

The socialist realism officially proclaimed as the only allowed artistic method was a sheer propaganda (There is a classical work on socialist realism in particular and on totalitarian art in general, a book that

comprehensively and convincingly demonstrates the substance, forms and institutions of the artistic culture in USSR, PRC and Nazi Germany under totalitarianism: Golomshtok, 1994; See also: Gunter, Dobrenko *Ed.*, 2000). Realism is what makes art a mass social phenomenon, it is the product of the world's rationalization which is one of the key properties of the creative culture. Realism is so widely available exactly due to its rationality, and it is primarily the form that undergoes rationalizations. Realistic imagery is distinct and definite, displays somatic and psychic concreteness, historicity and a consistent correlation with the historical time and space. It is also standard; its model is a rational notion of the aspect of reality being depicted or expressed. Such were the majority of Soviet artistic images. However, socialist realism expressed not only the reality but also the ideology, which brings it together with the symbolism of the traditional culture. Like the form, the substance of socialist realism's imagery was very specific and definite; still it was primarily the result of both rationalization and the ideology, with a focus on emotionality and faith, so this definiteness lay not in the architectonics and temporality, but in the subject matter and axiological contents of a piece of art.

Art must serve the people. Already from Aristotle's *Poetics* we know that art depicts or expresses not what has really been but what could or ought to have been. What socialist realism offers is this 'pure' reality and not the historical one. The subject matter or socialist art is in full conformity with the axiological worldview of the Soviet culture. This is art that tells us of a new – the fair and correct – society and of a new man who, through sacrifice of time, labour and even life, is erecting the edifice of universal happiness. This art can sing of hardship but not defeat, of 'optimistic tragedies' but not of doubts. Such an art is clear and plain, emotionally elevated and available to wide masses of people. It invites one to make a concrete choice in favour of the system of values it represents and promotes.

The subject matter and axiology of the Soviet art implied a rigid hierarchy of genres, art types and styles. The choice of material for artistic images and the latter's specific characteristics were also strictly regulated. The leading types of art were now those addressing a mass audience, esthetically elevated and most fully rendering the appropriate ideology. Literature was able to openly name the things their names, formulate the proletarian values and thus fulfill the social order it was given. Cinematography as a less intellectual but incomparably more popular art also

allowed the illiterate people to learn about the tasks the Party and Government set before them. Monumental sculpture and architecture, solemn music created a necessary emotional disposition in the viewers or listeners, prepared the Soviet man for future heroic deeds, clearly demonstrated the scale and elevation of the grand socialist goals that were to be attained.

Monumentalism is the key genre-based component of the Soviet Art. Large forms were on the top levels of the art hierarchy. In literature there were epic multi-volume novels ("And Quiet Flows the Don" by M. Sholokhov, "Transfiguration of Russia" by S.Sergeev-Tsensky, "The Rods" by F.Panferov, etc.). In architecture – giant buildings in the so-called 'Stalin's Empire Style' that were incorporated into the system of similarly grandiose urban ensembles of streets and squares. In sculpture we find enormous statues like V.Mukhina's famous "Motherland". In music most popular were symphonies and operas. Revival of large realistic and classicistic art forms was accompanied by their hyperbolization and filling with the new proletarian substance. At that, the less significant (middle and lower) genres stylistically and thematically were very close to the high-ranking ones.

Summing up our brief analysis of the Soviet art, I have to note that the above characteristics were relevant only in the cases when art as such was effectively reduced to the 'servant of the ideology'. If, however, a true artistic value was created, even having the form and contents in full conformity with the socialist realism dogmas, what we witness in these cases is *axiological ambivalence* that allows us to construe such pieces of art both as *official* and at the same time *anti-soviet*. This can be said of all the major works of the most 'true' Soviet art. Thus, "And Quiet Flows the Don" by M.Sholokhov, "Foundation Pit" by A.Platonov, collage drawings by A.Deineka, music by D.Shostakovitch and I.Dunayevsky not so much asserted the Soviet values as questioned their true substance and scale. Artistic activity has always been related to value-orientation not as its derivative but as form to substance.

7.2. Artistic Work vs. Perception of Art: Institutions

Particularly important for totalitarian art was its communicative component. In the Soviet culture, with its manifest social focus, the crucial role was given to appropriate social institutions. Artistic communication was no exclusion to the rule and underwent a thorough institutionalization.

Artistic communication is the procedural aspect of art that necessarily comes about together with the emergence of the form/substance of an artifact. The process is a two-way technology to produce a piece of art: artistic communication is directed towards its artifact either from the side of the author or that of the recipient. In the first case the process is called 'creative work', in the second – 'perception of art'. The creative work's result is a *piece of art*, that of perception is an *aesthetic object*. The first outcome differs from the second in its fullness and objectivity, i.e. a piece of art contains some objective substance that is related to the esthetic object as to a stimulus for its organization, and therefore works as a trigger for the process of its creation. On the other hand, the esthetic object is the end point of the process which, nevertheless, strips the starting stimulus of its objective contents because it depends on subjective traits of the recipient in whose perception does occur the actual building of the final interpretation of the piece of art.

In philosophy and arts history, the relation between the esthetic object and the piece of art has been thoroughly studied. Two important concepts were introduced in the scholarly use, with an appropriated background research: the 'function of the author' and the 'function of the recipient' (Bart, 1983; See also: Dokuchaev, 1999; Ingarden, 1962; Foucault, 1996). In the traditional culture, a piece of art was organized in a manner that the freedom of its interpretations within the framework of the aesthetic object was minimal. As a result, the author often acted 'on behalf' of a group or tradition, or hid behind authoritative pseudonyms. An example of this is the medieval work "Areopagitics" whose authorship was attributed to one of the New Testament characters.

In the creative culture, the predominance of the author over the recipient holds out; however, the relations between a piece of art and aesthetic object are changed radically. The right to construe the substance of art is handed over to the recipient, which complicates the contents and makes it less definite, less conformant with standards and models. Thus, one might argue (in respect of what we considered above concerning the types of existence of totalitarian culture and artistic communication) that the Soviet culture endeavored to give creative culture artifacts the properties of the traditional one. This meant not only the rise of the socialist realism's dogma which regulated specific requirements to the form and contents of Soviet art, but also setting up appropriate institutions devoted to artistic work and perception of

art as activities. Creativity turned out to be focused on authorities and traditions, while perception was largely limited in its freedom of interpretation. The author again took control over the recipient, and the distance between the art object and the aesthetical object dropped to minimum.

To the institutions that nurtured 'socialist creativity' belonged special colleges and universities where future writers, actors, composers, artists and architects got their professional degrees, and also respective artistic associations. Tertiary art schools addressed their teaching to both 'creators' *per se* and to ideologically indoctrinated 'fighters for the victory of the socialist cause'. In the academic courses of aesthetics, arts history, history of the Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist philosophy and 'scientific communism', future artists were provided an explanation for what the 'true sense and goals' of their creative work were, and instructed in what both the accepted artistic values and anti-values should be.

Artistic associations had particular importance for the shaping of socialist realism creativity and control over such. I.N.Golomshtok in one of his works wrote: "the most ominous thing to all these totalitarian 'artists' unions' was their universal compulsoriness: it was only on becoming member of one of these that an artist was given the right to pursue his professional occupation" (Golomshtok, 1994, 94 – 95). Unofficial creativity was a phenomenon wholly alien to the system. Those departing from the rule were pro/persecuted or had to work in secret. Physical extermination of artists, violence against freedom of expression were very characteristic of the Soviet culture.

The loyal, the faithful, those in conformity with the rules and requirements were treated more than kindly and got variously stimulated, e.g. by honorary titles such as Honoured Artist of the USSR or a constituent national republic, etc. Officially accepted writers, artists, etc. were granted state awards and prizes, admitted to various government-funded benefits: free of charge cars, country cottages, healthcare opportunities, food and leisure; they were provided opportunities to publish their books or stage their theatrical plays, etc., etc., regardless of respective public demand or interest. Naturally, circulation of million copies' of their books and pictures, massive radio and TV broadcasting, theatrical productions and film showings, lavish advertising – all this often made such artists highly if undeservedly popular (if we take into account their artistic value); i.e. market demand for this art was not

only the object of total control but simultaneously its own result. On the other hand, mass demand for a piece of art is what is quite difficult to control and suppress by official means, which became clear when the mass consumer of art in the USSR (often due to accidental concurrence of circumstance) would gain access to an art object that was inconsistent with the system and prohibited by censorship: it often became truly popular despite all and any suppression.

How art was perceived by Soviet people was the Soviet power's constant concern, although controlling perception processes (the 'consumer') turned out to be much harder than that of artistic creativity (the 'producer'). First, because the former was related to the whole wealth of world and domestic values of art, while the latter took place *hic and nunc*. In order to hold, control and hopefully limit arts perception, they had to withdraw from the scene or jugulate the art values most harmful to the socialist ideology. A notion of the 'prohibited artists' emerged, under which heading were categorized both those who openly opposed the soviet culture and those whose works could be construed as rather inconsistent with the formal and substantial parameters of the official value system. The history of the world culture was literally cleansed of many names and entire historical periods; thus a true scarecrow was made of Middle Ages because the spirit of this epoch did not agree whatsoever with the Modern Time atheism, and it reminded people of the recent past of Russia.

Institutionalization of art perception was implemented in a range of areas and along many a course. First, the system of education received a number of appropriate new disciplines. The key emphasis was laid on the secondary school's course of literature where the choice of literary works and authors was always determined not only according to aesthetical criteria but largely by the ideology. The methods of studying a literary work, analyzing it, too, were to solve ideological tasks; instead of revealing the aesthetic aspects of literature they reduced interpretation to finding out the ideological substance i.e. the legal socialist values in the contents of a work, which often entailed falsifying the gist and essence of the text (That this path could sometimes be gone too far was vividly demonstrated by literary critic V.I. Nepomnyashchy who recalled the absurdity of labelling XIX c. poet Alexander Pushkin a revolutionary by virtue of one of his poems beginning in "October has already come..." (cf. 'October 1917 revolution')). This was conceived to be the way of implanting the 'right

artistic flair/taste' in the society. That said, let's not forget that due to the multifaceted and multilayered nature of a true piece of art we can't reduce it to a primitive schema; it always breaks free and turns out to be more complicated than any foreseeable human interpretation thus translating to the recipient 'unaccounted for' values and offering a wide range of potential understandings.

The second in significance institution for control and formation of artistic perception was art criticism, the aesthetics, the history and theory of art. Each artifact underwent an ideological consideration and discussion as part of the criticism. Literary and criticism periodicals, arts history journals and even newspapers published critical reviews. Art criticism had an advantage over scholarship as the former did not have to care for finding plausible arguments and could without much ado express someone's opinion on how works of art corresponded to the system of the soviet values or didn't. As for the past, this task was taken over by popular science literature. The study of an art history was extremely ideologized and, again, aimed at finding out the 'ideological sense' of a work of art. And remember: if scholarship in the Soviet times managed to remain itself and keep at a distance from ideology, the official Soviet ideological schemata were either refuted or cast serious doubts upon, because we can't discuss values rationally in the context which demands a 'belief' in them.

Finally, another social institution designed to cultivate the 'correct' Soviet creativity and art perception were competitions, exhibitions and festivals. Such events could clearly demonstrate the official system of artistic values be it the direct display of 'models' and 'standards' at shows and festivals or demonstrating conformity to the etalons at creativity competitions. A particular importance was given to international events of this sort which allowed the Soviets to emphasize the significance of the 'Soviet (i.e. socialist) art' if compared with the 'bourgeois' one. The comparison criteria also were consistently ideological rather than aesthetical.

7.3. Soviet Scholarship and its the Substance

Science in the USSR was characterized by a series of characteristics that were cardinally at variance with the gist and essence of *cognition* as it is.

The key objective of cognition is a theoretical explanation and description of an object in question,

ideally – representation of the *essence* of the object and of its relations to other objects of the universe, its schema and structure (the set of components and their respective roles), its work in an appropriate environment. The object already known can be put to use and its behavior foreseen. The practical aspect of cognition results has always been very important but its true goal – the TRUTH – may not have an actual practical value. In culture history, cognition was assessed differently at different times varying with respect to the dominant type of values. The imaginative and practical types of cognition were prevalent in the structure of the archaic traditional culture, and were part of the appropriate mythology and practical or, as N.Ya.Marr aptly formulated, ‘work-magical’ activity. The medieval or agricultural traditional culture, with its religiosity, incorporated abstract theoretical cognition in its arsenal, too, in order to provide its values with a rational substantiation. Under the conditions of the creative culture, cognition became independent from the value-orientational activity, i.e. the former came very close to its own theoretical ‘substance’.

Within totalitarian ideological synthesis, cognition was subjected to axiology, at least in part, because its full subjection was already impossible due to the former’s significant differentiation and a weighty methodology, the latter two having been the result of a long evolution. Differentiation of cognition was what allowed people to single out the spheres of it that were essentially very far from axiology. But even these spheres of knowledge, for instance natural sciences, occasionally found themselves involved, sometimes in a very bizarre way, in the orbit in the Soviet ideology. On the face of it, natural sciences study specific objects by specific methods totally autonomous from value judgements. However, we know examples of the opposite: even today we are witnessing hot debates of whether cloning, using stem cells from human fetus, or interfering with the human genome can be considered fully ethical methods of science. This only confirms that science is part of culture, and in this status it is vulnerable outwardly; still, the contemporary value-related debates do not seem to be substantive for cognition, i.e. do not enter into the structure of its results.

On the other hand, in the context of the totalitarian ideological synthesis, ideology not only limits cognition by forbidding or permitting it to choose the methods and objects of study, but also inserts its components in the results of knowledge and thus directs the latter towards obtaining the ideologically necessary product.

This is the way how the idea of class struggle penetrated the fields of knowledge that were quite distant from social relations, like the theory of natural selection and inheritance, or cybernetics.

The harshest ideological coercion befell humanities and social science. Some university disciplines and fields of study were simply eliminated as unnecessary because they strove to objectively and impartially study ideology and existence linked to the latter. This was the reason why neither cultural studies nor axiology or philosophy and sociology were present in the USSR for quite a long time. Philosophy departments were reopened only after the WWII, while their methods and contents of education looked very much like in pre-revolutionary religions seminaries. Dogmatism became a key characteristic of the method of Soviet philosophy. Scientific doubt was out of question altogether. Students and scholars had to master a range of simple dogmas pertaining rather to a philosophical belief (such as primacy of matter, or the three laws of dialectics), along with supporting illustrations, and to mercilessly curse the ‘enemies of the truly scientific outlook’.

Thus, the Marxist-Leninist teaching (historical and dialectical materialism) came to be an ideological substitute for scientific philosophy, while the Marxist-Leninist political economy (scientific communism) turned out to be a surrogate for and projection of Soviet values onto sociology, political science and economics. Certain fields of humanities and social&cultural studies were preserved but carried the ‘birthmark’ of Soviet values as their most important characteristic. In addition to references to the classics of Marxism-Leninism or the decisions of Communist Party congresses, to mentions of the works by Soviet leaders (an essential component of a scholarly work), through which the author could express his/her loyalty to the existing ideology, such disciplines as history, philology, arts history and theory had to interpret their subject matter from a certain position: Each mental phenomenon was accounted for by the appropriate historical conditions of the tangible culture and the social&economic relations derived from it; even when explaining such self-sufficient phenomena as objects of art these relations came to the fore. All that appeared to be able to be stretched along the Procrustean bed of Soviet ideology –was proclaimed as ‘progressive’, all the other things that did not fit were labelled ‘reactionist’ and unworthy of study. The whole history of man, society and culture had been rewritten and ideologized even in their most remote and bygone periods; on the other hand, the peak of cross

dependence between history and ideology fell on the Soviet times.

We should also note that the Soviet science, in addition to solving ideological problems, always aimed at being in conformance with the practical needs of economy and at covering all the fields of knowledge; i.e. it strove to be *fundamental*. Despite its clearly expressed utilitarianism, Soviet science did not discard the study of phenomena that seemed not to offer quick and nice economic outcome.

Various and multiple research institutes, museums, libraries, laboratories and proving grounds were set up; lavish funds were allotted to R&D, scientific literature was published widely. Many a large plant or factory had its own experimental grounds, laboratories and design engineering bureaus. Industrial patents and invention certificates were granted to inventors and rationalizers who had very little to do with scientific work proper. Unfortunately, many inventions and scientific outcomes were left without practical application due to the Soviet economy's 'planned' management and to the sluggish administrative-command system that ran it. Innovations took root very slowly and with difficulty. The adopted plans and programs got corrected even if the outcomes would have been largely improved and increased thanks to such modernization.

We also have to take into account the focus that the Soviet science placed on the war industry that had to provide both for the own army and for the forces of other socialist regimes. The task of meeting the needs of an ordinary man was no priority for the Soviet science and never gained any specific funding.

7.4. Soviet Scientific Institutions

Institutionally, the Soviet science was a consistently structured one, which expressed itself in the system of specialist/researcher education and training and in the hierarchy of academic statuses and degrees that were designed to define the level of skills and professionalism. Primary, secondary and tertiary education plus post-graduate studies was an opportunity for scientists to get appropriate certificates, degrees and diplomas: Specialist, PhD and Doctor of Science. The academic degrees of Associate Professor, Senior Researcher, Professor, Corresponding and Full Academician of the Central Academy of Sciences and sectoral academies, the rigid hierarchy of posts corresponding to the academic degrees – all this practically compared this system of honours to that in the army. Besides, research

institutes might have either central or regional status and corresponding subordination; their work was controlled by the government bodies in charge of science. And only the Academy itself, at least prior to its moving from Leningrad to Moscow, managed to preserve some sort of independence.

As any other Soviet social institution, the academic community was controlled by the Party and its repressive agencies; the very contents of R&D, of fundamental studies was severely checked up against the dominant ideology. Classical works on philosophy and methodology of science (See works by Alexandre Koyré, Thomas Kuhn and others: Kuhn, 1977) demonstrate how important is the role of scholarly communities in the development of scientific knowledge even in the context where no direct ideological pressure is to be felt. The Soviet science, at that, was critically dependent on the collective opinion of the scholarly community, so that research findings were determined not by the experience or logic of scientific cognition, but by the community whose guidance in work, in their turn, was the prevalent value system where 'truth' and 'value' were not differentiated.

Under Josef Stalin as in later periods of the Soviet power, science had the same social status as other institutions. But isolationism in research and knowledge, as was decided by USSR's global policies, was the more harmful as research findings cannot be 'texted ad the table' as works of art are. Scientific results always have a strongly pronounced social character: while produced by some people they need to be confirmed and further developed by others. XX century witnessed increasing secrecy over R&D in many countries due to its strategic military implications; in the first socialist land of proletarians and peasants this clandestineness was total. Studies or traineeships/fellowships abroad, participation in international conferences were 100% banned for Soviet researchers. On account of this isolationism and the pressure of ideology, we find among the papers of Soviet scientists of that period the vivid examples of shameful ignorance and foolishness apt to compromise Russian science before the world; yet, there were results and inventions capable of being ranked among the accomplishments of scientific knowledge. However, it was only after Stalin's death that first Russian physicists were nominated for the Nobel Prize and finally got it.

If international recognition was lacking, within its own borders the Soviet régime made continuous

attempts to offset this situation. Government awards and state prizes were lavishly shed on researchers particularly those concerned with arms/military R&D. The classified, obscure status of many a prominent mind in the country was made up for by their colossal influence and the material comfort provided by the government and unseen by their fellow countrymen. Not rare was posthumous acknowledgement and remembrance, erection of monuments, giving one's name to settlements, streets, even stars in the sky. The disobedient ones were eliminated – quite plausibly for ideological struggle. The huge harms and losses caused to science and economy by this repression was no deterrence to new arrests and executions (we remember the names of such outstanding scientists as N.I.Vavilov, P.A.Florensky and thousands other killed, and D.S.Likhachev, S.P.Korolev and more and more ones repressed and spending decades in Stalin's concentration camps).

During 1930ies – 1950ies the work of an individual scientist could not take place outside the ideological framework; no research findings had independent significance beyond the world struggle of the proletariat for the victory of communism in the USSR and everywhere. Search for the truth was not seen as a legal scientific goal. Social prestige attached to science was rather low if compared with industrial labour; it was only in the time of the scientific and technological revolution of the 1960ies that education and R&D became more important and respected, yet, the wage/royalties levels were left unaffected by this otherwise positive development. In the USSR, a scientific finding, someone's labour/work and his/her intellect – all was public domain. The ideological equality, the equality of results of labour were in fact implemented in the country, although the actual material inequality remained the birth trauma of the fairest society in world history. This also holds true for the scientific community where financial divide was determined by the degree to which one participated in the solution of most important political and economic tasks set by the Party.

8. CONCLUSION

To sum up, I would like to note that despite the sketchy exposition of this paper, which can't always take into account the whole diversity of life, our model of the Soviet culture is what allows us to outline its key components that were seminal for its history in the XX c. Most consistently and logically this model was implemented in 1930 – 1950ies.

The totalitarian culture is one of the crucial stages of the crisis of the values of creative culture; changes to the latter result in making attempts to revive the traditional culture which never brings success; in spite of that a 'conservative modernization' takes place. The Soviet industrialization was a form of such modernization, while a new town was one of its key components. The rise of the town was determined by axiological and praxeological considerations.

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